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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Residents of Cochabamba, a Bolivian village, spent three years digging a hundred and
twelve-meter-deep well that supplied fresh water to two hundred and ten families. Five years
after its completion, they were informed that the country’s political leadership, led by the
president, had sold the country’s entire water rights (including rain water) to a consortium, via
the World Bank.1 Said consortium informed the village of plans to install meters on all water
sources (paid for by customers) and charge a fee for all water sources.2
This is an example of the sort of problem that falls under the broad category of global
injustice.3 Sweat-shops, human trafficking, the marginalization of indigenous groups, as well as
global poverty, are other examples of global injustice. Such social problems are termed ‘transnational’ because the physical locations in which they manifest and the places where they
originate are usually located in more than one political unit.4 The ‘trans-national’ nature of such
social problems is what elevates them from ‘social’ justice issues to ‘global’ justice issues.

Paul Laverty, “Even the Rain” (Spanish: También la lluvia), DVD, directed by Iciar Bollain. Los Angeles,
CA: Vitagraph Films, 2010.
1

2
William Finnegan, “Leasing the Rain,” The New Yorker, April 8, 2002, accessed February 10, 2017,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/04/08/leasing-the-rain

For other examples see, Tim Worstall, “The Outrage of Child Labor in Bangladesh's Sweatshops,” Forbes,
December 19, 2016, accessed February 13, 2017, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/12/19/the-outrageof-child-labour-in-bangladeshs-sweatshops/#5ed55cc47b58. Elizabeth Day, “The Desperate Plight of Africa's
Cotton Farmers,” The Guardian, November 14, 2010, accessed February 13, 2017,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/14/mali-cotton-farmer-fair-trade
3

4

Nancy Fraser, “Identity, Exclusion, and Critique: A Response to Four Critics,” European Journal of

1

2
In this project, I argue for the position that the required changes to institutions and
practices that will address cases of global injustice must be grounded on a strong negative duty.
Furthermore, generating such a duty will require looking beyond duties that attach to particular
institutions or practices, to the inter-subjective relations between moral agents. Some of the
questions I raise include: Is there a relationship between the persons who maintain and benefit
from the global economic and financial order and those who suffer as a result of this order? If so,
what is the nature of such relationships? What role does inter-subjectivity play within
asymmetrical power relations, even when distance and numerous layers of causation mediate
such relations?5
Freedom as Non-Domination
The possession of autonomous agency is what makes human beings persons. This feature
is also what makes a moral agent entitled to the respect of all other moral agents. Therefore,
respect for personhood entails respect for autonomous agency. This makes it wrong for a moral
agent to express his or her agency in a way that leads to a restriction in the ability of another
moral agent’s ability to express his or her own agency. When a moral agent’s actions lead to
such results, the first acting agent has thereby dominated the restricted agent. I define such a
situation as the domination of the second actor by the first.
Although non-domination is the most basic duty all persons have and owe others, living
with others in a social community means that the actions and desires of others will inevitably

Political Theory 6, No. 3 (2007): 317.
‘Layers of causation’ points to the fact that even more than social justice issues, global justice problems
result from decisions made by many separate individuals, in many cases working in various institutions and located
in at least two countries.
5
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restrict at least some of the actions we might desire to take. Such restrictions could be just or
unjust. Injustice arises when an autonomous agent expresses his or her agency in a manner that
leads to the inhibition or restriction of the freedom of others, and the restricted party has no veto
power or room for reasonable dissent. Whether through action or by inaction, without the
restricted party having been provided the option of a veto power based on reasonable dissent, all
such interactions are cases of domination against the restricted party.
For a restriction to be justified, the one who is restricted must either explicitly agree to it,
or the restriction should be such that it could be reasonably justifiable to him or her. The
condition of implicit or tacit consent implies that in an ideal situation, persons will be able to
predict, anticipate and veto restrictions if they so choose. Restrictions to the agency of persons
that do not meet these conditions violates the personhood of the restricted party.
I see social and global injustice as the result of the expression of human agency in a
manner that leads to restrictions on the ability of others to express autonomous agency – I define
this as domination. Whether inter- or intra-country, such domination are violations of the basic
duty to respect the agency of others, and are on that basis, unjust. 6 Addressing global injustice,
therefore, requires that the negative duty not to harm others, particularly in their active pursuit of
resources necessary for living a minimally decent human life, be respected by acting on
obligations to protect against and redress the harm that could result from intersubjective
domination.

6
In this project, I do not go into the debate of the relationship between rights and duties or whether a right
entails a duty or duty bearer.
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Civic Republican Non-Domination
To the civic republicans, interference from others is not a problem in itself, except when it
is arbitrary – when the agent interfered with is unable to predict how, when or if he or she will be
interfered with. Republican freedom as non-domination is different from traditional conceptions
of liberty as either positive or negative freedom. The difference between the positive and
negative conceptions of freedom is that while positive freedom is a person’s ability to exercise
self-control or self-mastery,7 negative freedom is freedom as non-interference.8 These two
conceptions of freedom can also be differentiated by the fact that they generate two different, but
interrelated duties. Respecting a person's negative freedom from non-interference calls for the
negative duty not to interfere with the person, as well as the duty to protect the person’s right not
to be interfered with. This implies a positive duty to act and even interfere (to restrict every
person’s negative freedom) by creating a legal system.
However, both conceptions of liberty (taken separately), are limited. Positive liberty is
limited because it does not contain a clear explanation of what self-mastery entails and therefore
cannot tell us when a person is operating under self-mastery. Negative liberty is also limited
because a person could be subject to arbitrary power without interference (as in the case of an

To Isaiah Berlin, people are free simply to the extent that their choices are not interfered with. See Isaiah
Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford on 31 October
1958” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
7

There remains the question of what exactly, self-mastery entails. Frankfurt argues that self-mastery is the
ability to meet one’s second order desires. See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person,” The Journal of Philosophy 68, No. 1 (1971): 5-20, accessed January 20, 2017. doi: 10.2307/2024717.
8
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absent or benign master); a person could also be interfered with, without such interference being
arbitrary (as in the case of people who live under a democratically convened constitution).9
The civic republican conception of freedom is superior to both conceptions of freedom
because it incorporates elements of both negative and positive liberty. The condition that all
interference should be predictable means that to the civic republican, any interference that cannot
be reasonably anticipated by its victim is wrong. To them, holding such a power over another is
morally objectionable, no matter how benign the power holder chooses to be, or even if he or she
chooses not to act on the capacity. In addition, in the civic republican view, a violation of the
right to non-domination could arise as much from the action of others as through their inaction.
Furthermore, one is not either free or unfree, but rather, more or less free depending on the extent
of non-domination one securely enjoys.
I do not agree with the civic republican position which takes predictable interference as
justified interference.10 By making justifiability dependent on predictability, it skips an
important middle step between the two concepts. This conception of non-domination assumes
but does not articulate the condition that justice requires that room for reasonable disagreement
with the actor be available to the restricted party. I defend a modified, cosmopolitan, civic

9
Philip Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower,” Ethics 106, No. 3 (1996): 576-604, accessed January 20, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382272

Consider a situation in which a state does not permit woman to drive, and for various reasons, women are
not permitted to contest this law. Although as a woman I could reliably predict such a law, lacking the option of
reasonable dissent will make me experience the law as arbitrary, in the sense of it not being justified or justifiable to
me. Therefore, despite my ability to predict this law, in the absence of the room for reasonable dissent, the law
remains unjustified, and unjustifiable. Those who maintain such laws are thereby subjecting me to an arbitrary
power.
10
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republican conception of freedom as non-domination or independence from arbitrary power.11 I
modify the civic republican conception of non-domination by adding the condition that just
interference requires the option of reasonable dissent, and that a veto right must be available to
those that are interfered with.
Global Justice as Non-Domination
Victims of domination live under the threat of an “alien power” denying them the
possibility of, or limiting the extent to which they are able to express agency.12 This is the case
whether the alien power is domestic or international. The civic republican conception of freedom
as non-domination was developed to defend the interests of citizens against arbitrary state
interference. It was assumed to apply to a political unit, made up of citizens who live under one
legal system. But if the expression of agency is a universal human good, and all human
interactions bear the risk of domination, then the goal of minimizing domination wherever it
occurs should be a normative goal in all social, as well as global justice theorizing.
Pettit argues that although it is generally presumed that social goods are equally available
to all members of society, in modern societies, a social resource could be generally, but not
effectively available to some parties. A social resource is effective to a person to the extent that
the person is able to utilize or access such a resource.13 The ability to utilize social resources is

11
Frank Lovett, “Republicanism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), ed.
Edward N. Zalta, accessed February 14, 2017, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/republicanism/

Cécile Laborde, “Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch,” European Journal of Political Theory 9,
No. 1 (2010): 60.
12

A social resource is ‘effective’ to a person, only to the extent that she is able to utilize it. For instance,
although it could be said that political power is available to all citizens of a modern society, this social ‘good’ is only
available to those who do not face (social or economic) restrictions that can bar them from utilizing the political
process. See Philip Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower,” Ethics 106, No. 3 (1996): 589.
13
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also not just positively related, but also symbiotic to levels of social power.14 Furthermore,
different levels of social power create or at least exacerbates and sustains relations of social
domination. If this is correct, it would seem to apply to the global level as well – disparities in
effective access to social resources will also lead to relations of domination.
In the global arena, international agencies, multinational corporations and international
NGOs wield far more social power relative to most people affected by their actions. Such
organizations are not subject to the demands of political accountability which legal systems
demand from similar organizations within bounded political communities. These two factors –
disparity in social power and lack of accountability – contribute to the existence of both benign
and non-benign forms of domination in the global arena. This would make civic republican
arguments applicable to global injustice as well.
Writers like Cécil Laborde have proposed that republican freedom as non-domination
should be the cornerstone of global justice theorizing. Laborde frames global injustice as a
problem of ‘capability denying’ distributive injustice.15 She sees the global poor as people who,
despite the willingness and ability to work, live under global financial and economic institutions
that inhibit their ability to gain access to enough material resources to lead a minimally decent
life. She attributes this to “complex new forms of unchecked arbitrary power exercised across
national borders,” which makes the global poor vulnerable to decisions made from afar,

To Pettit, a person’s social power is determined by how much social resources the person is able to
‘effectively’ access. Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower,” 589.
14

“Let me simply posit, then, that domination is capability-denying in two senses: definition ally, it denies a
basic interest in minimum control and autonomy on the part of individuals and the political communities they belong
to; and normatively, those forms of domination which threaten access to basic socioeconomic capabilities such as
subsistence and health are a matter of particular moral concern.” Ibid, 56.
15
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anonymously, and over which they have little control.16 She sees this as an “evil of transnational
domination” perpetuated by states, corporations, and international organizations. Such relations
are based on domination and dependency since they preclude reciprocity and mutual benefit.17
Laborde finds “the combination of the absolute destitution of the global poor with gross
inequalities of power and resources between them and the better-off” of the current world order
morally shocking.18 However, she is careful not to argue for a stronger (and less plausible) idea
of global (material) equality, but rather for a sufficiency, gap-reducing ideal of justice.19 She
hopes that such a goal would help mitigate the kind of extreme lack that “undermines the sense
of dignity and self-respect of the poor.” 20
To Laborde, the global poor are being dominated by those responsible for designing and
sustaining global economic and financial institutions, because the poor have little or no realistic
options for changing, or even influencing such institutions. She, therefore, argues for a “critical
republicanism” which would make non-domination the basis of global justice.21 Such an
alteration of the global financial and economic order will create a situation in which the global
poor could gain more control of their circumstances and choices, and thereby, a measure of selfrespect.

16

Ibid., 50.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid., 60.

19

Ibid.

20

Ibid., 50.

21

Ibid.
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Because of the difficulty of duplicating the democratic practices and institutions found in
bonded political units to the global level, some writers have argued against Laborde’s position.
They claim that “cosmopolitan republicanism is an oxymoron.” 22 To such objections, Laborde
responds that non-domination is a universal good, and therefore, the (traditional) republican’s
anti-cosmopolitan argument that makes satisfaction of vital human needs derivative from the
ideal of political citizenship is, if not incoherent, at least flawed.23
To Laborde, unless and until the worst forms of domination generated by the global
economic order are checked and constrained by appropriately accountable political institutions,
universally fair access to basic capabilities cannot be institutionally secured.24 She, therefore,
defends a ‘critical’ strategy of political empowerment, which involves the reform of international
organizations, to make them more representative and more accountable, in order to ensure, for
instance, that poor countries are better able to defend their interests and demand fairer terms of
interaction.25
She sees all persons as possessing the basic right to be recognized by his or her
community of interaction as a moral agent, worthy of respect. The value a community accords to
a moral agent will be evident in the ‘weight’ such a person’s voice carries in deliberations,
particularly on decisions that directly affects her ability to act in the world. If other persons have
unchecked power over a person, or a person inhabits a world in which he is rendered ‘silent’ and

22

Ibid., 49.

23

Ibid., 49, 53.

24

Ibid., 62.

25

Ibid.

10
‘invisible’, such a person has thereby been denied the ‘right to have rights.’ She also proposes
that at the individual level, global justice theories should aim at achieving the basic capabilities
that are essential for moral agency and democratic citizenship. For instance, material resources
(nutrition, shelter, health, sanitation), as well as a ‘democratic minimum’ (or, the ‘right to have
rights’).26
Mira Bachvarova also thinks that non-domination could play a central role in global
justice theorizing.27 Bachvarova agrees with Laborde that the way in which power is
consolidated and exercised in the global order is of itself morally objectionable. But contrary to
Laborde, she sees global injustice primarily as a question of power relations which influence
distribution decisions. She agrees with Pettit that domination entails the experience of being in a
position of subordination to some form of alien control since the dominated person is not
reasonably free to make choices.28 Bachvarova also concedes that principle of non-domination is
more general and more demanding than democratic legitimacy since it could serve as a check for
all forms of political power, including democratic ones. She agrees with writers like Iris Marion
Young, who argues that although people have no prima facie right to non-interference, there
remains a duty to conduct interactions through democratic means, within and across political

26
Laborde borrows the term, “the right to have rights,” from Hannah Arendt’s understanding of fundamental
human rights. To Arendt, we all have a human right to belong to a community wherein our basic civil and political
rights will be protected. But as I will show later, and as Laborde implies, the current global situation raises the
question of the appropriateness of regarding citizenship as a necessary condition to having or enjoying rights. Ibid,
53.

Mira Bachvarova, “Non-Domination's Role in the Theorizing of Global Justice,” Journal of Global
Ethics 9, No. 2 (2013): 173-185.
27

28

Ibid., 175.
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jurisdictions.29 Bachvarova also agrees with Pettit that although a lack of democracy raises a red
flag, both procedural and substantive democratic processes or even a combination of both could
hide dominative relations.30
She, however, argues that, although domination is a cognate, and shares conceptual and
sociological commonality with “injustice, inequality, and exclusion,” it is not reducible to any, or
all of three words.31 Furthermore, the pluralistic nature of the global setting yields different
conceptions of justice as well as freedom, making universalizing the republican thesis of nondomination, and positing it as the best expression of liberty, controversial.
She recognizes the ills of relations of domination – vulnerability to exploitation,
exclusion, and dependency on the goodwill of property owners etc. However, she maintains that
non-domination should not be the basis of global interactions, but instead, should be the measure
of the “legitimacy, or the moral quality of power relations between specific agents.” 32 Rather,
she calls for a thinner conception of freedom to ground any discussions of global injustice. To
her, therefore, non-domination should be “complementary within a multi-faceted project, (and
not be taken) as an alternative framework to rethink all global justice questions.”33 Instead of
making freedom as non-domination the goal of global justice as Laborde suggests, Bachvarova
thinks republican freedom as nondomination should be an ideal that checks the exercise of

29
Ibid., 176. See also Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford Political Theory) (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 260.
30

Ibid., 183.

31

Ibid., 176.

32

Ibid., 176, 181.

33

Ibid., 176.
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power. For instance, in the absence of the kinds of checks provided by a national constitution,
the power of global institutions should be assessed by the extent to which those who live under it
experience it as an ‘alien’ power.
Project Overview
I take the free expression of autonomous agency as a universal good and a right which all
persons are entitled to. Relations of domination ignores or undervalues the agency of the
dominated, and thereby constitutes a violation of this basic right. In a world of trans-national
interactions, the uneven distribution of all forms of social resources and as a consequence, social
power, leads to structural relations of domination. Victims of domination occupy social positions
in which they have little ‘effective’ social power – they are less able to access and utilize social
resources relative to those who dominate them – to alter their situations. We live in a world
where such relations of domination are so entrenched that in many cases, they are now systemic.
But social forces are not anonymous, but rather, derive from human action (and inaction).
Injustice, inequality, and exclusion result from decisions made by persons who either disregard
or in other ways silence the voices of those who suffer such social injustices.
Whether non-domination is taken as a regulative principle or the primary aim of global
justice, it remains central to the idea of social and global justice. Therefore, an adequate global
justice theory should have at its core, if not the eradication, at least the mitigation, of dominative
relations. Using the principle of non-domination as an ideal, or a benchmark, I will assess some
social and global justice theories. My assessment of these theories will be guided by whether or
not a given theory precludes or is able to retain relations of domination.

13
In Part 1, I provide overviews of the global justice theories of the Rawlsian
Contractarians, Thomas Pogge, Chapter 2 and Richard Miller, Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I present
an analysis of both theories, in the form of putting both writers in conversation. Both limit their
analysis of global justice to global distributive justice, thereby failing to adequately theorize
other equally important sites of injustice, for instance, indigenous group rights. And by locating
their analysis at the level of global institutions, neither theorist adequately accounts for the roles
of human agency, freedom, and inter-subjectivity in global injustice. Chapter 5 is a transitional
section in which I explain in some detail, the reason I revert to Critical Theory or the Frankfurt
School.
One of the notable features of critical theory is its emphasis on emancipation, nondomination and the need to bring about social reform or radical social reform of economic, social
and legal institutions to accord with the ideal of radical emancipatory justice. In Part 2, I engage
the works of two critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, Axel Honneth, and Nancy Fraser, who
represent very different types of critical theory that answer questions regarding normative
foundations and social diagnoses of pathology and injustice very differently.
In Chapter 6, I present Honneth’s Theory of Recognition in which he makes proposes
that flawed, or inadequate social recognition is always a prelude to injustice, repairing such
flawed recognition regime should be a first step in addressing social injustice. I discuss the extent
and limitations of globalizing the Theory of Recognition. In Chapter 7, I take on the work of
Nancy Fraser, who disagrees with key elements of Honneth’s theory by arguing that an adequate
emancipatory social theory needs to pursue both the aims of recognition of the disenfranchised,
and redistribution of resources. In later work, she adds that the principle of participatory parity is

14
best protected by adding representation as a third aim. I conclude the project in Chapter 8 by
arguing that of all the four theories considered, Fraser’s argument for the principle of
participatory parity, achieved by her all subjected principle, and best protects the universal right
to non-domination.
The Rawlsian Contractarians
Thomas Pogge and Richard Miller come from the Rawlsian contractarian tradition, and
frame their analysis of global injustice from the perspective of global distributive injustice. Both
derive their respective normative arguments from actually existing institutions and practices. But
while Pogge has a human-rights based approach, Miller offers a social justice approach based on
special relationships of cooperation and responsibility for those whose lives are shaped by
imperial power. Both argue that global institutions and practices contain a normative surplus
(expectations, promises), which such institutions do not live up to or fulfill.
In Politics as Usual,34 Thomas Pogge argues that the rich members of the global
population (who are mostly citizens of Western democracies) are violating the negative duty (not
to harm) the global poor. They do this by maintaining and benefiting from a global economic
order that generates vast amounts of global poverty. 35 In Globalizing Justice, 36 Richard Miller
argues that a large part of global poverty is caused by the operation of imperial power (Western
countries in general, and the United States in particular). To him, such practices constitute a

34

Thomas Pogge, Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).

35

Ibid., 3.

36
Richard W. Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
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violation of the negative duty not to harm (the global poor) by wrongfully exploiting them (by
taking advantage of their vulnerability) and engaging in reckless foreign policies, such as
sanctions and military interventions, which disrespects them as moral equals.
In Chapter 2, I analyze the arguments of Thomas Pogge, whose central theses are that
“the global rich” who are mostly, but not exclusively citizens of European and North American
countries, are committing (and covering up) a monumental crime against the world’s poor.37 The
crime is that the (global) rich have set up global institutions that guarantee that the bulk of global
resources continue to flow mostly to themselves while leaving a large proportion of the world’s
population in penury. To him, this is a violation of a negative duty (of the rich) not to harm (the
poor).
Pogge also draws a distinction between an interactional and an institutional moral
analysis of global poverty.38 He justifies his choice of locating his arguments at the institutional
level by positing that this provides a “more demanding” level of analysis.39 Since the rich
(societies and members of the global community) are responsible for the creation and
maintenance of global institutions, they are therefore obligated to redesign such institutions to
alleviate (reduce and eradicate) at least the severest forms of global poverty. It is important to
note that Pogge does not argue against the global capitalist order per se, but only against its

37
It is important to note that Pogge’s classification is loose in the sense that the group he classifies as rich
include the global elite who though concentrated in Western Europe and North America, are also present in other
countries.
38

Pogge, Politics as Usual, 15.

To Pogge, the question seems to reduce to “whether the causally relevant rules ought to have been
different and whether anyone is responsible for defects in these rules that are partly or wholly to blame for any of the
regrettable events.” Ibid., 15.
39
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current institutional form.40 Also, the more well-off members of the global economy (including
economic and political elites in poor countries), are responsible for the injustice of global
poverty and inequality. However, Pogge does not place direct responsibility on such persons.
Rather they only have an indirect responsibility, as a group that could alter, but who choose to
continue to uphold the global institutions that contribute to global poverty.
Referencing Articles 25 and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,41 Pogge
argues that the current global legal and institutional system is a violation of the social and
economic rights of the people whom the global order impoverishes. To improve the livelihood of
the global poor, while reducing global economic inequality, he proposes three initiatives. The
first is the Global Resources Dividend (GRD). This is a tax to be imposed on all natural
resources at the point of extraction, and the revenues utilized for development projects, in poor
societies and communities. The second initiative is to stop Western firms and governments from
buying raw materials from corrupt leaders of poor countries. Lastly, Pogge proposes that rich
countries desist from using their political and economic might to strike harsh bargains to the
detriment of poor countries, as is currently the case in The World Trade (WTO) negotiations.
First, I argue against Pogge that a positive rate of unemployment and the imperative of
economic growth are essential to (global) capitalism. In addition, in the capitalist economic
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Pogge warns us not to take his position as “a leftist argument”, thereby implying that he is not necessarily
taking a stand against capitalism per se. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human rights: Cosmopolitan
Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 24, 19.
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41

17
system, there are no legal or moral limits to how much resources an individual or group is
permitted to amass. The requirement of a positive rate of unemployment means that at every
given time, a certain proportion of labor (people) and capital (money) will be idle. The growth
imperative compels all parties to use whatever means available to seek increasing profits. It is
therefore not surprising that rich individuals and countries continue to use their power and
resources to design institutions and practices that guarantee that the (economically) powerful
continue to amass more resources. The net result of such a global economic environment is
downward pressures on both global wages and the price of primary goods, which in turn leads to
global unemployment, poverty, and inequality.
One of Pogge’s central arguments is that global poor should be compensated and
institutions reformed because the same set of people who create and maintain the global order
benefit the most from it.42 He sees global poverty as the shirking (by the rich) of the negative
duty not to harm (the global poor). If Pogge is right then this would seem to worsen the moral
violation, because his position also implies that the people who suffer the most have the least
power to alter the order. While I am in basic agreement with Pogge, I note two flaws in his
argumentation structure.
I agree with Pogge that global institutions create and exacerbate global poverty. And I
also concede that his policy suggestions could reduce some of that poverty. However, I do not

Pogge develops three main institutional reforms: Global Resources Dividend (GRD), or a tax to be
imposed on all natural resources at the point of extraction, and the revenues utilized for development projects. He
also suggests that measures should be put in place to discourage Western firms and governments from buying raw
materials from corrupt leaders of poor countries. Lastly, he proposes that rich countries should desist from using
their political and economic might to strike harsh bargains to the detriment of poor countries, as is currently the case
in The World Trade (WTO) negotiations. Pogge, World Poverty, 17-19, 112-113, 204-208.
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agree with his general position that locates the source of harm in the functioning and not in the
nature of such institutions. His position seems to be based on the contradictory argument that
global poverty could be addressed through a readjustment of the same institutions whose normal
functioning generates and sustains the poverty. Against this position, I argue that global
institutions are legally established; therefore, the negative effects they produce should be seen as
a consequence of their fundamental structure. Pogge’s arguments are weakened by his reluctance
to take the stronger stand of criticizing the nature of the global economic structure (on which
basis the institutions were created). Instead, he takes the weaker stand of criticizing the results of
these institutions. I see this as the result of Pogge’s reluctance to make arguments that could be
taken as a critique of capitalism.
Secondly, Pogge’s attempt to derive a negative duty can only succeed if he is able to
show the connection between the people who create and maintain the economic and financial
institutions and the people whom such institutions harm. Although the injustice he describes in
an important sense derive from institutions, such injustice is at root, expressions of moral
agency. By locating his analysis at the level of institutions, he obscures the role of human agency
in the problem and thereby fails to draw a strong connection between the global poor and the
persons whom he claims are harming them. Thus, although Pogge tries to derive a negative duty
not to harm the poor, his arguments can only sustain a weak negative duty that only implies for
its positive fulfillment modest reforms that do not go far enough.
I, therefore, argue against Pogge that since neo-liberal capitalist global institutions
inevitably generate poverty, what is needed is not their adjustment, but their replacement,
perhaps by a form of economic democracy that combines the benefits of markets with social
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control of productive assets.43 I conclude that Pogge’s analysis does not account for other
aspects of global relations that are prior to, and in many cases, determine (or at least heavily
influence) distributive decisions. For instance, inter-subjective relations, geopolitics, and
imperialism. And on account of this, his global justice theory does not preclude inter-subjective
domination.
Richard Miller attributes a large proportion of global poverty to oppression and abuses of
power by powerful countries against weaker ones. Some instances of such abuses include
exploitation in transnational manufacturing, unfair institutional frameworks of world trade and
finance, as well as the fact that the poorer members of the world community suffer more from
the effects of global warming than the richer members. Miller includes two other cases of such
abuse which he says are expressions of hegemonic power, and which he refers to as “the poverty
- inducing arm of military might.” 44 These are the imperial shaping of economic development
policies of developing countries, and the use of violence to sustain imperial global power. Miller
sees all of such injustices as sources of unmet duties of redress. He also holds the position that
neoliberal globalization is the best way to improve the circumstances of the global poor, and that
imperialism is unavoidable – at least in the foreseeable future.
Miller accepts that ordinary morality leads to cosmopolitanism since morality demands
that we value each person’s life equally. But he rejects the direct cosmopolitanism of Pogge,
insisting that the unmet duties noted above, do not “require an extrapolation of principles of

See David Schweickart, “Global Poverty: Alternative Perspectives on What We Should Do and
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domestic justice” to the international arena.45 This is because equal respect for the equal value of
each individual’s life – which is the provenance of human rights protection as well as the duty of
beneficence – does not necessarily entail equal concern for each person’s life, for this concern
and its correlative duties depend on the nature of our particular social relationships to specific
persons.46 There should, therefore, be a difference between the way we relate to compatriots and
the way we relate to the rest of the world; and a difference between the way we relate to noncompatriots with whom we interact (and upon whose lives our actions have an impact), and noncompatriots with whom we have no interaction and upon whose lives our actions have no impact.
It is the “nature of interactions” that exists between groups or individuals that decide the nature
of the ensuing rights, duties, and responsibilities.47 He describes his position as “quasicosmopolitanism,” and argues for, “global civic friendship,” which would replace “international
bullying” with “international reasonableness.” 48
Miller concedes that the unjust practices described above yield negative duties not to
harm as well as positive duties to alleviate at least some of such harms. But it is only those who
are directly affected by ‘imperial excesses’ that could legitimately demand some form of
redress.49 This is because the duties that arise from such practices are grounded in relationships
based on cooperation (or at the very least interaction). He thinks that a large proportion of global
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poverty result from the violation of a negative duty not to harm, but this violation is best
redressed by positive duties (which go beyond benevolence). He proposes Global Civic
Friendship (GCF), which are relations based on cooperation and respect between powerful and
weaker countries, as the way to reduce the negative effects of the expression of imperial power.
He proposes that all countries aim for GCF which he thinks will give rise to global relations in
which all parties would be able to give non-coercive consent to any institution, rule or policy that
affects them. He envisions such global cooperation as a force that will move all parties towards
the goal of equitable cooperation, which he says will ensure that even those subject to imperial
power will have their needs met.50 GCF will pave the way for Global Social Democracy (GSD),
which will make institutions function in a more equitable and just way. He however also notes
what he refers to as a ‘disastrous irony’, which is that, “The transnational influence of developed
countries that generates demanding responsibilities is guided by enduring interests and
institutional tendencies that guarantee deep irresponsibility in dealings with vulnerable people in
developing countries, especially among the most influential powers.”51
With regards to global poverty, I see Miller as trying to accomplish two incompatible
ends. The first is mitigating global poverty while retaining the core feature of the global order
that generates the poverty; namely, neo-liberalism (qualified by reducing and/or gradually
phasing in some harsh provisions as these apply to poor countries). The problem with this
position is that allocating resources through the principles of capitalism cannot eradicate or even
reduce global poverty, because even the most benign Keynesian variants of capitalism
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presuppose unemployment (which increases poverty) and continuous growth (which increases
inequality), and whose impact on climate change profoundly worsens the condition of the poor,
especially.
To counter “imperial excesses,” Miller’s proposes that all parties (countries) pursue
relations of global civic friendship based on mutual respect. Thus, while he recognizes the
injustice of imperialist relations, he does not explicitly argue against imperialism. He takes such
asymmetric power relations as a given, and merely advocates that imperial power should be
wielded responsibly.
Against this position, I argue that social power (economic, political, etc.) is relative, and
asymmetric power relations, therefore, bear a high risk of domination. The possession of social
power reduces the risk that the power holder will be dominated by others, while at the same time
increasing his or her ability to dominate others. Therefore, although mutual respect is laudable, it
is difficult to achieve from within asymmetric power relations. In the same way, capitalism
requires a certain level of unemployment, imperialism presumes relations of domination. Given
these features of imperialism and neo-liberal capitalism, it might be impossible to achieve global
justice (even if limited to the injustice of poverty). And lastly, even if we grant Miller that
imperialism might not be easy to eradicate, as a moral theorist, he should take a stronger moral
stand against asymmetric power relations, particularly when it leads to relations of dominance
and poverty.
To buttress his position, Miller argues that a market exchange could be exploitative
without the exploiter having taken advantage of the other party. To make this case, he cites
examples of the operation of sweat shops around the world, World Trade Organization (WTO)
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negotiations, and the global tariff regime as instances of such violations; the last two of which
rich, powerful countries use to protect their own industries, while forcing poor countries to open
up their own markets.52 He uses these examples to highlight the distinction between, “taking
advantage of someone’s bargaining weakness” and “taking advantage of someone because of her
bargaining weakness.” To him, the former is sometimes defensible, but the latter never is.53
Miller reads Pogge as attempting to ground demands for global distributive justice on the
fact of economic relations. While Miller agrees with Pogge that the global economic framework
“violates a responsibility not to take advantage of other’s weaknesses” in commercial exchanges
and that such violations create, and worsen global poverty, he insists that Pogge’s position is
wrong because to Miller, any negative effects that arise from an economic interaction cannot be
morally evaluated outside of the specific relationship of exchange.54
Pogge’s focus on institutions could be explained by the fact that he links human rights to
a notion of robust human flourishing,55 and not merely on the protection of human normative
agency.56 Miller approaches the question of global injustice from the perspective of citizens of
strong, imperialist countries, and thereby seems to engage more with the idea of intersubjectivity than Pogge does. Although they begin with a non-ideal world, the influence of
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Rawlsian contractarianism sets some ideological limits to their position and can be seen in the
works of both writers. In addition, their focus on distributive justice does not permit adequate
theorizing of other important dimensions of global injustice, like subjectivity, history, and
causation. And at the level of persons, neither of the two theorists adequately consider the role of
freedom, agency, and inter-subjectivity in considerations of justice and injustice.
The Critical Theorists
Pogge and Miller are justifiably outraged by the extent of global poverty. But while they
both regard growing global inequality as a moral problem, Pogge is more emphatic about the
need to regulate it through global redistribution based on cosmopolitan democracy. Miller on his
part, argues for the need to pursue global civic friendship through discourse. However, neither
seems to appreciate the structural limits inherent in capitalism that prevent a significant advance
toward economic (distributive) justice and global social democracy, or (in the case of Miller),
elimination or reduction of the excesses of imperialism. In addition, although both theorists
recognize that global poverty is wrong because it violates human dignity, neither seeks deeper
deontological grounds for human rights, such as inter-subjective recognition and nondomination.
To fill some of the gaps I have identified, in section 2, I attempt to provide a deeper
moral foundation for their views. To do this, I introduce the works of Axel Honneth and Nancy
Fraser. While Honneth emphasizes injustices of recognition and identity - based injustices,
affecting, for example, indigenous people vis-à-vis globalization, Fraser tries to give equal, nonreductive weight to both distribution and recognition.
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Axel Honneth’s brand of critical theory is both descriptive and explanatory. His version
of critical theory is “built around the history, structure, and dynamics of struggles for adequate
recognition and increased freedom.” 57 His understanding of recognition is the initial intersubjective situation in which one agent recognizes another as a moral agent, worthy of as much
consideration as him or herself.58 He argues that all societies function on prevailing recognition
regimes or systems. Social pathology is thereby always traceable to inadequate or flawed
recognition between moral agents. To Honneth, justice and recognition mutually illuminate each
other. This is because what counts as an injustice depends on our reasonable expectations of
recognition.59 So, an institution (say, a constitution) could disrespect (not adequately recognize)
persons. Social institutions effectively regulate behavior but also express and reinforce prevailing
social attitudes.60 To him, an adequate justice theory should develop a “categorical framework
of a sufficiently differentiated theory of recognition, since this establishes a link between the
social causes of widespread feelings of injustice and the normative objectives of emancipatory
movements.” 61
Honneth developed his theory to apply to a modern, western democratic state. I will raise
the question of whether, how, and in what manner his arguments for recognition could be applied

57

Christopher Zurn, Axel Honneth: A Critical Theory of the Social (Chichester: Polity Press, 2015), 8.

58

Ibid.

Mattias Iser, “Recognition,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), ed. Edward N.
Zalta, accessed April 29, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/recognition/
59

60

Ibid., 8

61
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange
(London: Verso, 2003), 113.

26
to the problem of global injustice. Specifically, I ask whether global injustice could be seen as
resulting from a flawed global recognition regime. And if so, whether his theory provides a
means of repairing such a regime.62
Nancy Fraser disagrees with key elements of Honneth’s theory of recognition. She argues
that, although access to resources seems to be the touchstone to human welfare, it remains just
one aspect of social injustice. The other aspect, which is just as important, is the aspiration of
recognition. Proof that mal-distribution and inadequate recognition are of equal importance can
be seen in the fact that although they are analytically distinct, they tend to move in tandem. She
sees these two ideas as core components of social justice. Against Honneth, she proposes a “twodimensional conception” of justice that can accommodate defensible claims for both social
equality and the recognition of difference.63
In an important debate between Honneth and Fraser, both agree that the trend towards
“growing impoverishment of large parts of the population,” which Honneth says is the result of
“unbridled capitalism” is problematic. Both philosophers also reject “the economistic view that
would reduce recognition to a mere epiphenomenon of redistribution.” 64 They also both agree
that “an adequate understanding of justice must encompass, … [both]…recognition … and
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redistribution.” 65 But while Honneth feels that mal-distribution is a result of miss-recognition,
Fraser disagrees.66
Fraser maintains that an adequate social theory must grant equal weight to both problems,
while Honneth insists that recognition should be given precedence over mal-distribution. To
Honneth, we can only begin to address the problem of inequitable distribution after the
establishment of an adequate recognition regime. This is because to him, the prevailing
recognition order of any society determines the distribution pattern. Therefore, an adequate
recognition order will automatically address the problem of mal-distribution.
Like Pogge and Miller, Fraser thinks that distribution patterns are fundamental to social
justice.67 However, Fraser includes social recognition as a second, important aspect of social
justice opens up the theoretical space in which other dimensions of social injustice that go
beyond distributive justice could be assessed. She also thinks that redistributing without due
consideration of relations of recognition might stigmatize receivers as “social parasites,” and
thus further disrespect them.68 Fraser seems right that calls for a global redistribution of
resources, as exemplified by philosophers like Peter Singer and to an extent Pogge, bear the risk
of disrespecting the recipients of resources. 69 This highlights an important feature of an adequate
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social or global justice theory. It should be able to support arguments that will ground the
creation of an economy in which anyone who is willing to work is able to earn enough resources,
at least to the level of a minimally decent life.
In her later work, Fraser modified her theory to include the category of (political)
representation, which she says “allows us to problematize governance structures and decisionmaking procedures,”70 the third dimension of social justice.71 To her, justice demands adhering
to the principle of ‘parity of participation,’ or the principle that all members of a polity be able to
participate on a par with all other members in decision-making processes.72 This, in turn,
demands social recognition, adequate distribution of resources and just representation for all
members of the polity.
Fraser’s earlier work was developed to address social injustice within a modern, western
democracy. In more recent work, she has modified some aspects of her theory to make it
applicable to global injustice. For instance, without changing the basic structure of her theory,
she adds to it that justice requires that all who are subjected to any set of rules should have a say
in the development of such rules. She calls this the “all subjected” principle.73
Fraser is right that misrecognition and mal-distribution tend to move in tandem, but both
aspects of social injustice are manifestations of domination. Misrecognition and mal-distribution
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move in tandem because it is the socially powerful who determine how resources are allocated,
and resource allocation is dependent on how the allocators recognize the different categories of
recipients. I, therefore, argue that it is in only in a context of asymmetric power relations that one
party could be unjustifiably deprived of some social good.
I agree with Fraser against Honneth that it is wrong to claim that “distributional injustices
must be understood as the institutional expression of social disrespect – or, of unjustified
relations of recognition.”74 But I also agree with Honneth against Fraser that recognition is
philosophically prior to patterns of resource allocation. I hold the position that inter-subjective
relations presume an already occurring recognition between moral agents. And although it is
possible to deny or qualify this already occurring recognition, it is not possible to ‘misrecognize’
another. Therefore, with regards to social justice, inadequate (or qualified) recognition is
problematic only because it is closely correlated to social domination.75
Therefore, although social recognition cannot, and should not be demanded from another,
with regards to social justice, questions of who gets what are really questions of who is allowed
to get what. If the denial of social recognition is thereby a prelude to social injustice, then Fraser
is correct that ‘misrecognition’ is not a problem unless and until it negatively affects the
allocation of social benefits, which could include, but is not limited to material resources.
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The value of social recognition lies in how much agency a moral agent is thereby able to
express, relative to others. That a moral agent is accorded adequate social recognition implies
that her society does not inhibit the full expression of her agency. It is only when the freedom of
a moral agent is restricted by the actions of another moral agent that it becomes dominative and
thereby, a question of justice. Therefore, the “wrong” of social injustice is not in deprivation as
such, but in domination, which is a moral violation of intersubjective relations. Thus, the
argument for a right to recognition is better understood as an argument for the right and duty of
non-domination.
Conclusion
This project is an attempt to provide grounds for my position that global injustice deficits
can best be addressed by an argument for a negative duty of non-domination. Although I present
this as an intersubjective, reciprocal duty, to the extent that institutions are created and sustained
by persons, it is also a duty that institutions owe to persons. I put Pogge and Miller, in
conversation, and highlighted some of the drawbacks of their respective theories. There is a way
that an analysis of institutions and social practices refer to inter-subjective interactions, however,
both Pogge and Miller fail to ground their normative theories of human rights and global justice
in discourse theory or recognition.
I looked to the field of critical theory in the works of Honneth and Fraser, to modify
Pogge and Miller’s theories to account for freedom, agency, and inter-subjectivity. I also
modified some key positions from the critical theorists, to make them applicable to global justice
issues. I concluded that Honneth’s right to recognition should be understood as a call for
relations of inter-subjective non-domination because it is in instances of social injustice (which I

31
redefine as domination), that a recognition deficit becomes visible. Therefore, with regards to
social injustice, misrecognition in itself is not a problem; rather, social misrecognition is a
problem because it is a necessary prelude to social injustice, which rests on inter-subjective
domination.
Fraser modified her theory which originally argued for social justice as just distribution
and adequate recognition, to now include representation and the ‘all subjected’ principle. That is,
all those subjected to a social system should have a say in its development and implementation.
Being subjected to social rules and institutions, not of one’s making entails domination by those
who make the rules against those who are obligated to follow them. Therefore, Fraser’s
arguments for recognition, equitable distribution and (political) representation could, therefore,
be understood as arguments for non-domination. I, therefore, conclude that of all the theories
considered, Fraser’s “all subjected” principle best guards against social injustice or intersubjective domination.

CHAPTER II
THOMAS POGGE: POVERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WRONGFUL HARM
According to Thomas Pogge, 2.8 billion people or forty-six percent of humankind live
below the World Bank’s $2 a day poverty line. Of this number half, or 1.2 billion people live on
less than a dollar a day.1 These figures indicate that in this century, world poverty has overtaken
war as the greatest source of avoidable human misery. 2 To make matters worse, although a shift
of one percent of aggregate global income from the well-off to the global poor could eradicate
severe poverty worldwide, shifts in global income has tended to go more from the poor to the
rich. Even as global poverty persists, global product, income, consumption, and wealth are rising
– along with global inequalities.3
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Pogge regards global poverty as an on-going crime perpetuated by the rich members of the
global community against the global poor. However, it is a crime that is covered through lies,
deceptions, hypocrisy, and carefully made-up statistics.4 He addresses two of the most common
arguments usually made against his position. The first is that statistics from international
development agencies like the World Bank (WB) and The United Nations (UN) indicate that
global poverty is declining. The second is that so long as the global economy continues to grow,
aggregate global wealth and income will inevitably ‘trickle down’ to the global poor, making the
poor better off, if not in the near term, then in the long run.
To start with, index construction a normative, and thereby a contestable issue. For instance,
there is currently little consensus on issues like the necessary levels of daily calorie consumption
or what constitutes an increase in gender justice.5 This lack of consensus is reflected in the
arbitrary nature in which many indices are calculated. For example, the World Bank (WB)
measures global poverty rates by taking a simple headcount of people on, below, or above the
International Poverty Line (IPL). The IPL is calculated by picking a base year and basing
poverty reduction on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) from that year.6 The WB does not provide
any justification for its choice of a base year. But it is clearly in their interest to downwardly
adjust the IPL since the reduction of global poverty is an important part of their mandate.7 They
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are inclined to favor earlier base years to generate a lower IPL, making it easier to claim progress
in poverty reduction.
Tracking poverty by this means provides little information about, and in fact could
obscure, how other poor groups are doing. And by merely moving people situated immediately
below the poverty line to just above it, such a system indefensibly prioritizes those who are just
below the poverty line.8 The IPL also focuses on income and consumption expenditure. It leaves
out cost of living and does not differentiate between foodstuffs and discretionary items.9 This
sets limits to how well such figures are an accurate measure of global poverty.
Next, Pogge discusses national income figures, which proponents of the WTO provide as
proof that global economic growth is not disproportionately benefitting the rich.10 These
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people may, given local circumstances and individual differences, result in unequal development across factors of
health, education, etc.) For example, those in a cold climate may have to spend more on heat, and those who face
more disease might have to spend more money on healthcare. The current use of consumer price indices and parity
purchasing power parity (PPP) is also misleading. PPP calculations are made across national/ regional boundaries
and across currencies. They are also calculated in a way that exaggerates the PPP of poor people. Foodstuffs are
50% higher than PPPs suggest since, with regards to food, $1.25 is the equivalent of $.86 PPP. Current calculations
also combine tradeable (food) and non-tradeable goods (land and services). Tradeable goods cost about the same
everywhere, while the cost of non-tradeable goods varies widely. For instance, the fact that non-tradeable goods in
poor countries are about three to four times cheaper than in affluent ones makes it seem as if food too, were three or
four times cheaper in these countries, but in fact, costs the same. The current system of PPP calculations
underestimates the price of food in poor countries by 50%. Pogge recommends that in general, PPPs should be based
only on commodities satisfying basic needs; not alcohol, “quackery”, and other things poor people might consume.
Or better still, poor countries could also be left out in calculating PPPs.
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For instance, between 1980 and 2000, while Per-Capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United
States only grew by 2%, China’s grew by 6% while India’s grew by 4%. “It should also be noted that economic
growth tracks year on year increases, but says little about entrenched patterns. For instance, if a country experiences
a consumption growth of 10% in a given time period, and no growth in the next time period, this does not entail a
reduction in production and consumption, but a continuation of whatever level of consumption was achieved in the
earlier time period. Therefore, that China and India grew by 6% and 4% respectively relative to the United States at
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statistics are taken to show that although there remains a gap between rich and poor countries,
things are getting better for poor countries as well. Pogge argues that such a conclusion is wrong
because Gross National Product (GNP) include a foreign investment component, which is
reflected in the Gross National Income (GNI) figures.11 Therefore, it is not necessarily the
citizens of a country that benefit from growing GDPs.12
In addition, whether calculated as GDP or GNI, national income figures do not indicate
how income growth is allocated within a country.13 Even in reasonably democratic countries,
economic growth does not necessarily mean that the lot of the poor has been improved. Such
growth should not be regarded as progress.14 This is particularly true for undemocratic societies,
where increased growth betters the lot of the elites or results from resource sales that enable a
repressive government to increase its abuse of the masses. Economic growth accompanied by

2% does not mean that production and consumption grew in China and India more than it grew in the United States.
Rather, it means that the rate at which income increased in China and India was more than the rate at which incomes
increased in the United States. With income levels in the United States already so much greater than the levels in
China and India cannot be taken to show that the US suffered an economic decline compared to these two
countries.” Ibid., 93-94. Ibid., 94, Figure 5.1.
11
The difference between GDP and GNP (or GNI) is that “When residents of country A derive income from
country B – returns on investments, for instance, or revenues from the sale of natural resources they own in country
B – then such income is counted toward the GDP of B, yet toward the GNI of A.” The difference between Gross
National Product (GNP) or Gross National Income (GNI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is that, the “…GNI …
excludes the earnings accruing to foreigners and includes the earnings that residents derive from abroad.” Ibid., 95.
12

Ibid., 96. Table 5.2. When we, “Define the poorest and the richest countries in any year as groups of
countries that each contain 10 percent of the world’s population…,” using the GNI per capita, inter country
inequality is exacerbated. For instance, using GNI as opposed to GNP, between 1980 and 2007, inequality ratios
almost doubled between poor and rich countries.
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Many things money can buy are positional or competitive: political influence, for instance, and access to
education and even health care depend not merely on how much money one has to spend but also on how much
others are willing and able to spend on those same goods. “For example, if we compare the growth in wellbeing
compared to their compatriots, despite the affluence and continued growth in the United States, the poor in the
United States are doing much worse than the poor in Norway and Hungary.” Ibid., 97-98.

36
rising inequalities diminishes both absolute and relative shares of economic and social resources
of the poor.15 Therefore, it is only when economic growth eases the plight of the poor that we
should consider growth in income as leading to their betterment.
Economic growth yield benefits to all members of the society, including at least some of
the poor. However, increased economic inequality also harms poorer segments of the society the
most. For example, although China’s economic growth has led to a decline in some of its
poverty, the extent and content of this decline remains unclear.16 It, is however, clear that
China’s recent economic growth has been achieved at the cost of a sharp increase in domestic
inequality. This rise in inequality give more affluent Chinese “greater opportunities to influence
political decisions, to give unfair advantages to their children, and to dominate the poor
directly.”17 Pogge argues that if Chinese policymakers had focused on not allowing inequality to
rise, it would have cost the country half of its GNI growth. But this would also have meant that
the bottom four deciles of its population would have done better in both absolute and relative
terms. The poorer members of the population would have been spared at least some of the
increased “marginalization, social exclusion, and vulnerability to domination that they are now
experiencing.”18
Pogge, therefore, wonders if the Chinese society would not have been better off with less
growth (and less inequality): was the rise in economic inequality a necessary price for whatever
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reduction in poverty China was been able to achieve?19 Furthermore, the alternative scenario
(lower growth and increased equity), would also have had a better effect on the global
environment, which China is now burdening with a huge upsurge in pollution, resource depletion
and environmental degradation.20 These (avoidable) negative effects: growing domestic
inequalities and negative global environmental effects, buttresses Pogge’s position that
governments should be more focused on improving the lot of the worse off at the expense of the
better off even if such a policy results in a lower rate of economic growth.
In addition, China’s economic growth may also have been at the expense of other poor
countries’ growth, and therefore, at the expense of the global poor.21 This is because the
protectionist policies of affluent countries limit opportunities for access to exports for poorer
countries to affluent country markets. Secondly, to succeed in the global export market, China
lowered wage and labor standards and therewith export prices, forcing other countries to follow
suit. And lastly, China has had to increase its import of oil and food, thereby inflating the global
prices of these commodities, making it more expensive for other poor countries to access these
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“One may object that we should not expect China to moderate its ecological footprint so long as the
affluent countries continue to pollute and deplete at even higher per capita rates. All countries should conceive
growth much more from the standpoint of their poorer population segments. Doing so, they would do much better in
terms of avoiding poverty and (if equity slows aggregate growth) environmental degradation. I do not contest this
objection. The example of China is meant to illustrate quite general quite general points about intra-national
inequality. All countries should conceive of growth much more from the standpoint of the poorer population
segments. Doing so, they would do much better in terms of avoiding poverty and (if equity slows aggregate growth)
environmental degradation.” Ibid., 101-102.
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goods.22 It is, therefore, wrong to argue that China’s growth can be duplicated by any other poor
or emerging economy.
The Moral Wrong of Global Poverty
Although global economic growth is indeed bringing some out of poverty, it is at the cost
of increasing global inequality – many people are either remaining poor or experiencing even
more extreme poverty. Pogge thinks that extreme poverty as eradicable and avoidable at a price
“that would entail minuscule opportunity costs for the affluent.”23
To illustrate the causal connection between extreme poverty and growing global wealth,
Pogge first draws attention to the global reach of transnational actors like The United Nations
(UN), The European Union (EU), The World Trade Organization (WTO) and The World Bank
(WB). The global reach of such organizations means that most of the global population now live
under global regulations that constrain governments of nation states such that a state’s sovereign
control over its borders and citizens is no longer understood as a purely domestic issue.24 The
linguistic turn from discussing international relations as ‘global ethics’ to the current norm of
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The first step to eradicating, or at least mitigating extreme global poverty is the reform of major global
institutions so that they lead to more equitable results. But such reforms are resisted because the current situation is
beneficial to those who create and sustain the institutions. Ibid., 107.
24
“The United Nations and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflect efforts to establish globally
uniform minimum standards for the treatment of citizens within their own countries. The Bretton Woods Institutions
and later the World Trade Organization powerfully shape the economic prospects of countries and their citizens.
Finally, Global and regional organizations, most notably the UN Security Council and the European Union, have
acquired political functions and powers that were traditionally thought to belong to national governments. These
organizations make rules that profoundly affect the rules that govern the lives of many of us. Those actors and these
rules powerfully affect the domestic life of national societies: through their impact on pollution and climate change,
invasive diseases, conflict and violence, culture and information, technology and (most profoundly) through market
forces that condition access to capital and raw materials, export opportunities, domestic tax bases and tax rates,
prices, wages, labor standards and much else.” Ibid., 11-12, 14.

39
discussing international relations as ‘global justice’ reflects, and further entrenches these recent
changes in global relations.25 This new terminology also holds the advantage of providing
conceptual tools that enable us to extend moral analysis beyond the state to transnational
institutional arrangements.26 Given the preponderance of transnational institutional rules that in
many cases disregards sovereignty, a global justice theory that remains at the level of the
interaction between countries will be inadequate.27
Pogge notes that since the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the social
domain is now generally understood as a “distinct domain of moral assessment.”28 Institutions
are now assessed by how much they help or hinder the attainment of the human rights of persons
who are affected by their actions. Global institutions are also morally assessable and evaluable
by the standard of their impact on “the conditions of life experienced by human beings
worldwide.” 29
To explain how the current institutional order contributes to poverty, Pogge first notes
that while rules governing global trading system and military interventions have been modified,
access to natural resources, borrowing, treaty, and arms privileges have been left in place.30
Although this is sometimes the result of competitive pressures and trans-national bargaining,
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more often, it is the result of the deliberately “opaque” and “undemocratic” way such rules are
made.”31 Current global rules make things worse for poor people in three ways. First, anyone
who is able to grasp power in any country is internationally recognized as legally permitted to
dispose of any natural resource in the country, borrow, make treaties and buy arms.32 This makes
it attractive for military juntas to take over power in many poor countries and proceed to enrich
themselves to the detriment of members of the country. Secondly, rich powerful countries use the
WTO treaty system to protect their markets while forcing poorer weaker countries to open up
theirs.33 Third, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) component of the
WTO grants monopoly patent rights to a wide range of innovation including advanced seeds and
medicines, thereby limiting the global poor’s access to cheap generic versions of advanced
medicines.34 The majority of the global poor belong to societies or communities that are
adversely affected by such rules.
Pogge notes that although universal human rights are codified in international law, the
same international law establishes and maintains organizations that “systematically obstruct the
aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights, and minimal
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economic sufficiency.”35 And although affluent Western states are no longer practicing slavery,
colonialism, and genocide, they still enjoy crushing economic, political and military dominance
over the rest of the world, while a large proportion of humankind can barely obtain enough to
survive.36 Compared to other countries Western democracies do not just benefit the most from
global institutions, they are also more involved in the creation and maintenance of such
institutions.37 The net effect of such benefits is evident in global national income disparities,
which tracks global individual income disparities.38 To Pogge, that such detrimental results are
“foreseeable and avoidable” makes them a moral violation.39
Pogge thinks that extreme poverty is “avoidable through comparatively minor
modifications that would entail only slight reductions in the incomes of the affluent.”40 But rich
Western states habitually block reforms that could alter this situation.41 He argues that since such
countries are reasonably democratic, their citizens share at least part of the blame for a global
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“In shaping this order, those governments have given much weight to the interests of their domestic
business and finance elites and rather little weight to the interests of poor and vulnerable populations of the less
developed countries.” Ibid., 21-22.
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arrangements. See Jean Treanor, “Half of World's Wealth Now in Hands of 1% of population,” The Guardian, 13
October 2015, accessed January 15, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/oct/13/half-world-wealth-inhands-population-inequality-report. “Richest 1% Will Own More Than All the Rest By 2016,” OXFAM
International, January 19, 2015, accessed February 9, 2016,
https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2015-01-19/richest-1-will-own-more-all-rest-2016
39

Ibid., 31.

40

In addition, “Reforms have been blocked by the governments of the affluent countries which, advancing
their own interests and those of their corporations and citizens.” Ibid., 31.
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“Corporations and citizens, are designing and imposing a global institutional order that, continually and
foreseeably, produces vast excesses of severe deprivation and premature poverty-related deaths.” Ibid., 31.
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order that benefits them while keeping others in penury. Citizens of such societies are thereby
implicated in the violation of the human rights of the poor because their prosperity creates and
sustains the penury of the poor.
To Pogge, “Extensive severe poverty can continue because we do not find its eradication
morally compelling. And we cannot find its eradication morally compelling until we find its
persistence and the relentless rise in global inequality troubling enough to warrant serious moral
reflection.”42 He notes that as bad as (in his opinion, underestimated) global poverty figures are,
they do not appear to be morally salient to people in Western societies.43 He thinks this is
because although we lie to ourselves that we are moral people, who care about morality, we also
recognize that we benefit from current global arrangements.44 But more importantly, we are also
aware that we can get away with it - the global poor can do the citizens of affluent countries no
harm - the current global order lacks a discursive space for those who are negatively affected by
global policies to express dissent.45
In addition, people in rich countries tend to have an inbuilt “rationalizing tendency” that
enables them to utilize “cosmetic arrangements” to achieve a “moral disconnection” to global
injustice.46 This tendency leads to their holding on to two moral prejudices: “The persistence of
severe poverty abroad does not require our moral attention, and that there is nothing seriously
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wrong with our conduct, policies, and the global economic institutions we forge in regard to
world poverty.”47 Armed with these rationalizations, they continue to cover up the situation and
their culpability, by telling themselves that things are getting better, since global agencies are
working hard at creating a world in which everyone will be able to access enough resources to at
least have their basic needs met.
Pogge notes how of all the Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UNDHR), Article 25,48 which guarantees all persons’ socio-economic rights, is the most
frequently violated. But it is Article 2849 of the UNDHR, (which addresses the institutional order
under which all persons live), which he thinks should set the standard for assessing global
institutions, and is, therefore, the basis of his moral arguments.
Interactional and Institutional Analysis
To Pogge, we can look at events in our social world interactionally “as actions, and
effects of actions performed by individual and collective agents,” or we can look at them
institutionally, “as effects of how our social world is structured and organized.”50 Although a
“commitment to human rights goes along with interactional moral commitments, but this is no
reason to identify the former with the latter.”51 For instance, a malnourished child could be seen
47
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as the result of the actions (or inaction) of his parents (interactional), or the result of the high
import duties on food, or a high rate of unemployment (institutional).52
He notes that while there is general acceptance of the existence of socio-economic rights,
there is also wide disagreement over whether their violation yields positive or negative duties.53
To Pogge, “The postulate of a human right to X is tantamount to the demand that, in so far as
reasonably possible, any coercive social institutions be so designed that all human beings
affected by them have secure access to X.” This implies that “A human right is a moral claim on
any coercive social institutions imposed on oneself and therefore a moral claim against anyone
involved in their imposition.”54 Therefore, although the violation of socio-economic rights (for
instance when persons are not able to meet their basic needs), generates positive duties, they also
create negative duties.55
He sees human rights as primarily “claims on coercive social institutions and secondarily
as claims against those who uphold such institutions.”56 This is different from the usual
understanding of human rights as a meta right - one has a moral right because such a right is
supported by a constitutional, legal right. Thus, his institutional understanding of human rights
contrasts with an interactional understanding, “which represents human rights as placing the
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treatment of human beings under certain constraints that do not presuppose the existence of
social institutions.”57 On this standard, “current global institutional arrangements as codified in
international law constitute a massive human-rights violation.”58
Such “Human rights are violated institutionally by those who make uncompensated
contributions to the imposition of social institutions that foreseeably give rise to an avoidable
human-rights deficit.”59 On this institutional understanding, “responsibility for a person’s human
rights falls on all and only those who participate with this person in the same social system. It is
their responsibility, collectively to structure this system so that all participants have secure access
to the objects of their human rights.”60 Thus, by participating in, and benefiting from, the global
institutional order “most of the world’s affluent are making uncompensated contributions” to the
order, and thereby violating the negative duty not to harm (the global poor).61 In this manner,
Pogge connects negative duties to persons through the results of institutional arrangements which
they uphold, and thereby, generates negative institutional duties.62
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Refuting Arguments
Pogge notes and refutes four arguments that could justify our apparent unconcern.


“Preventing poverty deaths is counter-productive because it will lead to
overpopulation and hence to more poverty deaths in the future.”63 In response to this,
Pogge points out that not only is global food production increasing, available
evidence shows that birth rates fall wherever poverty is alleviated, and women gain
better economic opportunities.



“World poverty is so gigantic a problem that it simply cannot be eradicated in a few
years, at least not at a cost that would be bearable for the rich societies.”64 Pogge
counters this by noting that the aggregate financial shortfall for the 2.8 billion people
who live below the $2 a day poverty line is $300 billion dollars annually, or 1.2% of
the aggregate annual gross national incomes of the high-income economies. This
means that we could at least begin to remedy the most extreme aspects of this
problem at a cost that will not be destructive to the global economy.



Global poverty cannot be eradicated by “throwing money at the problem.”65 Pogge
does not disagree with this position but says that this does not justify abandonment of
the problem, but is rather, an invitation to rethink strategies for addressing it. Besides
which, donations are not the only way to address world poverty, since there remains
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the option of restructuring the global order. He notes in addition that in many cases,
the much-touted assistance to poor countries is not designed for the benefit of the
poor, but to achieve the political interests of the donor.66


Lastly, relying on statistics provided by international agencies, some argue that,
“world poverty is disappearing anyway.”67 As noted above, this argument relies on
questionable statistics. Not only is the number of the global poor higher than the
statistics indicate, there appears to be little seriousness of intent to implement the
modest plans that are already in place to address global poverty.68

Although the foregoing arguments attempt to de-emphasize the seriousness of the
problem of global poverty, they do not explicitly deny that global poverty is a moral problem.
Pogge next responds to arguments that support the position that even if global poverty exists, it is
not a moral problem that concerns us.69
Arguments have been made that the economic destiny of a country is determined by
internal factors like the (moral) character of the people, and the (socio-political) culture of the
society. For instance, John Rawls attributes the cause of people’s wealth to its political culture,
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moral traditions, industriousness, political virtues, as well as their (chosen rate of) population
growth.70 To support this position, examples of two formerly poor countries are usually
provided: those that have grown economically, and those that have stagnated or declined, within
the same time-period. This is taken to show that the global order notwithstanding, poor countries
either grow or decline economically. The reasons for the persistence of severe poverty and the
key to its eradication could therefore only be local.71
To the first part of the argument (which is Rawls’ position), Pogge responds that it
ignores the fact that rich and poor countries arrived at their current levels of economic
development through the same historical process. Through slavery, colonization, and genocide,
many of the currently rich societies established great income and wealth inequalities.72
“Relations structured under so unequal conditions are likely to be more beneficial to the stronger
party and thus tend to reinforce the initial economic inequality.”73 In response to the second part
of the argument, Pogge responds that conceding that local factors play a role in low economic
growth does not mean that global factors are irrelevant.74
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Global institutional designs are extremely complex and will affect different countries in different ways.
Besides which, one can concede that poverty might reflect voluntary choices while also holding that global
institutions explain at least some inequalities between rich and poor countries. Ibid., 34.
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He also responds to the position that the current global order is close to optimal with
regards to the challenge of global poverty avoidance.75 Pogge disagrees with this position,
arguing instead that the current global order is designed to give priority to the interests of
“governments, corporations, and citizens of affluent countries” over the goal of poverty
avoidance.76 Furthermore, negotiators are obligated to heed nationalistic imperatives over the
goal of global poverty avoidance, and in so doing reinforce “the very inequality that enables the
governments of the affluent countries to impose such a skewed design in the first place.”77
The last position which Pogge addresses is the argument that although an alternative
global order could do more for the poor “it does not follow that the existing global order causes
excess poverty or excess poverty deaths, that it harms or kills anyone, or that it violates human
rights.”78 Pogge sees this argument as one that relies on an understanding of negative human
rights as rights that could only be violated in the process of direct inter-subjective interactions.
On this understanding, legally established institutions cannot be said to be violating a human
right, and therefore, neither can those who operate such institutions. Pogge sees this argument as
an attempt to exploit the moral distinction between causing something to happen and merely
failing to prevent it from happening.79 He thinks that those who support this position want to
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reduce the imposition of the global order on poor people from the level of an act to the level of
an omission.80
To buttress this position, its defenders sometimes rest their case on the prior question of
whether global poverty is declining or increasing. They sometimes do this by making diachronic
comparisons. Using poverty levels at some point in the past, they argue that since there have
been some gains in poverty reduction from that time period, then the global order cannot be said
to be ‘harming the poor’. Pogge thinks that such diachronic comparisons are faulty because it
takes an arbitrary point in the past as an “appropriate, no-harm baseline.”81 To him, such
arguments would commit us to support the argument that since Jim Crow laws are acceptable
and not a violation of the human rights of black people since they were an improvement over
chattel slavery. In the same vein, that the global poor are marginally better off now than in some
previous time period does not mean that this global order does not harm them, or that its
imposition is not a human rights violation.82 Pogge sees such arguments as a deflection since the
question at stake is whether this global order is benefiting or harming the poor, and not about the
current level of global poverty, compared to prior levels.83
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A variation of the same argument is one in which a “subjunctive comparison with a
hypothetical baseline” is presented.84 For instance, it is sometimes argued that had African
colonialism and slavery not occurred, Africans would still be as badly off as they are today; or
more generally, that the global poor are better off than they would have been in a hypothetical a
state of nature. To the first argument, Pogge responds that these would be different Africans, not
the ones that were in fact harmed by the invasive contact with Europeans. And to the second, he
responds that accepting such an argument would commit us to the position that whatever we do
to another person is permissible so long as it does not reduce such a person to a condition that
places him or her below what would be available in the state of nature. On this view, chattel
slavery would also be considered moral since it is an improvement over the state of nature.85
The argument is also sometimes made, based on the legal precept that one cannot claim
harm for something he or she has consented to, that since the poor (via their governments)
consent to the global order, the order cannot be said to be harming them. 86 To this Pogge
responds first, that the inalienable nature of human rights means that they cannot be signed away.
And even if a person chooses to waive a fundamental human right, such a waiver is never
considered morally or legally enforceable.87 Furthermore, the greatest majority of people who
suffer the economic hardships that the current order imposes are children. Such children cannot
be regarded to have ‘consented’ to an order that leads to their deprivation, and in many cases, to

84

Ibid., 39.

85

Ibid., 39-40.

86

Ibid., 40.

87

Ibid.

52
their deaths.88 Likewise, the most impoverished people in the world cannot be said to consent to
the global order, since in many cases they live under oppressive dictators that the WTO permit to
represent them in trade negotiations. And even when democratically elected governments in poor
countries “consent” to trade and loan agreements, to the extent that they have no other tolerable
options, they do so under “coercive” conditions.89 And to the argument that a poor country does
better under the current global order when such a country complies with the rules (more than
poor countries that refuse to), Pogge says this merely illustrates the fact that there are no other
viable options, and not that these rules are the best that could have been made.90
Citing China and the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) as
examples, arguments are sometimes made that any well-governed country can pull itself out of
poverty. Pogge regards this as an instance of the “some - all” fallacy.91 Just because the Asian
Tigers succeeded in pulling themselves up during the cold war (thanks to authoritarian labor
practices and a US government that opened its markets to aid said Tigers, while allowing them to
protect their industries through tariffs), doesn't mean that any poor country could. These
successes were based on a strong export market, which presumes access to foreign markets.
Given the zero - sum logic of international competition, particularly the global export market, the
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Imagine a situation in which a WTO policy leads to the death of a child because TRIPS laws prevent his
country, and as a result his parents, from obtaining food and medication. In such a situation, it is hard to argue that
such a child or his parents ‘consented’ to those WTO rules. Ibid., 41.
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historical and geographical factors that led to these countries’ successes are not likely to be
duplicable. It is, therefore, unlikely that all other poor countries could have done the same.92
But these arguments do not settle the question of why the global order should not be
absolved since much poverty could be avoided if the leaders of these countries were more
competent and less corrupt.93 In response, Pogge enumerates four ways that “oppression and
corruption” … “are themselves very substantially produced and sustained by central features of
the present global order.”94 He notes that until 1999, not only were foreign organizations legally
permitted to bribe public officials in developing countries, such bribes were tax deductible. To
date, such bribes remain difficult to eradicate even after it was generally proscribed by most
Western countries in the 1999 convention.95
It is also usually the case that politicians and elites in poor countries are also confronted
by two possible sources of influence. The first is the global institutional order – international
agencies, multi-national corporations, foreign governments, etc., and the second is the generally
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poor, uneducated masses of poor countries. The power asymmetry between the two groups
makes it easy to divert the loyalties of the politicians and elites in poor countries since they have
more incentive to answer to powerful governments and multi-national corporations rather than to
their own citizens.96
The democratic deficit in poor countries also worsens their economic conditions. The
global order currently grants recognition in all political and economic transactions (as well as the
privilege to enter economic exchanges and treaties in the name of the country), to whoever is
able to grasp power – irrespective of how they come to power, or how repressive the
government. This has provided incentives for coups and repression in poor countries.97 The
foregoing show that there is a need to scrutinize and reform the institutional rules that govern
global economic and political exchanges, particularly as these rules affect poor countries.
To support his position that the global order is a violation of a negative duty of justice
from rich members of the global community, Pogge presents three additional arguments. The
first is that the global rich and poor alike share one institutional order, which is shaped by rich
countries and imposed on the global poor.98 Since the radical inequality under discussion cannot
be traced to extra-social factors like natural disasters or genetic handicaps, it seems to be the
result of the nature of these institutions. And because there are feasible alternatives to this
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institutional order, the order is implicated in (if not directly responsible for), the reproduction of
radical inequality.99
Secondly, it is contradictory to simultaneously hold the position that natural resources
belong equally to every human person on the planet, while at the same time allowing a system
that permits a few to appropriate these same resources.100 It is, therefore, wrong for the global
poor to be excluded and uncompensated from the use of the world’s natural resources. Pogge
acknowledges that the rich pay for their use of natural resources; he nevertheless asks “what
entitles a global elite to use up the world’s natural resources on mutually agreeable terms while
leaving the global poor empty handed?”101 Thirdly, he thinks that “a morally deeply tarnished
history should not be allowed to result in radical inequality.”102 Since the social starting positions
of the rich and the poor are greatly influenced by a shared history of the rich societies exploiting
the poor ones, in a process of exploitation and other “grievous wrongs.” This history gave rich
societies great advantages, which are reflected in present inequalities.103 And to him, this history
yields a duty for the rich to assist the poor. The world’s poor are very badly off both in absolute
and relative terms. Although radical inequality and extreme poverty are impervious and
pervasive, it is also avoidable.104 Based on the principle that anyone who benefits from an unjust
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institutional order should compensate those who suffer from that order, the present economic
system calls forth a duty of rectification.
What Should Be Done?
The duty of compensation could be met in one of three ways - individual donations,
national donations (bilateral aid), or institutional reform.105 Since “severe poverty could be
rapidly reduced through feasible reforms that would modify the more harmful features of this
global order or mitigate their impact,”106 he chooses to pursue institutional reforms. He justifies
this choice by adding that “even small changes in the rules governing transnational trade,
lending, investment, resource use, or intellectual property can have a huge impact on the global
incidence of life-threatening poverty”107 Pogge proposes three initiatives, which he thinks will
improve the livelihood of the global poor, while reducing global inequality.
Pogge’s Reforms
The Global Resources Dividend (GRD) is a tax to be imposed on all natural resources at
the point of extraction, and the revenues utilized for development projects, in poor societies and
communities. The second initiative is to stop Western firms and governments from buying raw
materials from corrupt leaders of poor countries.108 Lastly, Pogge proposes that rich countries
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desist from using their political and economic might to strike harsh bargains to the detriment of
poor countries, as is currently the case in The World Trade (WTO) negotiations.109
Pogge envisions the GRD as a tax to be imposed on all natural resources that can be
destroyed, eroded, worn down, used or exploited.110 He proposes that funds collected from this
initiative should be used to finance development projects.111 The rationale behind this initiative is
that in the current system, use of the earth’s resources is skewed in favor of the global rich. The
GRD could, therefore, be seen as a way to address this imbalance.112 The need for a GRD arises
because the global financial and economic system does not distribute the use of natural resources
equitably, thus excluding the poor from access to our shared natural resources, which arguably
are equally owned by all human beings. This is a fundamental flaw of the order – a person
without money is automatically excluded from even those things that he or she is morally
entitled to.
Pogge argues that rich countries use their economic and political might to conduct
negotiations in World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations that lead to an “especially brutal
path of economic globalization,” to the detriment of the global poor, who are mostly to be found
in poor countries.113 The immorality of these sorts of negotiations cannot be excused because it
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yields material gains on behalf of rich country citizens and the global elite.114 The second reform
is to stop rich countries from using their power to extract detrimental economic concessions from
poor countries in such negotiations.
The global poor are also made even poorer when businesses and governments of rich
countries indiscriminately purchase raw materials from oppressive leaders of poor countries or
supply arms and grant loans to them. He argues that such acts give such dictators the power to
further oppress their citizens.115 For instance, since all loans must be paid back, if a corrupt
leader is granted a loan, but misappropriates the funds, such a leader would thereby have
effectively immiserated future generations of the country. Pogge, therefore, proposes that rich
businesses and governments of rich countries should only engage in transactions with leaders of
poor countries if and only if, such transactions will benefit the people of the country, particularly
the poor.
These reforms should be designed to compensate for past harms and their accumulated
after effects. Pogge thinks that if properly designed and implemented, they could easily generate
the $300b a year which is the estimated cost of eliminating severe global poverty. However,
distribution of the burdens of such reforms should be legally orchestrated rather than made
voluntary (for instance through donations), because the free rider problem would impose unfair
burdens and stresses on ethical donors.116
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Conclusion
Pogge conceives of almost half of the global population as an undifferentiated mass,
which he refers to as “the global poor.” Pogge’s categories of ‘we’ (who are harming the poor)
and “the global poor” (those who suffer on account of global institutions) are both too broad. He
provides little distinction within these two groups, thereby inadequately examining the possible
distinctions among sub-groups within these categories. For instance, he does not address the
question of how global distributive injustice affects the poor; or how group members have, or
could resist global institutions. He seems to conceive of “the global poor,” as an inert group of
people, who are acted upon by global institutions. This limits the extent to which he is able to
disambiguate the idea of responsibility. While the decision makers at the management level of
the WTO hold some responsibility for global poverty, this should not be conflated with the kind
of responsibility that could rightly be assigned to a high school teacher in a Texas city; simply
the teacher votes and pays taxes.
Another flaw in Pogge’s analysis is that he locates the moral problem in the execution
and not in the structure of the (neo-liberal) global order. There is little acknowledgment of the
fact that the structure of neo-liberal capitalism intensifies the rate in which resources flow more
to already affluent persons, societies, corporations and countries to the detriment of those who
have less. The implication that global poverty could be addressed through a readjustment of the
same institutions whose normal functioning he claims creates global poverty yields a
contradiction. Therefore, although Pogge tries to derive a negative duty not to harm the poor, his
arguments can only sustain a weak negative duty that only implies for its positive fulfillment
modest reforms, which do not go far enough.
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Lastly, Pogge does not adequately account for the inter-subjective domination that is at
the root of all social injustice. The result of his analysis is that the more powerful members of the
global order (deliberately) dominate weaker members. In some cases, the domination is the result
of the normal interactions that could be expected between unequal parties without checks on
power differentials. But in other cases domination is a deliberate policy – the stronger party
deliberately sets out to dominate the weaker. This kind of relationship is most clearly seen in the
hegemonic practices of the United States, although it can also be seen in the behavior of other
powerful countries. An important consequence of this is that although Pogge mentions the role of
power differentials, he does not explicitly engage with geopolitical power. This can be seen in
his reform proposals that rely on the willingness of powerful countries to accept forgo the
benefits that they currently derive from the current order. If power and domination is a feature of
the global order, then an adequate global justice theory must account for such relations in both
the analysis of the problem and in proposed reforms.
I include an analysis of Pogge’s global justice theory because he is one of the most
prominent philosophers working in the field of global justice. Although there is substantial
secondary literature responding to his position, this chapter is an important example of a
dominant trend in current global justice theorizing. An important feature of this trend is that
global injustice is approached from the perspective of global poverty. I disagree with this
position because, in an imaginary world in which extreme and debilitating poverty did not exist,
the problem of global injustice would not necessarily have been resolved. I hold the position that
global poverty is just one dimension of global injustice, besides which global poverty is a mere
symptom of the more fundamental injustice of inter-subjective domination. A test of the
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adequacy of each of the global justice theories that I engage in this project is whether, and to
what extent, each theory accommodates or precludes inter-subjective domination.
Pogge would be hard pressed to make arguments against a relationship in which a rich
country dominates a poor country, while ensuring that no-one in the dominated country suffers
extreme poverty. But we would thereby not be justified in claiming that such a relationship is an
ethical one, or that the demands of justice are met because basic needs are guaranteed. This
shows that Pogge’s theory fails because it could accommodate relations of inter-subjective or
inter-country domination, and thereby also accommodate injustice.

CHAPTER III
MILLER
Introduction – Global Injustice
To Richard Miller, a major cause of global poverty is the economic, military and political
domination of poor countries by rich ones. While acknowledging the “imperialistic” practices of
countries like France and Japan, he sees the imperialistic practices of the United States is
paradigmatic of such relations. Miller argues for a change from the current global relationships
of abuse of power to one of more help and less political intrusion. This requires that all countries
aim for global relations in which all parties would be able to give non-coercive consent to any
institution, rule or policy that affects them. He envisions such a global scheme of cooperation
and civic friendship as one guided by the principles of Global Civic Friendship (GCF), based on
Global Social Democracy (GSD).1
In what follows, I provide a summary of Miller’s analysis of global injustice, as well as
the solutions he provides to address such injustice. I note some of the advantages that Miller’s
theory has over Pogge’s. I conclude on the argument that although Miller argues against the
results of geopolitical domination, by not taking a stronger stand against imperialism, he ends up
with a theory that accommodates relations of domination.
Like Pogge, Miller also approaches the problem of global injustice from an economic
perspective. Miller sees export-led growth as the only feasible path out of poverty. Therefore,

1
Richard W. Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 6-7, 230.
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like Pogge, he also does not take issue with neo-liberal capitalist globalization.2 Miller accepts
that unfair economic exchanges greatly contribute to global poverty, for example, through the
“process of production, exchange and finance and the institutional framework that regulates it,” a
substantial amount rich country citizens are irresponsibly “making improper use of the desperate
neediness of people in developing countries.”3 Contrary to Pogge, he does not think that global
capitalism imposes material neediness on the poor.4 Specifically, he disagrees with Pogge’s
position that we “do not merely let people starve, but also participate actively in starving them.”5
Miller sees global distributive inequities as the result political domination, which yields
duties of redress, particularly for citizens of rich, Western democracies. He notes five areas of
dominating interaction: exploitation in transnational manufacturing, the institutional framework
of world trade and finance, and the effects of global warming on the poor. Others are the
negative consequences of foreign powers steering the course of development in developing
countries, and the obligations created by uses of violence to sustain imperial power. Because the
benefits of such interactions flow more to rich countries, while poor countries suffer its burdens,
citizens of rich countries have a large “unmet responsibility” to help the global poor.6
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Exploitation in Transnational Manufacturing
Miller attributes the recent sharp growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to foreign
firms setting up manufacturing operations in middle and low-middle-income countries as a
reflection of the low cost of wages in these countries.7 Although workers in these factories work
and live under dismal circumstances, the alternatives to employment for many in these countries
are usually worse – grinding rural poverty, even worse working conditions, etc.8 “These hard
facts of life in developing countries benefit globalizing firms,” which is the reason for the global
explosion of sweatshops that are mostly located in developing countries.9
To illustrate the moral deficit of such economic arrangements, Miller distinguishes
between two different meanings of ‘exploitation.’ Exploitation could mean “taking advantage of
someone’s bargaining weakness,” or it could mean “taking advantage of a person by taking
advantage of her bargaining weakness.”10 The first sense of exploitation is ordinarily
permissible, but the second needs additional conditions to be justifiable. Miller thinks it is wrong
for “A person takes advantage of someone if he derives a benefit from her difficulty” … “in a

“In 2000, the current dollar value of manufactured goods imported from low and middle income
countries by high income OECD countries was 3.7 times the current dollar value in 1990, as compared to a ratio
of 1.7 in the values of total high income country imports in those years. Those imports from low and middle
income countries had risen to 16% of high income country merchandise imports, from 7% in 1990. By 2005, the
proportion had further increased to 21%. Opportunities to profit from this expansion are a major source of the
growth of foreign direct investment in developing countries: from 1990 and 2005, foreign direct investment in
low and middle income countries grew eleven-fold (nearly thirteen-fold in lower middle income countries) as
compared to a fourfold increase in high income countries.” Ibid., 63.
7
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process that shows inadequate importance of her interests and her capacity for choice.”11 That
the weaker party is made better off by such an exchange does not mean that the stronger has not
thereby taken undue advantage. He refers to this as “taking advantage of weakness that wrongs
while bettering.”12
Since market exchanges presume that both parties have something the other desires, only
the second sense of exploitation condemns. However, in relations of very steep power
differentials, “mere exploitation” in the first sense of the term, is prima facie reason for ascribing
the second sense. The moral flaw lies in taking advantage of bargaining weakness of others who
face very bad outcomes because this “uses them as mere means.”13
But such relations could be justified when abstaining from entering them could be
excessively costly to one or both parties, or when such a relationship is necessary to correct for
the results of “shortsightedness, moral insensitivity or outright injustice of other parties.”14 But
that notwithstanding, since a great many beneficiaries of globalized manufacturing are people
living in developed countries, abuses in trans-national manufacturing generate duties of
rectification.15

Ibid., 60.
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Miller likens this to the case of a Victorian husband who exploits the prevalent culture to ensure that
his wife remains differential. Such a husband does her wrong, even if within that culture, the wife would be
worse off as a divorcee or a widow. Ibid., 61.
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He provides a moral standard: Payment for services rendered must not exceed what would be paid if
bargaining power were not crippled by urgency. Ibid., 60, 61.
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“In the context of trans-national manufacturing, there might be good reason for engaging in mere
exploitation, besides which, it might be too expensive for both parties to desist. For example, raising wages may
price a manufacturer out of business, and insisting on ‘fair’ wages might cause the company to move to another
region or country.” Ibid., 60.
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Inequitable Frameworks
Another area in which bargaining weaknesses are exploited is in trade regimes which
through “threats of exclusion or discrimination,” privilege rich countries to the detriment of poor
ones.16 The global system of Tariffs and Quotas operate in a way that provides greater export
access for rich countries while limiting the access of poor countries to export markets.17 This
shortfall in “reasonableness,” which on many occasions is achieved through “bullying,” leads to
a net loss of $600 million a year to the poorest 48 countries.18 To Miller, such arrangements
“could not be justified without violations of reciprocity of reasons.”19
Powerful countries also use trade agreements to further ends that are not purely
economic. For instance, excess agricultural products are routinely dumped in poor countries,

to the transaction. Therefore, Miller’s conclusion rests on a contradiction because an economic exchange is purely a
matter of two parties reaching an agreement. Although it could be morally relevant outside of the exchange specific
exchange, whether, and to one extent either party is “bettered” is not morally relevant to the specific interaction of
exchange.
16

For instance, during the Uruguay Round of the WTO (1981-94), developed countries bullied developing
countries into accepting inequitable agreements that allowed the former (but not the latter) to keep tariffs and
subsidies. And during the Doha Round of the WTO, the United States for example only agreed to cap its agricultural
subsidies at a level twice its actual size. Ibid., 73. “This trade and investment framework has been shaped by threats
of exclusion or discrimination, through which major developed countries take advantage of the especially urgent
need of developing countries for access to developed country markets.” Ibid., 70. In 2005 alone, developed countries
spent $280 on agricultural subsidies. Such subsidies shield rich country farms from the same competition that is
‘encouraged’ by neo liberal “free trade” policies, which poor countries are forced to implement. Removing poor
countries tariffs reduces their tax base (which makes up to a quarter of the GDP earnings in many developing
countries), further reducing domestic funds available for social spending. Ibid., 80.
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Eliminating the unequal tariff burdens imposed on developing nations, which is three times higher than
those imposed on developed nations, could add up to 100 billion dollars in total value added. Ibid., 77. “No country
has ever successfully developed without relying on measures to manage damage and increase advantages from
world trade that are banned by rules that were instituted by the Uruguay Round, through dire threats overcoming
heated resistance.” Ibid., 80.
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with devastating results on local farming. 20 And although immigrants’ impact on affluent host
country is generally positive, while creating opportunities for poor countries to benefit from
remissions, restrictive immigration laws prohibit or limit immigrants from entering developed
countries.21 Miller sees such impositions as dominative, and only agreed to by poor countries
because of the “rational need of the weak to acquiesce to the threat influence of the strong.”22
Due to competition in global trade, “A developing country’s entry into the world of
globalization is often grim.”23 It, therefore, seems best for vulnerable developing countries to
have more flexibility in deciding the path of their own “painful” entry into globalization.24
Despite its questionable track record of success, the current trade regime blocks other options
and models of economic development that developing countries could have pursued.25 Miller
argues that since any path of development is a gamble, those who will be most affected by such
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gambles should have a say in selecting a path of development. Poor countries should, therefore,
be left alone to experiment with different methods and packages for entering the global market.
To Miller, “in a joint enterprise, those who have imposed inequitable arrangements in the
recent past have a duty to compensate for the toll, and a duty to mitigate on-going consequences
of the inequity after it has ended.”26 There is a need to “make up for previous political
irresponsibility, at least in the recent past.”27 The first step towards doing this is to “Replace
international bullying with international reasonableness,” or reasonable discourse, which requires
three conditions.28 The first is reciprocity toward other representatives - both regarding good
faith consideration of each party’s interests and in the giving and weighing of reasons acceptable
to all. Secondly, there should be reciprocity towards one’s own compatriots by justifying
agreements by reasons they (compatriots) could accept; and third, all parties have a duty to live
up to their responsibilities.29
Any agreement not reached from within “constraints of reasonableness in deliberations”
could lead to “the strong is taking advantage of the weak.”30 To guard against this, Miller
recommends discourse – ethical principles for regulating trade negotiations: mutual respect for
interests leading to reasonable deliberation oriented to principled compromises that all could
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accept without constraint.31 It does not matter whether the goals of justice are internal to the
regime or external to it, so long as principles are “justified to others in light of their
consequences and their coherence.”32 In such deliberations, the interests of the most vulnerable
poor must be placed near the front of all considerations. He suggests that in this case, the use of a
“veil of ignorance” could be useful in resolving conflicts over competing paths toward
development that favor certain parties.33
Globalization impacts developing countries much harder than developed ones (for
instance up to 25 percent or more of the tax revenues of some poor countries come from import
tariffs). He therefore suggests that the IMF should increase its social fund, which currently
averages between $8-18 per poor person per year, an amount which Miller describes as too “little
and late.”34 Meeting the foregoing conditions might also require that national representatives (of
trade negotiations) suspend advocating too strongly for interests of compatriots for the sake of
compensating for past iniquitous agreements.35 For instance, although “U.S. power has sustained
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“For instance, a WTO decision might have to choose between bringing advancing the interests of one
country (maybe China) and thereby bringing more poor people out of poverty, or fewer poor people located in more
than one country.” Ibid., 74. For an explanation of the concept of the veil of ignorance, see John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice: Original Edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 129, 134, 139.
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“The most important element of a discourse ethical setting is its reliance on the principle of reciprocity of
reasoning, which forbids that I demand of another what I am not willing to give to him or her; or claim a position I
am not willing to grant another (similar circumstances presumed). However, the need to make entry into the global
market less painful for poorer countries could be used to justify the violation of the reciprocity of reasoning
principle.” Ibid., 72.
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the status quo,” the forced global reliance on the U.S. dollar could be replaced with a more
equitable global financial system.36
Climate Change
Miller sees harmful climate change due to the release of greenhouse gasses as another
source of unmet responsibilities.37 To him, this is a problem that “generates a shared duty of
containment,” because it is the “collective effect of our individual pursuits taken together.”38 The
moral responsibility arises from the duty we have to show “due concern for unintended harmful
side-effects of conduct which may, itself, be morally flawless.”39 Addressing the problem of
climate change brings to the fore two questions: what level of mitigation should be pursued, and
how should the required sacrifices be allotted? Miller identifies three parties that should be
considered with regards to these questions: the global poor, relatively well-off citizens of western
democracies, and future generations.40
Two additional factors further complicate the problem. The first is lack of a “wellestablished comprehensive, reasonably precise description of when costly forbearance from
conduct with harmful side effects is morally required.”41 The second is that forbearance from
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“Although this responsibility does not derive from wrongdoing, since prior to the 1990s, the climatic
effect of many commercial activities were not well known. But information about the effects of these activities on
the atmosphere is now readily available, calling for the need to take responsibility for those effects.” Ibid., 95.
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“The establishment of such a standard would have to settle questions about the difference between
intentional and intended harm that are among the most obscure and contested in ethics, and provide a principled
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economic pursuits could constitute an important loss to persons in the three groups.42 To
guarantee equity, Miller proposes that deliberations be based on a model of teamwork and
“responsible deliberations.”43 He suggests that in this case, we should assume the global
analogue of domestic political relationships, and carry out deliberations based on a principle
similar to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, which would favor the global poor in the imposition of
burdens.44
And although more sacrifice should be expected from rich countries, equity demands that
the burden should not be placed on rich countries alone.45 In the same vein, “a climate regime
that is insensitive to the special needs of the world’s poor seems grossly inequitable.”46 However,
fairness demands a policy that lowers emissions in the least developed countries to the point
where more sacrifice would lead to increased destitution.47 On this model, the cost of climate
control will burden poor people in rich societies more than those in poor countries. The
principles of reasonable discourse require that poor people in rich countries who could be
negatively affected be “offered justification for accepting this arrangement rather than others

solution to a problem that theorists of justice in war have tried to solve for a long time, a reasonably precise
description of adequate care to avoid causing civilian deaths.” Ibid., 105.
42

Ibid., 92.

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid., 93.

45

Ibid., 87-88.

46

This is because between a policy that postpones escape from destitution and one that reduces economic
production, the former seems unfair, since it demands more morally significant sacrifice. Ibid., 93-94. We should
therefore accept as equitable, a distribution “that imposes significant risks of sacrifice on many people in developed
countries, while advancing the interests of the global poor.” Ibid., 86.
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inflicting less harm.”48 In sum, although priority should be given to poor people in poor
countries, the concerns of poor individuals in developed countries should not be discounted.
These policies should be grounded on trust among all parties, and such trust should be
honored by the willingness to make sacrifices and not becoming parasitic on the system. 49 On
this view, it would be unfair to demand that the (global) poor carry greater burden just because
they stand to gain more from climate change reduction. By the same token, the poor U.S. coal
miner who refuses to sacrifice by appealing to the principle of sympathy ignores that he or she is
from a society that has contributed a greater share of global pollution.50 But although, “those
taking part in an activity giving rise to grave harms must make a good faith effort to reduce those
harms,”51 this should not commit us to a “polluter pays” position, since such a position places
undue burdens on those who could not have anticipated that their commercial activities could
affect the environment in this way.52
Relatedly, we should also not recklessly reduce commercial activities that contribute to
global warming, since this could lead to widespread industrial shutdown.53 It would also be
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Miller notes that prior to the 1990s, many people were not aware of the problems (and causes) of global
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unfair to require that everyone reduce their emissions towards some ideal (equalizing) target.
Instead, Miller suggests a “Contract and Converge” model aimed towards rough equality in per
capita carbon emissions, while taking into consideration contextual differences like local weather
and rate of development.54 Since “any citizenry worthy of trust will seek a package of global
climate policies that is impartially acceptable to every person,”55 global warming deliberations
should be made according to the principles of ‘reasonable discourse,’ based on the principle of
impartial acceptability – “the ultimate agreement benefit each party overall and on balance, as
compared to non-agreement.”56 But Miller is also aware of the risk that rich, powerful countries
could be tempted to use their power to bully poor countries in deliberations. But this would be an
irresponsible abuse of power. To Miller, “If responsible, the strong (countries) would” “prefer to
forgo the concessions they could extract, in order to base political stability on mutual trust rather
than asymmetric fear.” Otherwise like tyrants, “they base rule on the exploitation of
vulnerability.”57
Addressing global warming should be a collective effort – the gains to the well-off should
therefore not be purchased at the expense of the poor. For instance, developed countries should
accept a reduction in GDP growth, and countries like Canada (who might stand to benefit from
global warming) should also be willing to make sacrifices.58 Compensation in the form of (well

54

Ibid., 96, 98.

55

Ibid., 107.

56

Ibid., 104.

57

Ibid., 100.

58

Ibid., 104.

74
targeted and apolitical) aid should also be made available to help poor countries develop using
less polluting technologies and adapt to warming.59 And because the harms we are trying to
prevent are anticipated to start towards the end of this century, special consideration should also
be given to up to two generations into the future. Miller recognizes that this means that global
warming deliberations will ask people to make sacrifices and give “standing to climate harms
that will not be endured in the lifetimes of many.”60 But this is justified because genuine
commitment to the principles of justice and fairness cannot be limited to one’s lifetime. Besides
which, the duty of “due care” demands that we do not deliberately and avoidably take actions
that are guaranteed to be detrimental to the well-being of future generations.61
Empire, Obligation and Imperial Excess
Miller sees the United States (U.S.) as a paradigmatic of “the systematic influence of
great powers (that) crosses borders unaccompanied by appeals to political allegiance or
legitimate authority.”62 This imperial, hegemonic ability to change foreign lives through
processes that do not depend on willing support by those who are affected, yields moral and
political duties.63 To make his case, Miller first responds to two arguments that are usually made
against his position. The first is that the U.S. does not always get what it wants, even within its
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territorial dominion. Secondly, even when it does, the mere fact of influence does not justify
referring to the U.S. as an “Empire.”64
Miller justifies his terminological choice (of referring to the U.S. as an empire) by
defining domination as “non-reciprocal influence.65 More than any other nation lives everywhere
are affected by U.S.’s domineering influence. While it is true that countries sometimes assert
their sovereignty to resist the U.S., such resistance does not negate the mechanisms of U.S.
empire. One can justifiably say that the U.S. dominates a country when U.S.’s initiatives are
“especially important in the shaping of the local terms of life.”66 And although the U.S. is not a
literal imperial power like Great Britain was, it functions in an analogous manner.67
Miller understands “the bearer of prerogatives” as one who “has importance that forces
others to give way.”68 Through such prerogatives, direct threat power, and the use of destructive
power, the U.S. uses its “domineering influence” to forcefully shape lives in many developing
countries, “in ways that are hard to reconcile with respect for their autonomy.”69 For example,
the financial predominance of the United States gives it the capacity to pursue its interests in
ways that give rise to costs to others.70 But the U.S. needn’t carry out threats in order to bully –
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“The use of the dollar as international currency means that 90% of all foreign trade is conducted in
dollars, and 60% of dollars is held by creditors outside the US. The US is still regarded as safest haven for foreign
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it sometimes rules by indirect or concealed force. For example, countries run the risk of losing
World Bank or International Finance Corporation (IFC) aid or loans if they contravene the
wishes of the U.S.71
U.S.’s domination of institutions like The World Bank (WB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), enables it to steer multi-lateral processes that affect the course of
development of the vast majority of developing countries. Such exclusive, hegemonic and
asymmetrical prerogatives and threats are dominative because they “shape lives” in developing
countries “according to policies and preferences shaped by U.S. initiatives.”72 Such external
domination risks altering the contract between governments and citizens in developing countries
from a state commitment to manage development, to a state commitment to carry out the wishes

investment. US treasury bills in foreign exchange reserves – upward to 16 trillion dollars – reflect US borrowing
prerogative. When Fed decides to tighten credit to offset local inflation, money becomes tight and poorer countries
cannot borrow; likewise, when the dollar is devalued, this impacts foreign holders of US treasuries adversely (but
too much devaluation would make treasuries unattractive to bond-holders like China, thereby limiting US capacity
to borrow). These create coordination prerogatives, or the need for foreigners to adjust their business and financial
practices to the need of US business and finance means that US is always has access to foreign intellectual labor
tailored to its interests. But all of these also mean that a financial crisis in the US will impact the whole world.”
Ibid., 121-123.
71

“However, the U.S. sometimes employs actual destructive power, for instance, in the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein. Such actions heighten fears of opposing the U.S. interests. Destructive Power also includes
“violence by foreign groups which rely on US support,” such as power exercised by foreign U.S. client regimes and
proxies (Nicaraguan Contras, Afghani Mujahedeen).” Ibid., 124,127. Prerogatives, threat and destructive force are
mutually reinforcing - the capacity to borrow enables exorbitant build-up of U.S. military capacity, which in turn
leverages economic power (access to oil, etc.).
72
Miller illustrates this scenario with examples of Guatemala, the Philippines, Egypt and Ethiopia IMF and
WB votes are weighted by contribution with US possessing veto power despite its declining share (16.77% of IMF
votes but still 3X the next highest), as we all as an informal agreement that president of the WB must be a US
citizen. Both IMF and WB rely on US financial resources (WB created the WB’s low-interest deferred payment loan
program to coopt less US uncontrollable parallel program. History vis-à-vis Chile, Vietnam, Nicaragua, etc., shows
that the US geopolitical interests determine who gets and doesn't get loans. Unconditional loans have been replaced
by conditional, structural adjustment agreements, especially beginning around 1980. The new loan conditions since
the 1990s have rewarded market-based privatization and deregulation reforms over anti-corruption and rule of law
reform. Ibid., 130, 133, 135-138.
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of global private enterprise.73 This form of dominance gives rise to special responsibilities to
citizens of the U.S., towards dominated foreigners74
U.S. military sponsorship and military and armed sales dependence relations with
‘strategic’ countries like Saudi Arabia is another form of domination.75 This can be seen in the
pattern of U.S. (military and non-military) aid, which is apportioned “not on the basis of poverty
reduction needs, but on the basis of its own strategic needs.” 76 In addition, the U.S. uses the
threat of stopping trade to accomplish its purposes, a strategy that has been particularly
successful in many Latin American countries, where trade dependence on the U.S. could be
many times more important than U.S. aid.77
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“Austerity has sharply reduced social welfare and health expenditures while at the same time actually
lowering growth in 98 countries receiving IMF loans by 1.5% and increased by 14 million the number of poor
people falling below $2 a day. IMF riots in more than half of the countries where it was imposed. The IMF and WB
policies serve US corporate/economic and geo-political interests – not poverty reduction. The financial world obeys
the dictates of the United States, which is fully aware of the harms that this regime inflicts, but uses its dominating
influence to continue to deepen and widen these policies.” Ibid., 139.
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“The Middle East is one prominent site of military patronage. The House of Saud has played a leading
role worldwide in containing oil price surges and expanding production and has provided preferential terms to
American oil companies in exchange for its tenuous rule, renowned for repression, bigotry and the taking of national
wealth for princely luxury. The largest arms supplier to Saudi Arabia, the United States, had military sales of over
$115 billion (in contemporary dollars) to the Saudi regime in the second half of the twentieth century.” Thus, the two
countries have developed a “long standing security relationship.” Ibid., 142.
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“In 1999, Israel got 51% of US military aid while Egypt got 35%, and more recently, more money has
been given to Iraq, and Afghanistan. Israel, which received lion’s share of aid in 1999, ranks No 5 in per capita GNI,
and Egypt, which received second largest aid amount, is lower middle class. “Even in the disbursement of aid
classified as “development assistance,” the US does not favor low income countries. Aid dependence is not “an
unfortunate effect of poverty”, but “a vehicle of domineering influence. Israel, which received lion’s share of aid in
1999, ranks No 5 in per capita GNI, and Egypt, which received second largest aid amount, is lower middle class.)
Haiti, by contrast, saw its aid sharply reduced (and eventually delivered indirectly by NGOs) following Aristide’s
resistance to the IMF/WB agreement he had promised to accept.” Ibid., 142-145.
77
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Specific Patterns of Domination
When countries are poor, but endowed with rich natural resources, or are in a strategic
location, developed countries are especially energetic in shaping the local terms of life, through
rewards and threats that promote the local dominance of elites favoring their interests. Such
countries are the targets of violence, direct or sponsored, that advance the power or wealth of
leading developed countries.78 Miller argues that a nation’s responsibility for promoting the
autonomy of foreigners is proportional to its contribution in promoting activities that threaten to
disvalue that autonomy.79 Therefore, such transnational dominion yields a duty of trusteeship to
ensure that basic needs to lead a satisfactory life are met. Failure to do this impose duties of
correction and repair.80 In general, citizens of domineering countries have a duty to “hem in” the
“immoral excesses” of their countries.81
Structural Adjustment
Miller notes three specific processes of imperial abuse of power and the duties that they
generate. The first is the shaping of the course of development through ‘structural adjustment’
policies, which he sees as using the economic needs of others to further the ends of empire
(specifically, the United States). He argues that such policies generate a residual responsibility to
meet the basic needs of citizens of affected poor countries. The second is the propping up of
repressive client regimes, which he says generates a duty to promote prosperity (beyond basic
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Ibid., 149. Specifically, the imperial reach of the United States in “the transnational shaping of lives”
creates unmet “transnational responsibilities” for American citizens. Ibid., 147.
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needs) in such countries. And the third is the exercise of destructive power, both direct and
sponsored, which generates a vast duty of repair.82
Miller is of the opinion that if a trade/structural adjustment regime is imposed to replace a
regime where farmers sold to a marketing board, and consumers purchased subsidized food;
tariffs protected local farms and businesses from foreign competition, and local ownership of
assets was required, and local banks and credit agencies preferred, this creates a responsibility to
ensure that those under the new regime have their basic needs met such that they would have
freely consented to the new system.83 Such economic policies (like structural adjustment) should
only be imposed “if it merits the willing support of all.”84 Current structural adjustment policies
fail in this regard and are simply a way in which the U.S. manipulates the pressing needs of
developing countries so that local markets are made amenable to global, predominantly
American firms.85 Such policies are immoral because they (forcibly) transform the course of
local economic development while expanding the resources of developed countries. Similarly,
geopolitical or strategic conditions to (economic) aid are also immoral or at least, negligent.
U.S.’ imposition of conditions on developmental assistance through threats is thereby a violation
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However, this should not be taken to mean that everyone that could be affected by the policy should be
engaged in physical conversation. It however does imply that all interests should be adequately considered before
such a policy is imposed. Ibid., 152.
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of morality.86 Both policies (structural adjustment policies and geopolitical or strategic condition
to (economic) aid) are thereby forms of domination and tyranny.87
It must, however, be noted that countries like Japan and France also engage in hegemonic
practices. Therefore, although the United States “is the leader in a dominant coalition of
developed countries, (it is) not the sole independent force.”88 In addition, no country is “a passive
receiver of Washingtonian prescriptions.”89 Some responsibility for global poverty should,
therefore, be assigned to other imperialist countries, as well as officials and business elites in
developing countries.90
Invasion and Occupation
The United States also uses its “destructive power in many developing countries,
resulting in the deaths of millions and leaving the lives of many millions in shreds.”91 To show
how “devastating, continuous and bipartisan” U.S. destructive power has been, Miller cites
examples of U.S.’ involvement in “The Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central America, Indonesia,
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“The refusal to use the ensuing gains to help those whose basic needs are at stake disowns the
responsibility created by this special intrusiveness.” Ibid., 159.
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“Countries like France and Japan are part of the coalition that administers institutions like the World Bank
and the IMF that impose structural adjustment policies on developing countries. Such countries also maintain
imperialist relations with other developing countries.” Ibid., 156-157.
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“That is, although local recipients should have substantial control over the course of their own
development, whatever the global economic conditions they are faced with, local governments have the
responsibility to resist destructive loan conditions and make good use of loans (whatever the conditions). In
addition, populations should insist on, and struggle for accountable, non-corrupt governments.” Ibid., 158-159.
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Vietnam, The Congo, and Somalia.”92 These “reigns of terror” were launched to prevent the
foreseeable loss of economic wealth of nationalized resources.93 When the United States
interfered in these regions and countries (in many cases overthrowing democratic nationalists),
no “informed person supposed that the people of those countries were being protected from
domestic tyranny.”94
Such threats of destruction and actual destruction, as well as other forms of taking
advantage of weaknesses in developing countries, remain useful instruments for the United
States.95 To Miller, the utility of such actions does not detract from the moral violation inherent
to them. He argues that the potential loss of geopolitical influence didn’t justify the “shedding of
oceans of blood” in Vietnam, or the “devastation of a whole country and killing of 14,000 Soviet
troops, most of them conscripts,” in Afghanistan (the 1980s). Neither did security and safety
require the invasion of Iraq.96 He thinks that “America’s vast destructive power is guided by a
lethal combination of interest and disinterest”97 – interest in increasing power, material gains and
influence, with commensurate disinterest in the lives of foreigners. In the decision-making
process, maintaining threat credibility is given far more priority than reducing “severe costs to
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“The United States government caused the death of many hundreds of thousands by intentionally
prolonging the Iraq-Iran War, decimating the Iraqi civilian infrastructure in the first Gulf war, insuring its further
decay through the stringency of post-war sanctions, using massively destructive fire power in the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein and imposing a prolonged occupation against the wishes of the majority of Iraqis.” Ibid., 183.
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vulnerable people in developing countries.”98 However, moral responsibility for such policies is
partially shared by local elites, as well as other leading developed countries like France, Japan,
and Britain, who usually support U.S. policies.99 He, however, insists that any country in a
relationship of domination with another owes political responsibilities to those whom it
dominates.100
Political Decisions101
Miller describes two important factors that influence foreign policy decisions in the
United States. First, the political process is heavily influenced by economic-corporate elites, who
in turn demand beneficial policies from the politicians.102 By helping to maintain a culture that
is grounded on the premise of the beneficence of American world power, the media is an
important tool in this process.103 This leads to the second factor – “In the public political culture,
98
He sees the same attitude displayed in aid allocation. For instance, between 1965 and 1988, US
development aid declined by 83%, declining to just 0.1% of GDP after 1988 (after the fall of the Berlin wall, since
the USSR was no longer considered a threat). Ibid., 190-191.
99

As former Chief Economist of World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz notes, these loan agreements benefit only
elites in developing countries. Therefore, there is “mingled agency of outside powers and local elites.” “The fact that
these elites share responsibility does not eliminate the fact that they are agents of indirect US rule. The local
government’s willing though tacit, invitation does not cancel outside responsibilities toward the people of the
developing country, not to their government (except in so far as it represents the common good and general will of
its people).” Ibid., 141.
100

“In cases where the domination takes the form of a sponsored regime, while the sponsored regime is
profoundly responsible for the consequences of its rule, so is the outside sponsor. This is because without internal
acquiescence depending on the outside support, the regime might not otherwise stay in power.” Ibid., 132-133.
101
Miller thinks it is difficult for people to see that the pursuit of American power and wealth often demands
the use of destructive violence. He fears that any attempt to show how “the advancement of American power often
harms humanity would invite the scorn of both political parties, undermine the most important American
corporations, and excite anger and disbelief that accompany wounded patriotic pride.” Ibid., 195.
102

“American politicians must accommodate economic elites to win elections shaped by the public political
culture.” Ibid., 192.
103
The media strengthens and reflects the presupposition that American power only harms through
temporary departures from the prudent pursuit of its normal goals. For instance, reportage of US military
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the premise that what strengthens American world power is good is the common property of both
political parties and the standard presupposition of American schooling.104
Miller concludes that,
the interlocking mechanisms of institutional governance of U.S. foreign policy insure the
losses to foreigners in developing countries do not have substantial, independent force in
restraining the pursuit of American wealth and power. Granted, what would best promote
American wealth or power does not always have these costs. But it often does.105
However, “The fervent wish that the American empire would disappear as soon as possible
seems to underrate the hard facts of power.”106 Despite the problems it produces, U.S. empire is
“beneficial in some ways, dangerous in others, a process whose unconstrained exertion and
whose absence would be catastrophic.”107 Its immediate disappearance could be problematic
because, for instance, it could lead to the rise of China (another “global hegemony that promises
no advantage over the current power structure”108) to superpower status. Furthermore, because
markets hate uncertainty, the “caution and instability” that the demise of (U.S.) empire will
create would slow down global economic growth, further harming the world’s poor. 109

intervention via embedded reporters, etc., portrays such intervention in the most patriotic and humanitarian light,
taking note only of a few exceptional deviations (e.g., Mai Lai, Abu Ghraib), while concealing vast destruction and
high death tolls. This depiction of the US as the great peacekeeper in post-invasion Iraq obscures the fact that both
Shia and Sunni factions overwhelmingly (92%) blamed the US for the violence as a foreign occupier. Ibid., 191-194.
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merging most suffering into the background noise of the “wretchedness in the developing world.” Ibid., 192.
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The foregoing arguments indicate that to Miller, although the responsibilities that the U.S.
owes to disadvantaged people abroad are less than those owed to compatriots, these
responsibilities are still substantial.110 The foregoing analysis also indicates that the duties that
arise from being the citizen of an empire go beyond mere aid qualified by conditions.111 Citizens
of imperialist countries (particularly the U.S.) should, therefore, be ready to help foreigners in
proportion to their countries’ resources and influence. Merely advocating that their government
should do more to help (the global poor in general) is clearly not enough.
Policy Recommendations
One of Miller’s central arguments is that economic interdependence and global political
interactions have created a world in which resources are concentrated in rich countries, while
poor countries are getting more and more impoverished.112 To him, the obligation to help needy
foreigners should be based on the duties that derive from interactions, and not the mere fact that
foreigners are in need. He suggests that this provides the best way to override the standard
assumptions of priority for the needs of economically challenged compatriots.113 Thus, his
arguments are not based on impartial global concern like Pogge’s cosmopolitanism. Rather,
Miller subscribes to what he refers to as ‘quasi-cosmopolitanism,’ which is a form of

110

For example, while the political duties that Americans have toward compatriots are not the same as they
have toward Guatemalans, Americans do have political responsibilities to Guatemalans based on the United States’
dominance in shaping the development of Guatemalan lives; the military support of Guatemalan client governments
(especially in the past); and the destructive force meted on Guatemala in fomenting coups, dictatorships, and
oppression.Ibid., 149.
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cosmopolitanism that assigns equal value, but not equal concern, to persons. It is on the grounds
of this version of cosmopolitanism that he proposes a global scheme of cooperation and civic
friendship, which he thinks will “advance the interests of needy people,” “within the bounds of
political feasibility.”114
He agrees with cosmopolitans that citizens of rich countries have a duty to generalize the
duty of concern in a way that does not privilege poor compatriots.115 However, this would not be
on account of a global extrapolation of the political duty (to assist compatriots). 116 He believes
his “relational approach” to global justice, grounded on ‘quasi-cosmopolitanism’ will lead to
“willing, self-respectful cooperation as a basis for mutual reliance.”117
To determine the best way to meet these duties, Miller considers three options. The first
is the severance of all interactions with the foreign poor, after making good for “past abuses.” 118
114
He sees interactions between people in rich and poor countries as that which gives rise to ‘relational
responsibilities,’ which, if met, would greatly reduce suffering among the global poor. And given our special social
democratic duties to advance the well-being of our worst-off countrymen, the duty of beneficence does not justify a
duty to substantially reduce or eliminate world poverty. But a duty to appreciate the worth of foreign lives, which
implies a correlative duty not to take advantage of their weakness to extract gains for ourselves, does. Therefore,
Miller does not ground the duty to help needy foreigners on the principle of sacrifice or the duty of sympathy. He
thinks the principle of sacrifice is too stringent, while the principle sympathy leaves donors too much room to
address competing causes. The arguments to help the foreign poor are therefore better grounded not on the duty of
benevolence, or economic exchange (which would cause us to favor co-nationals), but on obligations that arise from
transnational interactions. Ibid., 2-3, 5-6, 31.
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He disagrees with Beitz’s position that “Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social
cooperation, they do not mark the limits of social obligations. Thus, the parties in the original position cannot be
assumed to know that they are members of a particular national society.” Ibid., Note 2, 265. He is also against the
position that, “duties to help disadvantaged compatriots are said to be duties of fairness towards associates in
economic interdependence.” Attributed to Moellendorf, Beitz and Pogge (in his earlier writings). Ibid., 31-33.
116

The significant losses to economically vulnerable people in developed countries could be justified on the
political duty to properly value the “interests and autonomy” of global poor. Ibid., 4.
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Miller understands standard cosmopolitanism as requiring “a global extrapolation of principles of
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118

Ibid., 216.

86
He rejects this because ending commercial interactions will make poor countries worse off.
Besides which, rationality demands that we continue to pursue mutual benefit based on
cooperation.119 Next, he considers and rejects a two-or three -fold increase in foreign aid,
because the efficacy of such aid is weakened by weak domestic government institutions and
bears the risk of undermining local economies’ self-reliance. Such loans also invariably come
with “strings” to advance the domination of the donor country over the recipient country
“attached.”120 He next considers the liberalization of trade relationships, including permitting
open migration of unskilled workers. He also rejects this as well, because such a policy would
have an unbearable cost on poor members of rich countries.121
In response to Pogge’s human (social and political) rights arguments, Miller argues that
partly because there is no “single global standard of distributive justice,”122 no one is entitled to
any (minimum) level of basic goods. Furthermore, if duties to the global poor were based on the
principle of charity, this would justify privileging the needs of compatriots over even more
extreme need in foreign countries. Therefore, global justice cannot be based on sympathy or the
fact that people are not able to earn enough to meet their basic needs.
A responsible citizen of the United States (and other dominating/imperial countries), has
a duty to limit her country’s “immoral excess through initiatives originating outside of
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institutional governance.”123 Citizens of the U.S. in particular, have a responsibility to “hem in
the empire by reducing its immoral excesses” through “strengthening of initiatives outside the
corridors of power.”124 He thinks such actions could create a world in which “inevitable shifts in
power will inaugurate an era of reasonable compromise rather than destructive frenzy.”125 He,
however, notes that unfortunately, exploitation produces insensitivity to the neediness that
facilitates it, therefore, these duties will probably not be paid.126 But he insists that his quasicosmopolitanism theory at least provides an idea of how such duties might be prioritized.127
He acknowledges that meeting these obligations could also “pose significant loss to
vulnerable people in developed countries.”128 However, such losses should be weighed against
“the significance of trapping people in China or Bangladesh in lives of fatigue, drudgery and illhealth.”129 Therefore, meeting the responsibility of foreign obligations by shifting some domestic
funds to help the foreign poor would reduce, rather than increase irresponsibility.130
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“Exploitation produces insensitivity to the neediness that facilitates it, insensitivity that is especially
secure when those who benefit are insulated from the immediate reverberations of discontent among foreigners they
exploit, with whom they share no strong ties of valued history or common culture.” Ibid., 231.
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Miller cites a study showing that 2/3 of the decline in relative wages among high school drop outs from
1980 – 95 was due to immigration) while another 6-11% was due to competition by imports with cheaper foreign
labor. In 2002, high school dropouts in the United States were 37% of those living below the poverty line. In
addition, “…moral responsibility dictates stringent emissions reductions concentrated in developed countries.”
Ibid., 221-222.
129
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As he says, “justice might well require such extensive reliance on foreign aid to fulfill responsibilities of
dominion and repair, avoid wrongful exploitation, alleviate unjust burdens of trade liberalization, support adaptation
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Global Social Democracy (GSD) Based on Global Civic Friendship (GCF)
Miller aspires to a world in which global relations will be based on “reasonable
deliberations” that will lead to “genuine cooperation based on mutual respect.”131 He conceives
of international relations as a form of (global) friendship, and on this basis, proposes that the
global community should aspire towards the goal of Global Civic Friendship (GCF). That is, for
all global interactions to be based on terms that all participating countries and societies could
willingly and self-respectfully support.132 In view of this, he argues for a Global Social
Democracy (GSD) movement (based on principles of GCF). Such a movement could bridge
cosmopolitan demands with patriot’s demands, and compel powerful countries to “use power

to global climate change and compensate for recent inequities in the global trade and finance regime that exceeds the
requirements of just provision for disadvantaged compatriots.” “Clearly, the foreign aid required to compensate for
inequalities in global trade and finance regimes, ease the impact of trade liberalization in developing countries,
support climate change measures in those countries, and to repair for past damage etc. would probably exceed $400
billion. Even if we shifted some of the money spent on domestic aid on foreign aid, to meet this amount, the
proportional benefit would be spread over many more people, so that the per-capita aid given to a compatriot would
still exceed the per capita aid given to a foreigner” Ibid., 224-225 However, governments of developed countries
should also be willing to make greater compensatory domestic expenditures for disadvantaged compatriots. Ibid.,
222.
131
132

Ibid., 1.

His vision is that we can develop political relations that will meet demands of justice like, compensatory
(Iraq) distributive (returning fruits of manufacturing exploitation in China), and ensuring need satisfaction and
development where U.S. has imposed a regime of development. (Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America). Ibid., 226.
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responsibly.”133 Duties of GCF arise from the fact that we are all part of a joint (global) project,
which demands loyalty to those who are expected to loyally to support shared institutions.134
The demands of “transnational respect [which is] … more efficacious than aid,” would be
met if rich countries’ took responsibility for global warming, and stopped interfering in local
governance, and removed the current constraints to “self-advancement in trade, investment, (and)
property-rights.”135 Therefore, politically responsible persons in developed countries should work
to establish an ultimate vision of a just world without exploitation.136 Transnational justice based
on such civic friendship seeks “a world in which no country,” “must hope for help from
abroad.”137 This vision is also laudable because “If and when this ultimate aim is reached,

133

Ibid., 2. He sees global civic friendship as “more salient and inspiring in a world in which the
machinations of governments are far removed from friendship and official talk of cooperation is often a cover for
subordination.” He envisions global social democracy as a precursor of global civic friendship, because it “combines
a commitment to relieve suffering with a commitment to end domination.” Participation in these movements
overlaps, and those strongly committed to one typically wish the other movements well, and derive comfort and
support from their successes. The cluster of social GSDs is itself a movement composed of movements in specific
causes. GSDs “take exercises of power through which agents in developed countries take advantage of weakness in
developing countries to be major causes and constituents of global injustice.” American global social democrats for
instance, would take, “…the project of hemming in the American empire to be an aspect of all their endeavors.”
They “treat people in developing countries as victims of transnational domination, not just transnational neglect, and
often follow the lead of movements and protests in developing countries.” They accurately portray the global poor
as victims of unjust imperial policy seek, and seek an end to transnational domination through the use of protest
movements, focused campaigns, and public arguments. Ibid., 252-257.
134

Ibid., 43.

135

Ibid., 200, 219, 221.

136

For instance, by supporting measures to return at least some of the gains of exploitation. Ibid., 231.
Another reason Miller gives for why we should all aim for GSD is that the structure of current international relations
give people in poor countries reason to resent governments, firms and people in rich countries. People in rich
countries merit this resentment if they do not feel unease at the ensuing own prosperity or are unwilling to pay the
price of alienation from their governments. Ibid., 225. He thinks that global challenges like climate change and
poverty/economic exploitation will require abandoning a self-serving patriotism in favor of the cosmopolitan
solidarity of GCF, making it “an inspiring positive goal” to which we should all aspire. He proposes that we all work
towards Global Social Democracy (GSD), which he thinks could change the public agenda and the strategic
calculations to which political leaders respond. Ibid., 182, 233.
137

This should be distinguished from the pursuit of beneficence, and includes the aspiration to reduce
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international political life will be attentive to considerations of distributive justice.”138 His GSD
and GCF proposals include the requirement that we all work to end dire neediness and support
measures that advance development and self-reliance in less developed countries. The collective
aims of this initiative comprise a single vision of civic friendship: mutual caring cooperation that
respects autonomy.
Miller also recognizes that genuine cooperation is incompatible with the stark inequalities
between developed and developing countries.139 He sees global inequalities as a major reason
behind flawed international relationships, as can be seen by the lack of symmetrical abilities to
opt out of relationships.140 Since neediness makes exploitation of weakness possible, greater
material equality is likely to reduce the tendency toward exploitation/domination. However, he
expresses two fears. The first is that this duty will not be met because of factors like greed and
irresponsibility, particularly on the part the political and economic elites of powerful countries.
141

The second fear is that due to the symbiotic relationship between inequalities and domination

(which leads to more deprivation for the global poor), “the reduction of severe international
inequalities that global civic friendship requires will postpone its attainment for a long time.”142

neediness on the way to a just world without exploitation. Ibid., 230.
138

Ibid., 233.

139

To buttress this argument, he references Aristotle’s analogy between genuine friendship and well-ordered
political relationships: civic friendship holds a just polity together, while deep inequality is a barrier to friendship.
Ibid., 232.
140

Ibid., 232.

141

Ibid., 6. Miller notes that insensitivity to suffering is especially secure when those who benefit from it are
insulated from the immediate reverberations of discontent among those whom they exploit, and being foreigners,
with whom they share no strong ties of valued history or common culture. Ibid., 231.
142

“International inequalities in per capita national income at purchasing power parity have grown rapidly
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Such “regrettable” power differential leads to the irresponsible wielding of power on the part of
rich countries and “rational fears of vulnerable people in developed countries.”143 He notes the
irony that the strongest political duties to aid the foreign poor stem from relationships, whose
structure conduce to exploitation.144 But much more insidious is the “electoral self-absorption”
on the part of the electorate in rich countries, which leaves shapers of foreign policy the room to
irresponsibly dominate weaker societies.145 He pessimistically notes that it is unlikely that the
current framework will remove inequalities in the foreseeable future – certainly not in the next
few generations.146
Therefore, “the interests and powers of the leading developed countries” is the greatest
challenge to this process.147 This is because “even if stark economic inequality were to end,
competition for domineering influence might continue to inflict violence across borders.”148
These factors point to the possibility that the struggle for global justice may last for many

since 1950, especially since 1980.” Although it seems to have decreased since 1970 this has been because of China
and India. Without these two countries, and international income inequalities have steeply increased since 1982.
Ibid., 234, 236.
143

Ibid., 226.

144

Ibid., 226.

145

Ibid., 226-227.

146

Ibid., 236.

147

Ibid.

148

Ibid. He also does not think that “a centralized global government capable of enforcing a global
difference principle” would solve the problem because such an authority might not be able to regulate global
political cooperation based on mutually respectful trust. Ibid., 233.
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generations.149 But he retains hope for such an endeavor “through morally motivated political
activity outside of the corridors of power.”150
Miller concludes his analysis by expressing the suspicion that his arguments might be of
little use in public persuasion, because “people resist seeing themselves as taking part in the
flawed transnational conduct that is presupposed.”151 But all the same, he insists that social
movements could help bring about the needed changes.152 He presents his “global version of
social democracy” as the most realistic way of reducing “the injustices it condemns.”153 He cites
the Vietnam Anti-War movement as an example of how social movements increased and
articulated “moral revulsion outside the corridors of power.”154 He sees the power of such
movements in politician’s reliance on public opinion, and the threat that public moral revulsion
could build enough disenchantment and “threaten a general crisis of disorder” while “imposing
significant reputational costs” to politicians.155

149

Ibid., 236.

150

Ibid., 237.

151

Ibid., 238. He also recognizes that such a candid discussion could also have the effect of inspiring antimodernist, anti-Western/American “fundamentalist” or “traditionalist” reactions in developing countries. Ibid., 257.
152

Ibid., 240.

153

Ibid., 238.

154

“In sum, the movement against the Vietnam War provides evidence that moral revulsion promoted from
outside institutional governance can make a substantial difference, not just to electoral fortunes (in fact, throughout
this period, pro-war presidential candidates won) but strategic calculations in the corridors of power.” Ibid., 240246.
155

Ibid., 241.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided an analysis of Miller’s theory of global injustice which he
frames as a problem of distributive injustice, created and maintained, through the political
domination of poor countries by rich ones. Miller argues that relationships of domination by
countries like France, Japan and most especially the United States, with poor countries are
unjust, and should be “hemmed in” by citizens of these countries. This is morally required
particularly in cases where the domination caused harms in the recent past, and which can be
traced directly to benefits to members of the dominating society. Miller also proposes that rich
countries should be prepared to take on more of the burdens to address climate harms because it
would be unjust to demand that poor people in poor countries sacrifice as much as people in
developed countries. He ends his analysis on a call for citizens of imperialist countries to pursue
the global social democracy based on the principle of global civic friendship. And recommends
that all trans-national relationships be carried out within the space of reasonable discourse.
Social injustice results from the expression of agency in a way that restricts the
expression of the agency of another, without providing the restricted party room for reasonable
dissent. Therefore, all global justice theories are first and foremost arguments against restrictions
on human agency. Therefore, an adequate justice theory should identify some social wrong, state
why it is wrong, assign responsibility, and state how the responsible party should desist or/and
repair the damage. A theory that fails in any of these respects will be flawed, inaccurate or at
least incomplete.
Although Miller argues forcefully against abusive and dominative international
relationships, he does not adequately theorize the agency of those who are harmed (dominated

94
against), those who make the harmful decisions, or those who benefit from such practices. In
addition, if personhood is what entitles persons to non-domination, then, irrespective of political
membership, all persons have the right not to be dominated.156 Although Miller’s quasicosmopolitan stance gestures toward a universal theory, his distinction of equal value and equal
concern makes his theory limited in an important way.
In addition, although he prescribes reasonable discourse, he does not explain how such
discourse will be attained from within deep asymmetrical power relations. He also does not
explain how to assure that the demands (or the veto right) of weaker parties will be met. He
merely presents GSD, not as a movement that could successfully address global injustice, or alter
relations of domination, but which we should all pursue all the same, because it is a laudable
cause, and is therefore what a moral person should do.157 Miller reaches such a conclusion
because of his tacit acceptance of imperialism. Although he recognizes the ills of imperialist
domination and argues for its curtailment, he stops short of calling for its end. And since
imperialism implies domination, Miller’s global justice theory does not preclude relations of
inter-subjective domination.

With his example of Guatemala, Guatemalan persons were harmed by harmful, dominative policies,
developed and implemented by persons acting in their official capacities. Miller could have been more precise about
who was harmed, who harmed the person, who derived benefits from the harm, and how the wrong party should act
in the future to either stop, or mitigate the harms. Ibid 147-148.
156

As he says, like the anti-Vietnam war movement, which had limited effect on U.S. foreign policy, the
efforts of GSDs will probably not be effective in the short or long run. However, it should be pursued all the same.
“Granted, no one in a social movement will have reason to believe that her individual actions will add much of
anything to well-being or justice. But if the expectation of significant pay-off from one’s own action were required
for participation no rational person would bother to vote in a national election. To give meaning to their lives, people
want to identify with a large cause, in which they can join with others in collectively making some difference in
their lifetimes. The aspiration to global justice pursued through the protests, campaigns and advocacy of social
movements is an undeluded source of meaning of this kind. Ibid., 252 .
157
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Miller and Pogge present important insights and perspectives that are helpful to global
justice theorizing. Pogge holds a universal, cosmopolitan, human rights-based perspective. Miller
on his part calls for ethical discourse. These are two notable examples of ideas that should form
part of an adequate global justice theory. In the next chapter, I put both theorists in conversation,
to further compare their positions, by highlighting their differences, and further emphasizing how
and why certain aspects of their theories are important for an adequate global justice theory.

CHAPTER IV
POGGE AND MILLER IN CONVERSATION
Introduction
Both Pogge and Miller engage global injustice from the perspective of global poverty and
inequality.1 Extreme poverty is a social injustice because in any give community, the level of
access to material resources is relative – how much access a person has is relative to what others

1

Available data show that despite increasing aggregate global growth, the poorer members of the global
community are becoming worse off. The income ratio between the upper 10% and the lower 10% of global income
distribution is 273:1. (71.1%: 0.26% of global income). The wealth distribution is 2730:1. While aggregate global
real growth per capita was 5.7% (1988-93), the real income of the poorest 5% of global population decreased by a
quarter. While the Gini coefficient increased from 62.2 to 64.1 between 1988 and 1998, between 1988 and 1993, real
incomes of the poorest 5% of global population declined 20%. Pogge, Politics as Usual, 12-13. “Using exchange
rate conversion, the top decile had 71.7 percent of global household income versus 0.26 percent of the bottom
decile.” Data from 2002 supplied by Branko Milanovic (World Bank). Pogge, Politics as Usual, Note 15, 205. Such
severe and extensive poverty persists while there is great and rising affluence elsewhere. The average income of the
citizens of the affluent countries is about 50 times greater in purchasing power and about 200 times greater in terms
of market exchange rates than that of the global poor. The latter 2,800 million people together have about 1. 2
percent of aggregate global income, while the 903 million people of the "high-income economies" together have
79.7 percent. Shifting merely 1 percent of aggregate global income - $312 billion annually - from the first group to
the second would eradicate severe poverty worldwide. However, the shift in global income goes the other way.
Inequality continues to mount decade after decade as the affluent get richer and the poor remain at or below the
subsistence minimum. Over a recent, closely studied five-year period, real growth in global average per capita
income was a respectable 5.7 percent. The top quintile (fifth) of the world's population got all of the gain - and then
some: real incomes declined in all other income segments. “The bottom 5 percent of the world grew poorer, as their
real incomes decreased between 1988 and 1993 by 1/4 while the richest quintile grew richer. It gained 12 percent in
real terms, that is, it grew more than twice as mean world income (5.7 percent).” Pogge, World Poverty, 2-3.
Although global poverty is a symptom of the wider problem of global injustice, global poverty remains a pressing
moral issue. According to Pogge, “a shift of 1% of aggregate global income from the well off to the global poor will
eradicate severe poverty worldwide.” Pogge. World Poverty, 3. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income or
wealth inequality in a society, with a lower number indicating more equality. Between 1988 and 1998 the global
Gini index increased from 62.2 to 64.1. “Between the years of 1988 and 1993, real incomes of the bottom 5% of the
world declined by a quarter, while that of the top 25% doubled in real terms. While the income ratio between the top
and bottom decile of the human population is a staggering 273:1, their wealth ratio is ten times greater still. In 2000,
the bottom half of the world’s adults together owned 1.1 percent of global wealth, with the bottom 10 percent having
only 0.03 percent.” “Real incomes among the poorest 5 percent of world population (identified by PPP comparison)
declined 20 percent during 1988-93 and another 23 percent during 1993-8, even while real global per capita income
rose 5.2 percent and 4.8 percent respectively.” Pogge, Politics as Usual, 12-13.
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have. In addition, when persons are unable to meet their basic needs, their ability to freely
express autonomous agency is also severely limited. These features of poverty make it a social
justice issue. I have redefined social injustice as inter-subjective domination because all forms of
social injustice lead to restrictions on the ability of those who face such injustice to express
agency. Social injustice is also the result of actions and inactions of other members of the
community or society. I therefore also redefine social injustice as the result of domination –
actions of some leading to the restrictions of other’s autonomous agency. I consider the duty not
to dominate another as the most basic duty persons have towards others. I see social injustice
(including global injustice), as the result of relations of domination. Since global poverty is a
form of global injustice, it is thereby a form of social injustice, albeit on a wider scale. If social
injustice is a form of inter-subjective domination, then global poverty must also be understood as
the violation of the duty not to dominate others.
In what follows, I provide an analysis and comparison of key points of the theories
developed by Pogge and Miller. I am in general agreement with their respective positions.
However, I conclude on the position that by not adequately accounting for agency, freedom, and
inter-subjectivity, both theorists fail to address the problem of the intersubjective domination
which is at the root of global injustice.
Poverty vs. Inequality
Both writers address the question of who is most responsible for global poverty, what
morality requires of us in the face of such extreme poverty, and why we should all work to
eradicate global poverty.2 If the most basic right we have and duty we are owed is that of not

2

My analysis is located at the level of agentic action which as I will argue later not only provides room for a
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being hindered in the expression of our autonomous agency, we should all be concerned about
persons who, due to poverty, suffer inhibited agency. However, extreme poverty is a moral
violation not just because of the lack that poor people suffer, or that the agency of the poor is
inhibited. Rather, extreme poverty is a justice problem that demands rectification because it is
the result of the actions and inactions of others. This implies that moral arguments that we should
all work at eradicating extreme poverty can only succeed if such poverty can be shown to be the
result of autonomous actions, resulting in the restriction of the agency of others. Such an
argument can only be made at the level of inter-subjective relations.
Both Pogge and Miller see global poverty as the most pressing aspect of global injustice.
Although they differ slightly with regards to its primary cause, they are more in agreement with
regards to who should spearhead efforts to address it. Pogge attributes the problem to the
injustice built into the structure of global economic and financial institutions, Miller sees it as the
result of abuse of power by rich countries over poor ones. However, both agree that citizens of
rich, western democracies in general (Pogge), and citizens of the U.S. in particular (Miller),
should take on the political responsibility of addressing the problem.
I agree with Miller against Pogge that the mere existence of poverty does not in itself
generate an obligation (for others) to mitigate it.3 But for persons to continue to live under

more robust theory of responsibility (for global injustice) but is also indispensable for a theory that guards against
inter-subjective domination. To be sure, both theorists allude to human agency but both theorists remain at more
general levels of analyses. (Pogge at the level of global institutions, while Miller is at the level of geopolitical
relations). Inter-subjective relations are implied but not explicitly theorized.
Relatedly, Miller also argues explicitly makes the argument that the mere fact of lack as a result of
economic interactions do not provide adequate grounds for the moral demand to eradicate poverty. This position can
be explained with the following analogy. The mere fact that a person lacks food to sustain her life does not in itself
yield a duty to others to others to feed her. I do not mean by this that it is not desirable that someone provides her
with food, rather, I want to stress the fact that the mere fact of her hunger does not in itself generate a moral demand
3
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conditions of extreme poverty implies that such people lack the (political) power to alter their
socio-economic circumstances. Extreme poverty, therefore, indicates both economic and political
powerlessness. The amount of (political or economic) social power a person has is comparative –
it is a function of the amount that other members of the community have - low level of access to
tangible and intangible social goods implies the existence of people who enjoy greater access.
The existence of people in extreme poverty implies the existence of others with greater economic
and political power, relative the poor. Therefore, the moral obligation to act on global poverty
must be based on arguments that establish some morally relevant connection between such
poverty and the people that are obligated to address it.
Those with greater economic power relative to others are better able to influence almost
all other dimensions of social living, including decisions of how to allocate future material
resources. Pogge and Miller would therefore agree that while global poverty is the result of
decisions made by persons with relatively higher levels of social power, it is suffered by those
with less social power.
It could be argued against me that while this is true for bounded political units like the
modern state, the same cannot be said of the global arena. However, a shared economic and
political order makes the global community resemble a single society more than a community of
states. Although this was the case only within bounded political units, in our rapidly globalizing
world, it more and more the case that access to one social good increases one’s chances of
gaining access to other social goods, and vice versa. As Pogge emphasizes, in our rapidly

that someone feeds her. The moral obligation to feed her requires considerations outside of the fact of her hunger. I
agree with Miller that more is needed to support the assertion that all morally sensitive people have a duty to work to
eradicate global poverty, particularly if the problem is approached as a purely economic problem.
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globalizing world economy, both the people who have excess resources and those who are
unable to meet their basic needs operate within the same global institutional framework, making
the poverty of the poor inseparable from the wealth of the rich.4 This implies that global
inequality cannot be separated from global poverty. Miller considers extreme poverty, but not
inequality as a moral problem. In this regard, I side with Pogge, who considers both poverty and
inequality as moral problems.
Cosmopolitanism and Quasi-Cosmopolitanism
Partly due to recent technological advances, in this era of globalization, it is becoming
more the case that inter-subjective ‘connections’ and ‘interactions’ transgress national borders
even more than before. It is becoming more the case that the relationality of social power applies
to groups located in different political units. The fact that almost all members of the global
community belong to one distinct political unit (or can only be in one political unit at a time),
further complicates attempts to develop an adequate global justice theory. The problem seems to
be that while a global justice theory must be universally applicable to all persons qua persons, it
must also account for unique locational attributes, which all persons have.
This raises the question of which of the unique attributes of persons should be considered
as morally relevant in a justice theory. On the one hand, since persons are not generic, a person’s
unique features should be a relevant consideration. On the other hand, a justice theory that gives
too much weight to unique features runs the risk of privileging some set of people over others,
limiting the extent to which the theory could be generalized. The ideal would seem to be to

4
The global apparel industry is an example of how those who purchase clothes made in the difficult
conditions of sweatshops cannot claim to be unconnected to the conditions of such sweatshops.
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develop a generally applicable theory that remains flexible enough to accommodate
particularities.
An important question that is often raised in global justice theorizing is the moral salience
of national borders, an issue that both Pogge and Miller discuss. Both agree that we have greater
positive duties of redistributive justice and beneficence to co-nationals.5 However, Pogge holds a
moral cosmopolitan, “universalistic” conception of social justice.6 He sees moral rights as
independent of any governmental body or institution, arguing these rights exist, are superior, and
provide the grounds for the formulation of legally instituted rights.7 Whether or not they are
codified, these moral laws are universal, general and equally applicable to all persons.8 He also
sees all moral agents as entitled to human rights, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of

“It is also evident that the asserted nationalist priorities cannot plausibly be affirmed as absolute. It cannot
be appropriate, for instance, in each and every context to put a compatriot’s interests, however minor, ahead of
foreigner’s interests, however vital. This raises the question of weight of the asserted nationalist priorities. Regarding
this question, many have argued that nationalist priorities have less weight than family priorities because nations and
states, being more abstract and contingent than families, do not have as much constitutive significance in human
lives. Bypassing this issue, I focus on the scope of the nationalist priorities, arguing that there are firm limits to their
application and hence contexts in which they cannot plausibly be invoked at all.” Ibid., 120.
5

6

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern
are human beings, or persons - rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities,
nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or
citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status
has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone - not only for their compatriots, fellow
religionists, or suchlike. Pogge, World Poverty, 169.
7
8

Pogge, Politics as Usual, 27.

Pogge also mentions other conventions and articles, like Part XI of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of
the Sea, of which Article 136 states that all natural resources in ocean floors of international waters are the common
heritage of mankind,” which are also currently violated. Pogge, World Poverty, 125.
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Human Rights (UDHR).9 It on these grounds that he argues that global (distributive) injustice is
a violation of the human rights of the global poor to basic needs by the global rich.
Contrary to Pogge’s human rights based, cosmopolitan arguments, Miller holds a “quasicosmopolitanism” which is predicated on “willing, self-respectful cooperation as a basis for
mutual reliance.”10 Miller agrees with Pogge that ordinary morality leads to cosmopolitanism
since morality demands that we value each person’s life equally. That we value all lives equally
does not obligate us to show equal concern for all lives.11 That is, equal respect does not
necessarily entail equal concern for each person’s life.12 Instead, it is the “nature of interactions”
between groups or individuals that decide the nature of the rights, duties, and responsibilities that
could be demanded of each party.13 Quasi-cosmopolitanism is the basis for his “relational

9

Such a conception meets with the following conditions: It subjects all persons to the same system of
fundamental moral principles; these principles assigning the same fundamental moral benefits and burdens to all; the
moral benefits and burdens are formulated in general terms so as not to privilege are disadvantage certain persons or
groups arbitrarily. Ibid., 92.
10

Miller understands standard cosmopolitanism as inclined toward the view that global political duties to
the world’s poor are the same as domestic political duties to one’s poor compatriots, neither weaker nor stronger. As
he says, requiring, “a global extrapolation of principles of domestic justice.” Miller 234 His quasi-cosmopolitanism
denies this but still argues that citizens and governments of richer countries have duties to the world’s poor. Ibid.,
Ch. 8.
11

“Because we are rightly wary of giving too much weight to our own interests (recall the worries about
misapplying Sympathy), the difference between equal respect and equal concern is clearest when a valuable special
relationship to another leads to special concern. I am not equally concerned for the girl who lives across the street
and for my daughter; for example, I am not inclined to do as much for this neighbor when she is just as needy as my
daughter, even if her parents have reached their limit. But I do not regard this neighbor's life as less valuable than the
life of my daughter; my unequal concern reflects a proper valuing of my special relationship to my daughter, not
unequal respect.” Ibid., 18.
12

“Of course, these claims require further scrutiny in light of alternative interpretations of the fundamental
moral perspective. If equal respect for all required equal concern for all, then the Principle of Sympathy would be
much too permissive. I show much less concern for imperiled children in developing countries than for myself when
I spend money on stylish clothes, nice restaurant meals and excellent stereo equipment that could be used to save a
child from early death. But equal respect does not entail equal concern.” Miller, Globalizing Justice, 18.
13
He holds what could be described as a ‘concentric’ conception of morality - the closer the interactions
persons have with each other, the more stringent the moral demands persons could make on one another. Ibid., 2.
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approach” which privileges specific relationships but does not “require an extrapolation of
principles of domestic justice,” to global justice.14
Both theorists emphasize equal moral respect for persons qua persons (which is reflected
in human rights and correlative duties) and both acknowledge that special duties could be owed
to co-nationals. They also agree that in cases of conflict, the latter duties do not override human
rights duties. Miller would also agree with Pogge that duties to co-nationals must not override
our duties to protect the human rights of foreigners. However, Miller insists that the relationship
and interactions that we have with co-nationals and those who are subjected to our imperial
dominion warrants some special consideration in the development of a global justice theory.15 In
sum, while Miller thinks that relationships with fellow countrymen are a relevant moral
consideration in global justice theorizing, Pogge disagrees.
Pogge’s position of the equal moral status of all human beings would cause him to
disagree with Miller’s distinction of equal value and equal concern.16 Pogge also argues that
current global relations severely limit the extent to which borders can continue to be considered
“moral watersheds.”17 In general, Pogge regards narrow nationalism as a normative position,

14

Ibid., 234.

15

Ibid., 46.

16

“A moral conception, such as a conception of social justice, can be to be universalistic if and only if (A) it
subjects all persons to the same system of fundamental moral principles; (B) these principles assign the same
fundamental moral benefits (e.g. claims, liberties, powers, and immunities) and burdens (e.g. duties and liabilities)
to all; and (C) these fundamental moral benefits and burdens are formulated in general terms so as not to privilege or
disadvantage certain persons or groups arbitrarily.” Pogge World Poverty, 92.
17

“This double transformation of the traditional realm of international relations -the proliferation of
international, supranational, and multinational actors, and the profound influence of transnational rules and of the
systematic activities of these actors deep into the domestic life of national societies - is part of what is often meant
by the vague term globalization. It helps explain why "global" is displacing "inter- national" in both explanatory and
moral theorizing. This terminological shift reflects that much more is happening across national borders than before.
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referring to positions like Miller’s as “common nationalism.” That is, showing more concern for
the survival and flourishing of one’s own state and compatriots than for those of other nations.18
Miller would consider this as an exaggeration of his position. Miller argues that it is wrong to
globally extrapolate the political duty (to assist compatriots)19 in an attempt to find an adequate
principle on which to base arguments in support of “helping needy foreigners.”20 The existence
of global economic interdependence, as well as severe foreign neediness is not enough to
override the political duty of loyalty to needy compatriots.21 To Miller, therefore, there is no
moral violation in privileging the needs of members of one’s own political community over those
of even more needy foreigners.
Interactional and Human Rights Duties
To Miller, the mere fact of commercial interaction (between rich and poor societies) does
not yield duties to help the foreign poor.22 He, however, acknowledges that rich countries might

It also reflects that the very distinction between the national and international realms is dissolving. With national
borders losing their causal and explanatory significance, it appears increasingly incongruous and dogmatic to insist
on their traditional role as moral watersheds.” Pogge, Politics as Usual, 14.
18
A more extreme version of this is what he describes as lofty nationalism, which entails an indifference to
injustice in foreign lands, an accusation which he makes of most citizens of affluent countries. Pogge World Poverty,
119.
19

He argues against the position that “duties to help disadvantaged compatriots are said to be duties of
fairness towards associates in economic interdependence”. Attributed to Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge (in his earlier
writings) and Darrel Moellendorf. Ibid., 31-32. “Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social
cooperation, they do not mark the limits of social obligations.” Ibid., Note 2, 265.
20

This argument is a response to global justice arguments based on principles of sacrifice or sympathy,
which Miller attributes to Peter Singer, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge’s early works. However, with regards to
duties of beneficence and ordinary distributive justice, Pogge’s later work seems to agree with this position. Ibid.,
31.
21

Ibid., 46.
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Ibid., 31.
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have to generalize the duty of concern (to ensure basic needs are met) in a way that might
disadvantage poor compatriots.23 However, economic interactions (alone) do not generate a duty
from more privileged societies to ensure that basic needs are met in poor societies.24 This is
because if global interactions were conceived of as purely commercial, poverty complaints
would be limited to local governments, and people in rich countries could thereby justifiably
treat their advantages as the result of mere luck.25
To Miller, the demand that citizens of more affluent countries be involved in poverty
eradication should be determined by the extent of political interactions between them and the
poor country in question.26 Territorial dominion gives rise to duties of trusteeship (to the foreign
power).27 In such situations, the assumptions of priority for the needs of compatriots could be
justifiably overridden. Pogge on his part insists that we have a negative moral duty to refrain
from impeding others, including foreigners, in accessing goods vouchsafed to them by a human
right.
Miller’s seems to strike a middle ground between the two extremes of a universal
cosmopolitanism and a narrow nationalism. He argues against the extrapolation of domestic
principles of justice to the international arena but seems to approach the global arena from within
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Miller, Globalizing Justice, 32.
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This can be illustrated by an analogy. The owner of a rich grocery store that I patronize regularly is not
morally obligated to provide me with items that I am unable to pay for, no matter how essential such items are to my
survival. No matter how pressing my needs, the moral demand that the store owner helps me to meet my basic needs
can only be made on the strength of considerations outside of the economic exchange.
25

Ibid., 52.

26

Miller, Globalizing Justice, 33, 210, 222, 223.
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a nationalistic perspective. This is problematic because since most persons belong to some
political unit, privileging or speaking from the perspective of one political unit will produce an
inconsistent and/or biased theory.28 Therefore, from the perspective of universality and general
applicability, Pogge’s cosmopolitanism seems superior to Miller’s.
Pogge would respond to Miller’s position by pointing out that the global order is
politically skewed against the less powerful, in such a way that ensures that the rich (country,
communities, and individuals), continue to amass more and more resources, to the detriment of
the global poor.29 Miller would agree with this position since he also argues that the global arena
is politically skewed to favor rich countries who routinely use their political power to extract
economic gains from the poor. However, while Miller emphasizes the political dimension in his
approach, framing it as a political problem (that is, violation of duties that result from (political)
interactions), Pogge frames his arguments as a violation of the human rights (to economic
subsistence) of the global poor. In this regard, I agree more with Miller. Although global
poverty is usually framed as an economic problem, that is, the problem of inadequate access to
resources, it is in reality, a social justice problem, making it a problem that could only be
addressed politically.

28
In addition, a post-Westphalian world in which some political units are bound to have more resources is
another reason why global injustice should not be framed as a resource allocation problem. This is because this
could lead to an over simplification of global injustice into a problem of how to move resources (or money) from the
“rich” to the “poor”. The economic, historical linguistic and cultural – to name a few, complexities of the real world
makes the problem of global injustice one that cannot be accurately reduced to a problem of access to resources.
Therefore, focusing on extreme poverty, which I argue is only one results of a more complex problem, could cause
us to pay inadequate attention to the processes that led to the distributive injustice in question.
29

Treanor, “Half of World's Wealth.”
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Both Pogge and Miller agree that the global order unfairly allocates increasing benefits to
some while depriving many others of needed basic resources.30 However, Miller disagrees with
some of the details of Pogge’s position. Their first point of divergence is in their attitude towards
social and economic rights. Those who advocate for economic and social rights do so in
recognition of the fact that without a minimum level of resources, other human rights cannot be
met. Such people also recognize that large income or wealth inequalities create the likelihood of
a political environment skewed in favor of the more powerful, thereby increasing the risk of the
violation of the (economic and possibly other), rights of the weak. Others, like Miller, argue that
social, and particularly economic rights could only generate a positive (optional), and not a
negative (non-optional) duty.31 Miller, therefore, thinks that Pogge’s attempt to derive a negative
duty, based on the violation of the human right to resources, is wrong.32
However, Miller also acknowledges the importance of basic needs. Although he
attributes such crushing poverty to political and economic exploitation, he also recognizes that it
is a violation of the rights of poor people.33 He sees global poverty as the result of rich countries,
particularly imperial ones, shirking relational duties that arise from interactions with poor
countries. He cites the global proliferation of sweat shops, as a result of trans-national
manufacturing, as an example of how people from rich countries make “improper use of the
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Miller Globalizing Justice, 58-59 and Pogge, Politics as Usual, 52.
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Miller argues that since there is no “single global standard of distributive justice”, no one could be said to
be entitled to any (minimum) amount of resources. Miller, Globalizing Justice, 226.
32

Ibid., 59.
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Ibid., 151-152, 155-156.
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desperate neediness of people in developing countries.”34 He uses this example to illustrate how
the duty not to exploit others’ “desperate neediness” is shirked by rich countries.35 Another
example he gives of the improper use of desperate neediness is iniquitous trade arrangements in
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
To Miller, the duties that arise from these are “relational responsibilities” that result from
“interactions.” He adds that nothing is added to global justice theorizing by designating the duty
to mitigate such injustice as “positive” or “negative.”36 He sees Pogge’s claim that the global
order harms the poor by imposing poverty on them is an inaccurate exaggeration, except the
statement is modified to mean a “negligent failure” to fulfill “positive responsibilities,” in the
sense of not doing the best that could be done for the global poor.37 Pogge would respond to this
position by arguing that universal morality demands that we take seriously the human right to
adequate resources for a decent life, without which all other rights are at risk of being unrealized.
He considers the global institutional order as primarily responsible for the limitations which the
global poor face in trying to access necessary resources, commensurate to “the ethical and
personal value of human life” (as stipulated in article 25 of the UDHR).38 He, therefore, argues
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Ibid., 59.
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Miller provides an analogy of a person who accepts to be rescued from being stranded in a desert, but on
the condition of lifelong servitude to his rescuer. The fact that the rescuer has indeed saved the person from death
does not justify extracting a payment of life-long servitude in exchange. He describes this as a case of “taking
advantage while bettering” The only reason why the rescued party agreed to it was because the only other choice
available to her was death. Therefore, she could not be said to have “chosen” lifelong servitude. The immorality of
such arrangements lies in the fact that the powerful agent in this relationship gives “inadequate regard for the equal
moral importance of (a person’s) interests and … capacity for choice.” Ibid., 59-60.
36

Ibid., 59.

37

Ibid.

38

Article 25 - (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
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that the global order, (and more directly those who maintain it), is thereby in violation of the
negative right of the global poor since its creation and maintenance stands in violation of Article
28 of the UDHR.39
To this, Miller would respond that, even if the global institutional order did not exist as it
does, “many people would still be unable to escape destitution” because “the primary problem of
not having enough to offer in commerce would not be solved.”40 And since global capitalism
works through “creative destruction” of traditional and less efficient economies, few are those
who are not harmed in some way by a dynamic market economy. 41 Many developed countries,
including the United States, are domestically receptive to such creative destruction through
displacement.42 Therefore, Miller does not share Pogge’s position that global economic
institutions harm the poor (except in the qualified sense that the order does not make their lives
better off than it could under some alternative). And even granting Pogge’s argument that we are
imposing harmful institutions on the poor since creative destruction is an inevitable component
of markets, this would not suffice to generate a negative duty.

himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control. Pogge, Politics as Usual, 28; Pogge, World Poverty, 49.
39

Article 28 - Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. Pogge, Politics as Usual, 28, 30.
40
“Facing no trade barriers in developing countries, no prohibition, under the WTO, of any responsible
policy option, gentler integration into world markets and no unjustifiable discrimination in resources offered by the
IMF, many people would still be unable to escape destitution. The primary problem of not having enough to offer in
commerce would not be solved.” Miller, Globalizing Justice, 82.
41

“Developed countries, especially the united states, are, domestically, receptive to “creative destruction”
through displacement.” Ibid., 75.
42
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It seems to be contradictory to concede that political rights as Miller would probably do,
while at the same time holding that the right to basic needs, not be regarded as a fundamental
right. In addition, the UDHR makes it clear that no human right cancels another one out. This
means that my pursuit of one right does not justify my being denied of another right, nor should
the pursuit of my basic needs entitle me to deprive another person of any of his or her rights.
Therefore, Article 28 (Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.), does not nullify, but presumes
the fulfillment of Article 25 (Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family). Miller’s argument that economic rights do
not exist because there is no agreement as to what level of resources is adequate seems wrong
because a lack of agreement over the level of economic rights does not negate the centrality nor
the desirability of such a right.43 It seems to me that Miller’s reluctance to describe global
poverty as a violation of negative rights comes from an unwillingness to assign responsibility for
the detrimental effects of the global order. This is probably because this would, in turn, commit
him to criticizing not just the global political order, but also the economic order. Such a position
will also force him, on pains of contradiction, to assign responsibility for the violation of the
negative rights of the poor, on those who benefit the most from global institutions.

43

“In answering the further question of over-all goals, one should not assume that the diverse, specific
projects of help derive their moral importance from a single global standard of distributive justice. (I will ultimately
reject such standards).” Ibid., 210. “Because of this diversity in the standards regulating politically responsible
choice in global processes, there is no such thing as “global distributive justice,” in the sense of a single, determinate
unifying standard concerned with material well-being throughout the world that regulates choice of particular
arrangements.” Ibid., 226.
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Responsibility for Global Injustice
Both writers diverge with regards to who should be held primarily responsible for global
distributive injustice.44 Pogge places primary responsibility for global injustice on citizens of rich
countries, and only indirectly on their government (officials). Miller reverses this order. He
frames the problem of global injustice as arising mostly from the dominative imperial relations
that some rich western democracies have with many poor countries. He places primary
responsibility for the detrimental effects of the global order on the global poor on the political
class of such countries, and secondary responsibility on the citizens. However, like Pogge, he
also argues that change can only come through the (political) actions of the citizens of the rich or
imperialist countries. But, unlike Pogge, Miller does not think that such citizens are violating a
negative moral duty if they either do nothing or too little to change the situation. The villains in
Miller’s story is the political class of imperialist countries.
Recommendations and Solutions
Both Miller and Pogge do not argue against the global economic order. Neither
challenges the idea of export-driven trade as the via regia for improving the lot of the global
poor. However, both believe that rules governing global trade should be made fairer. Although
Pogge recognizes the geopolitical dimensions of the problem of global poverty, his prescriptions
tend more towards the economic than Miller’s. He says that the structure of the global order “is

44

Pogge argues that the governments of rich, Western countries set up and maintain global institutions. He
thinks that since these countries are relatively democratic, their citizens have a least some power to influence their
governments to create a more equitable economic order. Furthermore, such citizens also derive more benefits from
the current global order, relative to citizens of other countries. It should however be noted that such placement rests
on very dubious assumptions that are not supported by the defects of democracy in the relevant countries: extensive
voter apathy, the influence on money on politics, class domination and hegemony of the ruling classes, patriotism,
etc. Pogge, Politics as Usual, 3.
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neither natural nor God given,”45 which implies that in the same way the economic order was
created, it could also be altered or adjusted. Miller, on the other hand, thinks that “export led
growth” is “the only path by which developing countries have substantially reduced poverty.”46
Therefore, we could begin to address poverty simply by ensuring that political power is wielded
more responsibly.
Miller – Discourse
To Miller, irrespective of how a political relationship came about, political domination
yields a duty of trusteeship to the occupying country to ensure that basic needs to lead a
satisfactory life are met within the occupied territory.47 A dominant country owes a duty of care
to those under its dominion. Failure to meet this duty is negligent and imposes the additional
duty to correct and repair.48 This implies that economic policies should only be imposed if those
who will be affected either willingly consent to it, or in their physical absence, be policies that
they could have willingly consented to.49
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Pogge, World Poverty, 172.
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Miller, Globalizing Justice, 59.
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With the example of Structural adjustment policies, Miller argues that “By imposing a new direction on
the national project of better meeting basic needs, the United States takes on a responsibility to help in the project.”
Furthermore, “The responsibility to help of the United States is especially demanding if the local government is at
least as competent in choosing the right course of development and more representative of local preferences. The
government was compelled to accept policy conditions it would otherwise reject by its responsibility to its citizenry
to get help in meeting urgent needs. By stipulating these conditions, the United States has arrogantly taken over the
proper prerogatives of those who will live with the consequences of the development policies it has imposed. It has
ignored the morally crucial difference between its citizenry and the citizens of another country. The proper
indemnity for this usurpation is an effort to insure the successful escape from destitution to which their own
government was rightly committed. Having treated those foreigners as if they really were its own citizens, the
United States should, if need be, devote its own resources to their success in development. Miller, Globalizing
Justice, 152-153.
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“This is the sort of political project – wide – ranging and unavoidable in impact, extending far beyond
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This should be done though ethical discourse. Any form of interference is “only rightly
imposed if it merits the willing support of all,”50 and any policy that fails in this respect is prima
facie unjust.51
However, Miller’s theory stops short of arguing against the injustice of political
domination. By not making political relations, particularly political occupation or domination a
subject of ethical discourse, his position seems to be based on an unjustifiable prioritization of
the economic over the political.52 Miller could respond to me that his suggestion that policies
provide what people could have consented to is not for ideal situations, but a minimum standard
that should be demanded from policy makers. But such a response does not address my concern,
which is that Miller’s ethical discourse seems focused on meeting at least a minimum level of
basic needs. He seems not consider the possibility an occupied people could make the political
demand for an end to the occupation, even when such a demand could lead to economic
hardships. There is also little account for how to create favorable conditions for reasonable

uncontroversial protections of pre-political rights – that is only rightly imposed if it merits the willing support of all.
A lack of commitment to meet basic needs among those whose lives will be shaped makes the project unworthy of
support. Before, the responsibility to engage in this effort was the local governments. Now that the US has used fear
of dire consequences to get its preferred direction imposed, it shares this responsibility.” Ibid., 152.
50

Ibid.
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As an example, he argues that whenever the United States uses the threat of dire consequences to get its
preferred development method imposed in foreign countries, such an imposition creates the for the United States,
the responsibility to ensure that the basic needs of people within such territories are met. Ibid., 152.

Provision of a higher quantity of material goods by a domineering country could be used as justification
for invasion. An imperial nation could choose to ignore a weaker country’s desire to sacrifice material needs for
political self-determination, by arguing that occupying the country led to an improvement of living standards. The
occupying country could thus justify the violation of political rights of the occupied country by claiming that “we
are meeting their basic needs better than in the past.”
52
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discourse in the face of power differentials between countries. This oversight makes his proposal
for ethical discourse seem unrealistic.
Miller – GCF and GSD
Miller recognizes that genuine cooperation is incompatible with inequalities, while sharp
income disparities between countries increase the temptation to exploit weaknesses.53 This
means that addressing lack in poor countries will reduce the tendency toward exploitation and
domination.54 Therefore, the GCF proposal includes the aspiration to reduce neediness on the
way to a just world without exploitation. 55 Seeking a world in which no country “must hope for
help from abroad,” the GCF aspires to alter current global relations in which “the machinations
of governments are far removed from friendship and official talk of cooperation is often a cover
for subordination.”56
The ideals of GCF requires that citizens of rich western democracies pressure their
governments to “rein in” their powers and deal with weaker countries on more respectful terms.
This ideal “combines a commitment to relieve suffering with a commitment to end

53

To buttress this argument, he references Aristotle’s analogy between genuine friendship and well-ordered
political relationships: civic friendship holds a just polity together. But in addition, deep inequality is a barrier to
friendship. Ibid., 232.
54

However, the guiding principles of GCF are different from the pursuit of beneficence. Ibid., 230.
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Miller sees international relations as a form of (global) friendship between countries. He proposes that we
should all aspire towards Global Civic Friendship (GCF), which like all genuine friendships, is non-coercive and
based on respectful terms that all participants willingly and self-respectfully support. His vision is that we can
develop political relations that will meet demands of justice like, compensatory (Iraq) distributive (returning fruits of
manufacturing exploitation in China), and ensuring need satisfaction and development where US has imposed a
regime of development. (Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America). Ibid., 226.
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domination.”57 He sees these principles as adding up to “an inspiring positive goal” to which we
should all aspire.58 The principles of CCF will move the world closer to the political ideal of
Global Social Democrats (GSDs), who accurately see the global poor as victims of unjust
imperial policy, and who thereby “treat people in developing countries as victims of
transnational domination, not just transnational neglect.”59
Global political power is perceived by many as a zero-sum game, in which domination is
an unfortunate but necessary device. The current structure of global relations is one in which
countries see themselves as faced with a Hobbesian world in a global state of nature. Pogge
would agree with Miller that poverty and other forms of institutional weakness are part of what
militates against healthy, trans-national relations. Both are also in agreement that inequitable
global relations are sustained in large part by countries acting in ways which they regard as
protecting their interests and by extension, the interest of their citizens. Pogge would also agree
with Miller that GSDs already exist but should be strengthened. And Miller would see Pogge as
already practicing the principles of GSD. Pogge describes in detail, how global organizations,
even those mandated to alleviate poverty, are not committed to their mandate.60 Pogge would
therefore also agree with Miller that a factor that militates against his GSD initiative is that
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“Participation in these movements overlaps, and those strongly committed to one typically wish the other
movements well and derive comfort and support from their successes. So, the cluster is itself a movement composed
of movements in specific causes.” Ibid., 247-251, 225.
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international agencies and corporations, as well as government agencies, are able to “absorb the
damage” of the actions of protest movements.61
WTO Negotiations
Both Miller and Pogge agree about the injustice of WTO regulations. Miller complains
that in place of the laudable goals of the WTO mandate,62 rich countries use these trade regimes
to protect their own domestic industries while forcing poor countries to open up their markets,
stop poor countries from subsidizing their products while they subsidize theirs; and also provide
little financial resources as a safety net to protect people from the effects of the destabilization of
local economies.63 Pogge, would therefore, agree with Miller that for the global poor, the WTO
leads to an “especially brutal path of economic globalization.”64 Miller sees inequitable WTO
rules as an example of imperial nations’ using multilateral institutions to “irresponsibly” reshape
the political and economic structures of developing countries, as their (the rich countries’)
“interests dictate.”65 To both Miller and Pogge, the immorality of such negotiations cannot be
excused because it yields material gains on behalf of rich country citizens.66 Pogge sees this as a
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Protest movements, on the other hand, are made up of amateurs and volunteers, severely limited in
resources, or comparatively small organizations focused on one or at most a few aspects of global injustice. Such
pressure groups do not have the resources available to large organizations, thus making it harder to achieve their
goals. Miller, Globalizing Justice, 250.
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good illustration of the violation of the negative duty not to harm, while Miller describes it as a
case of political “irresponsibility.”
I agree with both writers that less brutal WTO negotiations could relieve some of the
economic pressures of poor countries. However, the WTO is an arena in which representatives
have a duty to pursue the most favorable economic arrangements for their own citizens. As both
theorists acknowledge political power greatly influences the economic outcomes of WTO
deliberations. Another factor that contributes to negative outcomes for poor countries is that the
global capitalist order functions on the twin imperatives of growth and efficiency (along with a
built-in presumption that economic growth inevitably leads to increased well-being). Despite the
awareness that we live in a world of finite resources, the global order compels us towards
economic growth.67
Economic growth is posited as a sign of a healthy economy and is demanded of
individuals, countries, and organizations. Faced with the pressure to grow, it is understandable
that the powerful (individuals, organizations, countries) use whatever advantage they already
have, to achieve such growth. In a shared global economic arena, such growth will likely be at
the expense of the weak. WTO inequities result from global economic and political power
disparities. Therefore, I agree more with Miller against Pogge, that retaining the global order,
while demanding that rich countries be charitable to poor countries in WTO negotiations, entails
a contradiction.68 Both Miller and Pogge could respond to my position by pointing out that the

“Infinite growth, they maintained, is based on self-delusion, because the world is a closed space, finite
and of limited carrying capacity.” Wolfgang Sachs, “Environment,” in The Development Dictionary: A Guide to
Knowledge as Power, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (London: Zed Books, 1992), 27.
67
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“If, as Pogge is willing to concede, the existence of avoidable dire poverty does not, as such, entail a duty
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fact that a rich country is able to use its power to get the most out of a situation – in this case to
the detriment of the global poor - does not make such an action morally justified. But such an
argument misses the point, which is that we live in a world where the logic of growth pervades
economic and political interactions. We expect and in many cases demand, in both domestic and
transnational economic transactions, that individuals, enterprises, and nations strive for the
greatest possible benefits. Given such an environment, the detrimental results of our economic
order should not come as a surprise.
Pogge GRD
To Pogge, the earth’s resources belong equally to all, so no one person can assert a
superior moral claim to any natural resource.69 Therefore, the current situation in which the
global poor are excluded and uncompensated from the use of the world’s natural resources is
unjust.70 The GRD proposal, which is a tax to be imposed on all natural resources that can be
destroyed, eroded, worn down or otherwise exploited, particularly, resources like fossil fuels
whose consumption should be discouraged, is meant to rectify this.71 The GRD is aimed at the
twin goals of eradicating poverty and compensating the world’s poor for resources they don’t
currently use. Pogge suggests that both goals could be met simultaneously by using the funds
generated by the GRD to fund development projects in poor communities around the world.72

to eliminate it, it is not clear why its foreseeable persistence under current institutions entails a duty to eliminate it
by institutional means.” Miller, Globalizing Justice, 271, Note 4.
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Miller disagrees with the GRD policy, arguing that there is no reason “why the current
value of natural resources should be shared among people whose technologies and commercial
activities make very different contributions to this value.”73 But this response seems to rest on a
misunderstanding. Pogge’s argument is that currently, the benefits of natural resources tend to go
to the better off members of the human society.74 Pogge also does not argue for the sharing of the
value of resources after processing, but that a dividend should be charged at the point of
extraction, and not for finished or processed materials.75 Lastly, proceeds of the GRD is meant to
pay for development projects. The GRD is a small percentage of the value of natural resources to
be set aside for the sole purpose of funding development projects to raise the global poor out of
abject poverty.
One of the arguments Pogge makes in support of the GRD proposal is that the income
disparities between rich and poor countries can in large part be explained by “morally tarnished”
history. The “social starting positions of the worse-off and the better-off have emerged from a
single historical process that was pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs.”76 Miller responds to
this by saying that compensation for past inter-social harms should be “severely limited by the
moral equivalent of a statute of limitations” so that “people are not overly vulnerable to demands
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Not just members of rich countries, but also to the elites of developing countries, like the Saudi ruling
family and Nigerian oil elites. Pogge, World Poverty, 202.
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“This is not to say (or to deny) that affluent descendants of those who took part in these crimes bear some
special restitutive responsibility toward impoverished descendants of those who were victims of these crimes. The
thought is rather that we must not uphold extreme inequality in social starting positions when the allocation of these
positions depends upon historical processes in which moral and legal rules were massively violated. A morally
tarnished history should not be allowed to result in radical inequality.” Ibid., 203.
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deriving from past wrongs over which they had no control.”77 Thus, to Miller, it would be
perverse to make current persons responsible for acts which happened too far into the past. But
this does not address the crux of Pogge’s argument which is that the massive disparities in
economic power between rich and poor countries can be explained by how much wealth each
group started out with. To Pogge, an argument can be made for rectification because the present
“inequality demonstrates the power of long-term compounding more powerful than centrifugal
tendencies of our global market system.”78
Purchase of Raw Materials
Pogge proposes that some minimum standards be demanded of governments as a
condition to economic interactions like resource sales, arms purchases, and loans.79Against this
position, Miller first notes that the records of economic sanctions indicate that such sanctions
tend to harm poor citizens, rather than the rulers.80 To him, therefore, a broad prohibition of
purchases from oppressive governments would be unduly burdensome to both people in these
territories and people needing the resources elsewhere. And despite the sacrifices that this policy
demands, there is no indication that it will remove the incentives to oppress. He suggests that “A
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narrow prohibition in extreme cases of ferocious tyranny might be useful, but the help to the
global poor would be, correspondingly, limited.”81
I agree with Miller that economic sanctions tend to harm poor citizens of poor countries
more than the ruling class. However, this does not justify the current practice of some rich
countries either using sanctions either as a geopolitical tool or ignoring human rights violations if
the regime is seen as beneficial. However, Pogge’s analysis and policy recommendation are also
not an accurate representation of the global political order. As Miller notes, in many cases,
sanctions are used by rich imperialist countries to achieve their political and strategic ends than
to protect the rights of foreigners. It is not just that rich countries do not care about the moral
records of the leaders of poor countries. Rather, rich countries are more inclined to pursue their
own ‘strategic’ interests, irrespective of the negative consequences such policies to the global
poor. This misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the global political structure weakens
Pogge’s position and makes his analysis seem naïve. But all the same, the ineffectiveness of
sanctions should not be an argument to end sanctions, but an invitation to work towards
developing a more effective system to protect and further the interests of the global poor.
Self Interest and Greed
Both Miller and Pogge agree that it is immoral to benefit from an unjust order without
making good faith effort to compensate its victims, and/or work to alter the system.82 They both
hold the position that rich countries (and by extension their citizens) derive benefits from the
global order to the detriment of poor countries (and by extension their citizens). A citizen of a
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developed country ought to use these benefits to relieve underlying neediness in poor countries.83
This points to an aspect of global injustice that both theorists do not adequately emphasize – selfinterest and greed. For example, when the U.S. imposes its political will on another country, it is
usually to ensure that U.S. organizations continue to reap benefits from the country to the
detriment of the citizens of said country. The economic benefits of such imperialist ventures
usually make it back to the U.S. and is at least of indirect benefit to her citizens. This shows that
it might not be in the long-term interest of citizens of an imperial country to “hem in” the
excesses of their politicians. Both theorists are silent about the likelihood of such citizens rising
above self-interest and greed to work towards reducing such privileges. However, it has been the
case that citizens of imperialist countries have struggled to end imperialistic practices.
Unfortunately, over time this has met with declining levels of success. It appears that the
political class of these countries is getting better at fighting such movements. At the same time,
people seem to be getting even more apathetic towards the behavior of their leaders.
The Global Market
Although both theorists complain about the global extreme poverty that results from the
global order, they both make it clear that they are not opposed to the order as it is. Pogge
cautions his readers not to mistake his complaints for “a leftist critique” of the global order.84
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“A politically responsible person in a developed country should support measures returning gains from
exploitation, a framework for trade that could result from responsible deliberations…” Miller, Globalizing Justice,
62, 225.
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“Mine is not, then, a leftist critique.” Pogge, World Poverty, 24; in another passage, he makes it clear in
more general terms that he is not necessarily taking a stand against capitalism. “Many critics of the WTO regime
are, and many more are dismissed as, opponents of open markets, free trade, or globalization. It is worth stressing
then that my critique involves no such opposition. My complaint with the WTO regime is not that it opens markets
too much, but that it opens our markets too little and thereby gains for us the benefits of free trade while withholding
them from the global poor. I see the appalling trajectory of world poverty and global inequality since the end of the
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Miller on his part makes it clear that the current global order is the best way to organize
economic exchanges.85 Pogge thinks that certain aspects of the global exchange system can, and
should be altered. Miller does not argue for changes to the global economic order but thinks the
material needs of the global poor could be better met if global (political) power is wielded more
responsibly. Pogge’s ideological stand commits him to the position that the problem is not with
the economic order, but with the functioning of the order. Miller could agree with this position
but would insist that although capitalism carries within it some dysfunction, it is an unavoidable
price to pay for economic progress. Therefore, the problem is better located not in the economic
arena, but in the global political order.
Their two positions are more similar than at first appears, since neither argue against the
structure of the global economic or political order, but against abuses within the order. They both
think that with a little tweaking and vigilance, global institutions could be made to function in a
more equitable manner. They both thereby fall into the same contradiction: although they argue
against the results of the global (economic and political) order, they do not argue against its
structure. Both theorists thereby seem to be defending an unrealistic, ideal version of the global
economic and political order. They both seem to be operating under the assumption that the
current (neo-liberal) order functions economically as a genuinely free market, and politically, in
a manner that respects the ideals of democracy and equality.

Cold War as a shocking indictment of one particular, especially brutal path of economic globalization which our
governments have chosen to impose. But this is no reason to oppose any and all possible designs of an integrated
global market economy under unified rules of universal scope.” Pogge, World Poverty, 19.
85
“Export led growth, which contributes to and depends on globalization, has been the only path by which
developing countries have substantially reduced poverty.” Miller, Globalizing Justice, 59.
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Both writers would agree that global distributive injustice results from powerful global
actors using their power to extract the most benefits, thereby worsening the position of the global
poor. They, therefore, seem to be correct in their conclusion that a large part of global
distributive injustice is caused by the immoral wielding of political and economic power. They
both defend the global economic order in a language that implies that it is identical to theoretical,
or textbook capitalism. They both seem to understand the global economic order as determined
by indifferent market forces like perfect competition, free entry and exit into markets, etc. This is
a false assumption because the real world neoliberal global economic order differs in crucial
respects from theoretical capitalism. In the current version of (late) capitalism, both domestic and
global markets are determined by factors outside of the market, for example, legislation and
advertisement in domestic markets, and global regulations, which are heavily influenced by
political power in global trade and investment. These features of the market make assumptions of
global ‘free trade’ both simplistic and unjustified. This is more so because it is precisely the
artificial skew of the global market by factors outside of exchange relations that generates global
distributive injustice.
It seems that we either take the global order as harmful or seek its eradication; or we
accept it as our best option. The latter option would make the most that can be demanded of
those who benefit from the order the duty of beneficence to relieve the burdens of those who
must suffer its ills. Pogge’s human rights position leads him to propose policies to mitigate the
negative results, but not the structure of the economic system. Miller also offers suggestions of
how to wield political power in a more benign manner, without telling us why those relations
that lead to so much suffering should be retained. As Pogge regards the economic order as a

125
given, Miller also considers the global political order (including imperialism) as here to stay – at
least in the foreseeable future. Without providing an explanation for why a global order that
produces such negative effects should not be done away with, they both instead, provide
arguments for how to mitigate its (inevitable) harmful effects.
In addition, a desideratum of the capitalist economic system is constantly increasing
economic growth. To ensure economic growth, a ‘healthy’ economy must have some of what
economists refer to as ‘excess capacity.’ This is a technical term for unemployed labor and idle
technical capacity (land and machines). Capitalism thereby presumes some unemployment of not
just resources, but people as well as. The problem is that increasing growth implies increasing or
more intense idle capacity. Poverty and inequality will be a necessary feature of such a system.
Therefore, even if Pogge’s suggested initiatives are successfully implemented, it can only be a
temporary palliative to the structural unemployment that is inherent to capitalism.
Similarly, the global geopolitical system is one in which powerful countries regard using
their power to derive the greatest benefits for their own citizens as one of their primary duties.
This makes the temptation to dominate other less powerful countries, if not a necessary
component of the global arena, at least a strong tendency of powerful countries. Miller suggests
that global political domination should be curtailed, but he does not explicitly argue for the doing
away of imperialism. The problem with this position is that since there is no such thing as
“agency respecting” domination. Therefore, in this regard, both theorists provide justice theories
that fall short of eradicating relations of domination.
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Miller – Empire
Whether political or economic, the moral violation of a dominative relationship is that
one party accords inadequate consideration or respect to the agency of the other – the dominated
party is not free to make autonomous choices. In such a situation, the dominated party acts, but
not freely. And herein lies the problem with Miller’s justice theory - he argues for ethical
discourse (limited to economic demands) within relations of political domination.86
Although resources are vital to human existence, the ability to freely express agency is at
least as important, since this is what makes us persons. Therefore, the restriction of agentic
autonomy in relations of imperialist political domination is at least as important as whatever
material deprivation results from such relations. While I am not against Miller’s call for ethical
discourse, his position is problematic for two reasons. The first is that ethical discourse implies
that all agents are equal and free to make demands of one another. This is not the case with
imperialist relations, which are relations of grossly unequal power. The second is that Miller
conceives of ethical discourse as discourse limited to economic demands. He wants imperialist
countries to be in open to discourse with the dominated (and presumably poor) society with
regards to the provision of basic needs. However, he does not say the same about the political
demands of the dominated.87 I see this as a failing of Miller’s theory because just relations
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The difficulty of coherently addressing the violation of political rights within the context of imperialistic
relations seems to lead Miller to suggest minimum economic standards (ensuring that basic needs are met); for
addressing a political problem (the imperialistic violation of political rights, which on many occasions lead to
economic deprivation). Miller seems to think that the moral violation of imperialism is economic deprivation. But
while basic needs are vital to human existence, economic deprivation is important only to the extent that it is a
condition to the expression of agency. Therefore, the restriction of agentic autonomy is a deep moral violation
which, in my opinion, Miller does not pay due consideration to.
87
In fact, he presumes that empire is here to stay, and this might not be catastrophic. He says of the
imperialist practices of the U.S., that the desire to put an end to empire is usually made in the same spirit as people
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between moral agents presume mutual respect for the agency and freedom of the other.
Imperialism disregards this. In fact, an imperialism that respects the agency of the dominated can
no longer go by that name.
An adequate justice theory should take a stand against such relations. It is problematic
that Miller provides a global justice theory argues against the violation of the economic rights of
the global poor while remaining silent about the moral status of imperialism. In the same vein, to
address the ills that are inevitable consequences of the ‘creative’ destruction aspect of the global
order, Pogge argues for policies that are at best, cosmetic. Although neither Pogge nor Miller
articulates it in this manner, political imperialism and economic creative destruction are ‘social
problems’ precisely because they result in ills that are perpetuated by the powerful against the
weak. This makes them inter-subjective violations, which must be addressed at the level of intersubjectivity.
Conclusion
Although Pogge does not use the language of domination, his arguments against extreme
poverty and wealth inequalities could be seen as a way of arguing against extreme income
disparities which usually precedes domination. Miller likewise, also provide arguments which in
some respects, are superior to Pogge’s. For instance, by calling for ethical discourse, and making
discursive veto power a condition to it, he seems to take more consideration of the agency of the
global poor. But both writers do not adequately engage with the moral violation at the root of

seek an end to racism – without the illusion that it will end soon. This seems to be a tacit acknowledgement of the
desirability of ending imperialism but at the same time a realistic acceptance that it might not happen soon. Miller,
Globalizing Justice, 207.
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global injustice, which is that moral agents expressing agency in a manner that inhibits the
expression of the agency of another.
And although both are justifiably outraged by the extent of global poverty, neither seems
to appreciate the structural limits inherent in capitalism that prevent a significant advance toward
economic (distributive) justice and (in the case of Miller), elimination or reduction of the
excesses of imperialism and global social democracy. And although it is immoral to pursue gain
to the detriment of already impoverished people, the provision of material resources does not in
itself guarantee that the intersubjective relations are free of domination.88 This illustrates the
limitations of Pogge’s position because by focusing on economic solutions to global distributive
injustice, Pogge does not adequately account for the political foundations of such injustices.
However, Miller’s position is just as problematic. Imperialism ignores the agency of those under
its power and is thereby by definition dominative. And although it is possible to wield imperial
power in a responsible manner, this will not address the flawed inter-subjectivity that undergirds
domination. Therefore, both Miller and Pogge develop theories that might be compatible with
domination because they both do not address the flawed inter-subjectivity that is at the root of
relations of domination.
Despite these criticisms, ethical discourse would be a positive addition to, and an
improvement over, current global realities. As Pogge argues, human autonomy is best preserved
by persons “having a purpose of one’s own.”89 He would, therefore, agree with Miller’s
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Miller makes the interesting point that it is possible to dominate another without necessarily making the
person worse off (in material terms). Ibid., 84.
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Pogge, World Poverty, 31.
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discourse ethic proposal. But Pogge would also point out as Miller does, that grave economic
lack militates against equality, which is a core assumption of ethical discourse.
The ability to express free agency is the basis of personhood, therefore the most basic
right we have and are owed as persons, is the right to freely express agency, by not being
restricted by the expression of the agency of another. Both writers recognize that global poverty
is wrong because it violates human dignity, but neither seeks deeper deontological grounds for
human rights, such as inter-subjective recognition and non-domination. Such a deontological
ground must be based on the recognition of the person as worthy of dignity. Such a recognition
will ground an argument for adequate resources to live a life worthy of human dignity, and will
also be grounds for an argument for the protection of the political rights of persons. Lastly, the
person so described, must be in specific kinds of (non-dominative) relations with others. Both
Miller and Pogge allude to these, but they do not provide strong, deontological grounds, which
would have given their prescriptions the force of a moral law. To provide deeper a deeper moral
foundation and thereby sharpen the preceding arguments, in the next section, I engage with the
theories of Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser.

CHAPTER V
TRANSITION
The ability to express autonomous agency is central to personhood, and is an important
part of the reason why persons are said to possess inviolable dignity. But as social beings, we
encounter restrictions in our desire to express agency. Although such restrictions are usually
experienced as an inconvenience, some seem justified, while some are seen as unjustified. In
fact, the term ‘injustice’ could be defined as unjust restrictions in an agent’s ability to express
autonomous agency. This raises the issue of how we are to distinguish just from unjust
restrictions of agency. I propose that restrictions to human agency are just only when the
restricted party has room for reasonable dissent and a veto power to end any restrictions that she
or he does not agree with. Without these conditions being met, the restricted party is thereby
acting under the will of another and is thereby dominated by that other. Restrictions to agency
that do not meet the conditions of consent and veto power imply that the initial actor has thereby
disrespected the agency of the restricted party. To the extent that the restricted party’s agency is
thereby ignored or undervalued, such restrictions entail domination of the restricted party by the
initial actor. Given the centrality of autonomous agency to personhood, I argue for the position
that the most basic right all persons have is the right not to be dominated by others, which
implies a commensurate duty not to dominate others.
I regard social injustice as domination because such injustice results when the actions and
inactions of moral agents, leads to restrictions on some other person’s ability to express agency.
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Since “unjust” social situations imply the existence of inter-subjective relations of domination, I
propose an intersubjective conception of social injustice.1 Global injustice is a form of social
injustice, albeit with more layers of causation between the initial actor or actors and the restricted
or harmed party. Therefore, an adequate theory of global justice should engage with the intersubjective domination – both interpersonal and structural – that is the source of such injustice.
Rawlsian Contractarian Global Justice Theories
Living a minimally decent life requires an appropriate degree of agency, which social or
political relations must not arbitrarily restrict. Social justice requires among other things, that
persons have access to adequate resources to live a minimally decent life. The persistence of
agency-inhibiting poverty in a society means that those who maintain such social arrangements
at least implicitly do not adequately respect the agency of those who are thus harmed. This is
more so the case when such poverty can be shown to be impervious, pervasive, but avoidable.2
Thomas Pogge and Richard Miller think that global poverty is wrong because it violates
human dignity. Although they emphasize slightly different aspects of the problem of global
poverty, their positions overlap and could be regarded as complementary. To Pogge, global
institutional arrangements are the leading cause of extreme global poverty. To him, the global
order thereby violates the social and economic rights of the ‘global poor,’ and particularly so
under conditions of radical global economic inequality. Miller attributes global poverty to global

An accident or an act of nature that leads to a bad outcome for some person is not an injustice. It is only
when the bad outcome or situation results from the actions (or inactions) of another person that the situation could
be termed as “unjust.” Injustice can only arise when someone chooses to carry out an action that results in the
restriction of the free agential expression of another person.
1

Pogge, World Poverty, 198.
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political processes like unfair trade agreements, exploitative sweatshops, draconian lending
policies tied to structural adjustment programs, etc. To him, global poverty is the result of
imperial powers dominating weaker states, via a global political arena that is structured in a
manner designed to deprive the global poor of the political power to address poverty. Thus, with
examples drawn from aspects of the global political environment, both try to show how global
political power differentials contribute to global poverty. However, although they engage the
political dimension of global poverty, it is only to the extent that it supports an argument that is
grounded on an economic injustice.
I agree with Pogge and Miller that extreme global poverty is a grave injustice, and is the
result of complex global factors. I also agree that the global poor suffer economic injustice
because they are victims of a larger environment of injustice. However, their focus on the
economic dimensions of global injustice limits their analysis and influences the kinds of
recommendations they are able to develop. First, they posit lack of access to resources as the
fundamental injustice, which increased access to material resources will correct. But despite the
correlation between social and global injustice and poverty, global injustice involves more than
distributive injustice. For instance, important global justice issues like indigenous group rights
and the global sex trafficking are not caused by, or rectifiable through, increased access to
resources. Secondly, the focus on resources leads to inadequate attention to the way economic
injustice interacts with other forms of injustice. For instance, both Pogge and Miller do not
adequately account for the importance of empowerment and the fact that capitalism, by its very
structure, frustrates empowerment and human development. Furthermore, the structural limits
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inherent in the global order of neo-liberal capitalism militates against global distributive justice,
or the elimination or reduction of the excesses of political domination and imperialism.
Capitalism is one strand of the root cause of global injustice. The other related strand,
which the global capitalist structure greatly contributes to, is harmed subjectivity. Both writers
locate their analysis at the level of institutions. Pogge appeals to the social and economic rights
that global institutions cause. While Miller appeals to social contractarian moral duties that
concern fair cooperation, care over those under one's influence, emergency rescue, and
beneficence. They thereby focus on global political and economic domination, including
imperialism, but do not adequately theorize subjectivity. Since political power relations are
intersubjective relations, Pogge and Miller must agree with me that the expression of agency is at
the root of the problem of global injustice. The Rawlsian Contractarians thereby develop theories
that do not get to the root cause of global injustice. Any policy recommendations grounded on
such theories will at best provide temporary relief for the symptoms of the underlying problem.
However, of the two, Miller seems to account for inter-subjective domination more than
Pogge does. Miller attributes global poverty to global power disparities, particularly imperialism,
and the domination that it easily engenders. To mitigate such injustice, he recommends
reasonable discourse between global actors. He argues against Pogge’s call for ‘fairer’ global
market exchanges, by pointing out that it is possible to dominate another without necessarily
making the person worse off (in material terms). However, Miller is silent on the question of
how to enforce his proviso of reasonable discourse in the face of deep power asymmetries and
the temptation of the strong to dominate the weak.
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Specifically, by calling for more reasonable relations between stronger countries and
weaker ones, Miller communicates his disapproval of imperialistic policies. Although he stops
short of calling for the abolition of imperialism, his recommendations could help mitigate a
morally imperfect global situation. I agree with Miller that imperialist countries could certainly
respect the moral duties that Miller argues for, for instance, such countries could wield their
political powers in a more responsible manner. However, this might not be possible in practice
because imperialism is, by definition, a relationship of domination.3 Therefore, given global
power disparities, Miller’s proposal for ethical discourse between rich and poor countries, seems
like a morally desirable suggestion, not a morally demanded duty. The problem with this is that
global or social justice theories are arguments for the rectification of the violation of moral
duties. When such duties are violated, their rectification should be clear moral demands, and not
moral appeals, nor as a matter of charity or humanitarian aid. For example, the duties that
imperialistic relationships demand should not be presented as suggestions, but as moral demands.
Inter-Subjectivity
An adequate theory should identify social injustice, provide arguments for why it is an
injustice, and make suggestions of how to rectify it. The moral violation of social or global
injustice does not lie in the mere fact of the restriction of human agency, but in the fact that the
restriction is either brought about or sustained by the actions of other moral agents in a manner
that the restricted parties experience as arbitrary. For instance, extreme poverty, which inhibits

Although domination could be understood as a scalar concept, I am arguing for a justice theory based on
the principle of non-domination. With regards to inter-subjective relations, the principle of non-domination is either
respected, or violated. In that sense, there is no such thing as “mild” domination. It is either a moral agent is
adhering to the principle of non-domination or she is not.
3
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the expression of agentic freedom of the poor is not just a ‘social’ problem, but a moral one,
precisely because it is caused by the actions of others. Since social justice is premised on respect
for the expression of agentic freedom, an adequate justice theory must be grounded on respect
for the basic duty not to dominate others. Such a theory must, therefore, be based on an intersubjective analysis.
To begin to address the problem of global injustice, Miller and Pogge both make
recommendations for how certain people should act. Miller’s call for discourse, as well as his,
and Pogge’s demand that citizens of rich countries engage in political action does address
subjectivity, but not inter- subjectivity. The result is a one-sided analysis, which does not
adequately account for the subjectivity of the dominated or the global poor who suffer injustice.4
The result is a global justice theory that is focused on the subjectivity of members of the global
population who Miller and Pogge think have enough social resources to work towards the
rectification of global injustice (or global poverty). That is, rich global citizens and citizens of
imperialist countries, as well as global political elites.
Both theorists provide arguments and policies for why and how poor people could better
meet their material needs. Miller’s discourse ethic could also guard against relationships of
domination by the strong, on account of the extreme material need of the weak. The Rawlsian
Contractarians thereby provide arguments that could lead to an increase in the expression of
agentic personhood. But they do not adequately emphasize that global injustice, even when
limited to the injustice that results from the inequitable allocation of global resources, implies

4Miller does mention how poor countries should act in the face of unfair and dominative global lending, but
this is a prescription of how best to cope with injustice, and not how to change the unjust relations.
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flawed inter-subjective relations. This results in their making prescriptions that are not based on
deontological grounds, such as recognition and unconstrained dialogue, which would have given
their prescriptions the force of a moral law.5
I develop an alternative justice theory grounded on the duty of non-domination because
healthy intersubjective relations, which are relations that are free of domination, are the basis of
just social relations. Equal political participation and distributive injustice presume nondominative social relations. Healthy intersubjective relations are the first steps towards a more
equitable world because such relations preclude the relations of domination which are the basis
of social injustice.
Critical Theory
In addition to my general position that global injustice should be understood as
intersubjective domination, the foregoing also support the argument that, whether at the social or
global levels, material deprivation is not simply a material condition or just a form of political
domination. Rather, it is a certain intersubjective state that is mediated through certain socioeconomic conditions. An economic or political explanation of global injustice is not wrong, but it
could obscure the subjectivity of those who are implicated in the problem. An intersubjective
account, on the other hand, does not deny the existence of economic or political forces.
However, it has the added advantage of not allowing attention to such forces obscure the fact that
social injustice is the result of the expression of individual agency, and is suffered as the
inhibition or restriction of autonomous agency.

5As I discuss in Chapter 7 of this volume, Fraser provides a deontological account of social justice, which,
because it is based on stronger principles, holds an advantage over Honneth’s Hegelian, teleological account.
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In the next section, I turn to the critical theorists that work in the tradition of the Frankfurt
School.6 More specifically, I engage with the theories of Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser. One of
the notable features of critical theory is its emphasis on emancipation, non-domination and the
need to bring about social reform or radical social reform of economic, social and legal
institutions to accord with the ideal of radical emancipatory justice. It does this by developing
arguments grounded on agency, freedom, and inter-subjectivity. Critical theory thereby provides
deeper normative grounding in a prior social conception of free agency. For instance, by locating
the root cause of poverty in the structures within capitalism, they provide a different kind of
analysis from the individual-centered contractarian thinking. I engage with the field of critical
theory in order to develop an alternative global justice theory that is located at the intersubjective
level of analysis and framed around freedom, agency, and inter-subjectivity of the key agents
implicated in global injustice.
Axel Honneth emphasizes injustices of recognition, which includes group- or identity based injustices that affect, for example, indigenous people vis-à-vis globalization. He regards
self-realization and social happiness, which includes rights and freedom, as the most important

The project of a critical theory of (in)justice therefore consists in the following four points:
It contains an analysis of given social relations, that is, their historical genesis and their contemporary character,
especially the inequalities and power asymmetries they contain.
b) It connects this with a critique of false justifications for these relations on the basis of the principle of
justification, false justifications that hide social contradictions and relations of power.
c) Furthermore, it points to the necessity and possibility of justifications that can stand the test of reciprocity and
generality. Reciprocity means that none of the parties concerned may claim certain rights or privileges that they
deny others and that the relevance and force of the claims at issue are not determined one-sidedly; generality
means that all those affected have an equal right to demand justifications. Given this basic right, this has to be a
real and not a merely hypothetical test: ultimately, only those affected can themselves carry out the justification
of their own basic social structures. This is how critical theory links up with the claims and demands made by
social actors themselves in concrete social contexts.
d) Hence, critical theory calls not only for justifiable social relations, but for a practice of justification. This is the
first step towards justice. Rainer Forst and Jeffrey Flynn, The Right to Justification: Elements of a
Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 258-259.
6
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part of modern self-realization. His account is a Hegelian, teleological and psychological account
based on historical and contemporary struggles of recognition (which he sometimes formulates
as an ahistorical philosophical anthropology).7
I conclude with Nancy Fraser who, contrary to Honneth, gives equal, non-reductive
weight to both adequate distribution of resources as well as social recognition. In later work,
Fraser adds (political) representation as a third requirement of social justice. She argues that
social justice requires that all members of the society should be able to participate on a par with
all other members. She refers to this as the principle of ‘parity of participation,’ which in turn
demands that all moral agents have adequate social recognition and material resources, and be
able to participate in the political arena.

As a Hegelian, Honneth’s sharp distinction between deontological and teleological doesn't make sense
because the ultimate ground of a human rights regime and other duties for must reside in institutions that make
possible healthy and happy social relations, which for Honneth, is the very definition of freedom.
7

CHAPTER VI
AXEL HONNETH – RECOGNITION THEORY
Introduction
In this project, I argue for the position that social injustice should be understood as the
result of inter-subjective domination. I understand domination as the result of moral agents
expressing autonomous agency in a manner that leads to the unjustifiable restriction of the ability
of others to express agency. In modern societies, access to social goods is determined by social
allocation patterns, which is in turn determined by social institutions. This makes the level of
access a person has to tangible and intangible social goods relative to others, an important
determinant of how much agency he or she is able to express. Social injustice results from
allocation patterns that lead to agency-inhibiting lack for some members of society, relative to
others.
To Axel Honneth, social injustice is always preceded by, and based upon, flawed
relations of recognition.1 Allocation patterns of social goods in modern social institutions are
thereby a function of the society’s recognition regimes or systems.2 Therefore, social injustice

To Honneth, social justice and recognition mutually illuminate each other, since what counts as an injustice
depends on our reasonable (and mutual) expectations from others. Therefore, an institution (say, a constitution) can
disrespect (not adequately recognize) persons because institutions, besides effectively regulating behavior, always
express—as well as reinforce—underlying attitudes of those who designed or keep on reproducing them. Iser,
“Recognition.”
1

Christopher Zurn explains the connection between social recognition and social injustice as follows: “For
any specific society, there is a specific respect and esteem ‘dispositive’ or ‘recognition order.’ This recognition order
is a reigning set of interpretations of the specific principles that society uses to accord respect and esteem – fair
equality of opportunity and merited achievement for capitalist societies – and institutional structures that more or
less imperfectly realize those interpretations of the moral principles – e.g., social welfare rights and merit based
2
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(which I argue is always grounded on intersubjective domination), is a function of social
misrecognition.3
In this chapter, I examine to what extent Honneth’s theory of recognition could ground a
global justice theory. In part 1, I provide a description of the theory of recognition. In part 2, I
analyze the theory and highlight some of its drawbacks. In part 3, I provide a review of some
attempts to globalize the theory of recognition. I conclude in part 4 by agreeing with Honneth
that healthy intersubjective recognition relations are necessary to social justice. I argue, however,
that Honneth’s theory of recognition was developed to apply to a modern, western democracy. It
is thereby not robust enough to account for many dimensions of global injustice, particularly the
injustice that results from global economic and financial, neo-liberal, capitalist globalization.
Overview
Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition is based on a concept of mutual recognition, which
relies heavily on young (or early) Hegel’s Jena writings, in which Hegel proposes an intersubjective concept of the person.4 But Honneth takes the concept further and develops not just

remuneration.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 112.
Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press, 1995). Axel Honneth, “Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions,” Inquiry 45, No. 4
(2002): 499-519.
3

Hegel’s “Jena period” was between 1801 to 1806. Honneth, Struggle, 1, 6. “Hegel’s basic paradigm is the
struggle for recognition, within which individuals gain a sense of what and who they are only through
comprehending and internalizing their interaction partner’s recognition of their own autonomous subjectivity.” Zurn,
Axel Honneth, 25. “This is in rather stark contrast to the individualistic assumptions of traditional forms of liberal
and social contract theory which simply presuppose atomistic and asocial, instrumentally calculating rational actors,
each looking out for their own interests with no intrinsic concern for emotional connections to others, and generally
unaffected by ties of emotional and affection with particular others.” Ibid., 30. “Exemplary here is John Rawl’s
social contract theory of justice which states as one of its foundational assumptions that the individuals contracting
together into a just society are “rational and mutually disinterested.” This does not mean that the parties are egoists,
that is, individuals with only certain kinds of interests, say in wealth, prestige, and domination. But they are
conceived as not taking an interest in one another’s interests… Moreover, the concept of rationality must be
4
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preconditions for self-consciousness as Hegel does, but an analysis “for the practical conditions
for the development of a positive relation-to-self.”5 He describes his project as an attempt to
develop “the foundations for a social theory with normative content.”6 This entails the use of
immanent critique, to identify, and attempt to close “normative gaps” between how institutions
are supposed to function, and how they actually function.7 Thus he critiques social institutions in
order to reveal their “normative surplus” – or where they fall short in delivering the ideals that
produced them.
To Honneth, society’s moral progress can be measured by the extent to which more
persons are accorded previously denied legal and social recognition. Increases in social acts of
recognition increase individuality and social inclusion, and thereby jointly indicate social
progress.8 He, therefore, understands social struggles as the means through which, previously
unrecognized people demand recognition from their social interaction partners. Such demands

interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to
a given end.” Rawls, 1971, 13-14. Ibid., Footnote 24, 30.
5
“The above attempt to update my theoretical work should not mislead anyone about the fact that initially,
without really having thought through the methodology, I had set out to employ the young Hegel’s model of
recognition as the key to specifying the universal conditions under which human beings can form an identity; the
underlying intention was basically to conceptualize the structures of mutual recognition analysed by Hegel not
merely as preconditions for self-consciousness but as practical conditions for the development of a positive relationto-self.” Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 500.

“In this present volume, I attempt to develop on the basis of Hegel’s model of a ‘struggle for recognition’,
the foundations for a social theory with normative content.” Honneth, Struggle, 1.
6

“From this perspective, since the requirement of reciprocity is always already built into the demand for
recognition, social struggles for the expansion of patterns of recognition are best understood as attempts to realize
the normative potential implicit in social interaction.” Ibid., xviii.
7

Honneth insists that “history is made less at the level of structural evolution than at the level of individual
experiences of suffering.” And “…the claims to recognition … can only be met through greater inclusion, the logical
extension of which is something like the state of society envisioned by the formal theory of ethical life.” Ibid., xviii.
Danielle Petherbridge, The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth (Lexington Books, 2013), 173.
8
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could be for more legal rights (as in the case of immigrants), or demands for greater esteem for
social contributions (as in the case of women and child rearing). He identifies love, rights, and
solidarity, as the three major modes of social recognition which persons need to develop an
undistorted relation to self. These modes occur via emotional bonds, the granting of rights, and a
shared orientation to (social) values respectively.9 If a person is adequately recognized in these
three areas, it yields in her or him, self-respect, self-confidence and self-esteem, respectively.10
Love
Honneth defines ‘love’ as “affectional expression of care retained over distance.”11 It is
the psychological precondition for the development of all further attitudes of self-confidence.12
This conception of love encompasses the set of relationships that provides the primary grounds
that enable persons to develop the foundation not just of self-confidence, but also of self-respect.
Although Honneth emphasizes, and grants a certain priority to the parent-child relationship, his
conception of love also covers friendship and includes all cases of strong, emotional attachments,

9
“It is evidently quite natural to distinguish forms of social integration according to whether they occur via
emotional bonds, the granting of rights, or a shared orientation of values.” Honneth, Struggle, 94.

“… the arbitrary denial of rights is the paradigmatic form of disrespect negatively corresponding to selfrespect, while systematic insult or denigration negatively correspond to self-esteem. But in all cases, the crucial
claim for moral philosophy is that disrespect represents not only a form of harm to a person – insofar as disrespect
impairs the person’s psychological integrity – but also a form of wrong, a disruption of the appropriate social
relations we owe to other persons. And it is precisely the connection between individuals’ practical relation-to-self
and specific forms of intersubjectivity that allows one to understand recognitional harms to persons as, at the same
time, violations of what is owed to them, as injustices.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 31. Honneth, Struggle, 1; Honneth,
“Grounding Recognition,” 500.
10

11

Honneth, Struggle, 5, 118.

“Thus for Hegel, love represents the first stage of reciprocal recognition, because in it subjects mutually
confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature of their needs and thereby recognize each other as needy
creatures.” Ibid., 95, 107.
12
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as well as erotic relationships.13 Love is conceptually and genetically prior to every other form of
reciprocal recognition and is also essential to healthy personhood.14 Love is the first stage of
reciprocal recognition and is thereby what enables us to learn to strike a healthy balance between
symbiosis and self-assertion.
Two features of this conception of love are worth noting. First, love can only be
expressed to a small number of people in each individual life.15 Secondly, self-confidence in this
context is not used in the ordinary sense of the word, but to refer to a “basic sense of the stability
and continuity of one’s self as a differentiated individual with particular needs and emotions,”
which guides us through the rest of our lives.16
Rights or Legal Recognition
Self-respect is to legal relations what self-confidence is to love relationships.17 The
difference between the two is that where love is universal and timeless, legal recognition finds

“Love relationships are to be understood as referring to primary relationships insofar as they – on the
model of friendships, parent-child relationships as well as erotic relationships between lovers – are constituted by
strong emotional attachments among a small number of people.” Ibid., 9, 95.
13

14
“The payoff of this substantive analysis of love, from the perspective of Honneth’s broader theory, is that
love is critical for one pillar of practical identity: self-confidence. … intersubjective recognition in the mode of love
is a necessary and irreplaceable condition for the development of healthy self-confidence. And further, basic selfconfidence is a necessary and irreplaceable fundamental for the two other major modes of practical self-relation:
self-respect and self-esteem. Because the development of a multi-faceted practical identity is necessary not only for
self-realization but also for broader social interaction, it will even turn out that love is crucial for social and political
participation.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 29.
15

Honneth, Struggle, 98, 106.

“Moreover, because this relationship of recognition prepares the ground for a type of relation-to-self in
which subjects mutually acquire basic confidence in themselves, it is both conceptually and genetically prior to
every other form of reciprocal recognition. This fundamental level of emotional confidence - not only in the
experience of needs and feelings, but also in their expression - which the intersubjective experience of love helps to
bring about, constitutes the psychological precondition for the development of all further attitudes of self-respect.”
Ibid., 107. See also Zurn, Axel Honneth, 29.
16

17

Honneth, Struggle, 118.
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expression within specific social communities because rights depend on the specific nature of the
prevailing legal system. However, modern legal systems are also premised on “a universalist
conception of morality.”18 Thus while social struggles could expand the number of people who
have legal rights, the legal principle of ‘equality before the law’ means that in principle, all
members of a legal community have the same relationship to the legal system.19
Understanding ourselves as the possessors of legal rights is the condition under which we
can understand ourselves to be legal persons, and be sure that our own claims will be met.20 As a
form of recognition, rights enables us to take on the perspective of the generalized other, by
seeing him or her as the bearer of rights. Legal rights enable a person “to respect oneself because
one deserves the respect of everyone else.”21 There are thus two important dimensions of legal
recognition – awareness of our own legal obligations, and the knowledge of what legal rights
apply to the concrete other.22 To Honneth, dignity is the recognizable capacity to socially assert
claims, which derives from socially acknowledged legal rights, which he sees as “depersonalized

18
“With the transition to modernity, the post-conventional principles that had already been developed in
philosophy and political theory made their way into established law and submitted it to the constraints of
justification associated with the idea of rational agreement on disputed norms. From this point on, the legal system
can be understood as the expression of the universalizable interests of all members of society, so that, according to
the demand internal to it, exceptions and privileges are no longer admissible.” Ibid., 109.

Zurn refers to legal recognition as a “generic status,” because, “In virtue of having a generic legal status
in a given community, an individual is afforded certain legal rights.” “This is not meant to imply that all persons
have identical rights and obligations. Rather that all are understood to be equal before the law.” Zurn, Axel Honneth,
32.
19

20

Honneth, Struggle, 108.

21

Ibid., 109, 118.

22

Ibid., 112-113.
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symbols of social respect.”23 Honneth agrees with Feinberg, that self-respect generated by rights
is what enables us to “stand up like men” and “look others in the eye.”24 This is because legal
recognition demands that “self and other respect each other as legal subjects for the sole reason
that they are both aware of the social norms by which rights and duties are distributed in their
community.”25 Legal rights are an expandable form of social recognition which could increase in
inclusivity and precision over time.26
Esteem
Honneth argues that in modern societies, what was known as honor in earlier European
societies, is split into two parts - legal recognition and social esteem. 27 The former implies that
every person is an end in itself, while the latter alludes to the social worth of a person, “measured
according to the criteria of social relevance.”28 Social esteem is the aspect of social interactions

23

Ibid., 118.

24

Ibid., 120.

Ibid., 109. “Insofar as a society employs the medium of legal rights in order to express a kind of cognitive
respect for the inherent dignity of free and equal moral subjects, it commits itself to generalizable patterns of
intersubjective recognition.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 36.
25

26
The reciprocity of legal recognition emerges only in the course of a historical development, as can be
shown by the fact that the character of what constitutes a legal person could, and has indeed changed over time.
Honneth, Struggle, 108. “The respect involved here is not differential or graduated: it is not based on a comparative
evaluation of a person’s traits, capabilities or achievements. Respect, rather, is for a person as an end-in-herself, as
an irreplaceable source of intrinsic worth, just insofar as and because she is a moral agent. The object of the respect
is not what differentiates her from others, but, rather, the personhood she shares equally with others on account of
her moral autonomy: as a freely willing being, capable of reasoned insight into the moral requirements of social life
(including the demands of law), and responsible for the choices and actions she makes in the light of that insight.”
Zurn, Axel Honneth, 33. Honneth, Struggle, 110-113.

“In the course of these discussions, a tendency emerged of drawing the same dividing-line between the
two semantic aspects of ‘respect’ that first arose with the uncoupling of legal recognition from social esteem. In this
connection, the context of ‘law’ will occupy us with the first usage of the concept, whereas it is the second semantic
concept that will be of interest for the explication of the form of recognition found in ‘communities of value’.
Honneth, Struggle, 111.
27

28

Ibid., 111.
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that allows persons to relate positively to their specific traits and abilities. Esteem therefore
presumes, and in fact, requires “an intersubjectively shared value horizon.”29 An important
difference between esteem recognition and legal recognition is that while legal recognition is the
general feature that makes human beings persons at all, esteem is a matter of the particular
characteristics that distinguish persons from other persons.30 Also, while legal recognition of a
person cannot admit of any further degrees, esteem for his or her traits and abilities appeals (at
least implicitly), to a standard, in terms of which their 'more' or 'less' has to be determined.31 In
addition, while legal recognition expands by expanding the people that are recognized as legal
persons, social esteem expands the range of what counts as valuable for society’s selfreproduction. Social esteem thereby leads to solidarity because to esteem one another means to
view one another in light of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to “appear
significant for shared praxis.”32 Social esteem can also take on historically variable forms
because it is determined by the dominant conceptions of ethical goals in a society. But unlike
legal recognition which is generic, esteem recognition is of a nature to accommodate levels and

“Both Hegel and Mead contrasted love and legal relations with a further form of mutual recognition and,
although they chose to give different accounts of it, they were largely in agreement on its specific function: in order
to be able to acquire an undistorted relation-to-self, human subjects always need - over and above the experience of
affectionate care and legal recognition - a form of social esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete
traits and abilities. In Hegel’s Jena writings, the concept of ‘ethical life’ was the term for this recognition
relationship of mutual esteem. In Mead, by contrast, we found, instead of a purely formal conception of this form of
recognition, the already institutionally concrete model of the cooperative division of labor. From the comparison
between the two descriptive approaches, the conclusion could be drawn that this type of pattern of recognition could
only be properly understood at all once one further supposed, as a prerequisite, the existence of an intersubjectively
shared value horizon.” Ibid., 113, 121.
29

30

Honneth, Struggle, 113.

31

Ibid., 112.

32

Ibid., 129.
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hierarchies. However, like legal recognition, this form of recognition is also expandable and
could thereby also lead to social struggles for inclusion.
Antecedent Recognition
In an earlier work, Honneth theorized antecedent or primordial recognition, which is an
aspect of recognition that is prior to social recognition.33 This form or recognition is also known
as affective sympathy or sympathetic engagement, which “enables a basic form of antecedent
self-affirmation.”34 It is the “spontaneous, non-rational recognition of others as fellow human
beings.” 35While it is a precondition to the three modes of recognition (love, rights, and
solidarity), it as a morally neutral form of recognition, since an encounter with another person
cannot be presumed to be normatively imbued. This form of recognition precedes cognition, but

33

Zurn, Honneth, 39.

“However, importantly for Honneth, these exchanges are not achieved in a cognitive manner: it is not a
matter of the infant understanding and rationally processing the second person standpoint. Rather, it concerns a kind
of sympathetic engagement with the interaction partner, where the other is encountered as an emotional and
intentional creature with his or her own desires, goals, and projects. Such engagement differs fundamentally from
interactions with the world of things which cannot have their desires and goals, their own emotional responsiveness,
and their own perspectives which can be taken on by others. In short, this form of primordial sympathetic
engagement with interacting alter involves the recognition of the other’s existence as a human being. Hence the
object of antecedent recognition is precisely those characteristics of the other that identify it as a living human, a
person with her or his own emotional and intentional life.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 40. “Hence as with other forms of
recognition, spontaneous non-rational engagement with another as a human enables the infant to encounter her-or
himself as an entity with the characteristics of personhood. Hence antecedent recognition enables a basic form of
antecedent self-affirmation.” “The issue with antecedent self-affirmation, as with antecedent recognition of another,
is simply the existential awareness that one is dealing here with a person, possessed of his or her own drives, desires,
and independent existence.” Zurn, Axel Honneth 40.
34

I propose that the reason antecedent recognition is not demanded is because it is part of the structure of
persons. Non-recognition is an additional layer over an automatically occurring antecedent recognition. Compared to
social recognition, antecedent recognition could be said to be ‘automatic’. The former can only be demanded
because it depends on the perceiver – it is of such a nature that it could be accorded or denied. The latter on the other
hand cannot be demanded or legislated because as a necessary component of inter subjectivity, it will inevitably
occur, its range and nature is not dependent on place and time. But as Honneth notes (Reification, 2008), primordial
or antecedent recognition can be “forgotten” or distorted; e.g., we can objectify others. Axel Honneth, Judith Butler,
and Martin Jay, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 152.
35
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is morally neutral - it could generate positive, neutral or negative in the cognizer.36 The
encounter of antecedent recognition “is not taken to have any further normative implications for
the moral infrastructure of human life.”37
Additional Details of Recognition – Attributive and Perceptive
As of the publication of Struggle for Recognition (1995), Honneth had not yet settled two
questions. The first is whether his theory of recognition describes (a) “constants of human
nature,” or if they are (b) “the result of historical processes.”38 The ambiguity arises from the fact
that the theory is supposed to point out “universal conditions for positive human relation-toself.”39 At the same time, the concepts of legal respect and social esteem are socially, and
thereby historically determined. In a later work (2002), he explains that while the requirement of
social recognition is universal and timeless, its content (the modalities of love, rights, and
esteem), is socially determined.40 Recognition should thereby be understood as entailing both (a)
and (b). The second question is precisely what it means to be “recognized”: What does the
technical process of social recognition entail? To answer this question, he distinguishes between
two possible explanations of recognition: the attribution model of recognition and the perceptive

Zurn illustrates with the example of the experience of encountering a fellow driver in traffic. Such and
experience could be negative, positive or neutral. Zurn, Axel Honneth, 41.
36

37

Ibid., 41

38

Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 501.

39

Ibid., 501.

40“

I now distinguish much more sharply than in my original approach between ‘anthropological’ starting
conditions and historical contingency: although the human form of life as a whole is marked by the fact that
individuals can gain social membership and thus a positive relation- to-self only via mutual recognition, its form and
content change during the differentiation of normatively regulated spheres of action.” Ibid., 501.
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or receptive model of recognition.41
Attributive Recognition
In the attributive model of recognition, on encountering a person, we “award or
supplement the affected subject with something she had not had before.”42 That is, we attribute
to the perceived subject certain qualities. In this model, we “would award or supplement the
affected subject with something she had not had before.”43 The subject thereby ‘acquires’ new,
positive properties because we accept such properties as existent in the person. Thus, the
(attribution) “model allows one to speak of recognition being constitutive in a direct sense,”
thereby making recognition both a necessary and a sufficient condition for personhood.44
Although this way of understanding recognition generates the relevant qualities to regard an
agent as autonomous, Honneth sees some defects in this model. The first defect is that it places
the cognizer in the lead, and thereby gives her too much power to determine the nature of the
subject.45 Secondly, and relatedly, the model lacks an internal criterion for judging the rightness

41

He further differentiates the two modes as follows: “The affirmation effected by such an action can be
understood either on the model of attributions as a result of which the other subject acquires a new, positive
property, or on the model of perception, according to which an already-present property of a person is, as a
secondary matter, merely strengthened or publicly manifested.” In the first case, what we call ‘recognition’ would
award or supplement the affected subject with something she had not had before; in the second case, by contrast, it
would be a matter of a certain kind of perception of an already independently existing status.” Ibid., 506-507.
42

Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 506-507.

43

Ibid., 507.

44
“…only the attribution model will allow one to speak of recognition being constitutive in a direct sense: if
recognitional attitudes are understood as attributions, then they represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for
human beings becoming autonomous persons with the relevant properties.” Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,”
509-510.
45

“On the one hand, if recognition is supposed to have a constitutive role in the recipient’s development of
self, then it would appear that the recognizer takes the lead here, in some way or another constituting or constructing
or determining the positive quality given positive regard.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 47.
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or appropriateness of recognitional ascriptions, without which anything could be “recognized.”46
For instance, nothing in this conception of recognition as attribution prevents me from
‘recognizing’ my pet as a person. Honneth proposes that the model could be salvaged if the
“normative quality of the process by which it emerges” is specified.47 Such a specification
enables boundaries to be set for what could be attributed with the traits of personhood.
The Evaluative, Perceptive or Response Model of Recognition
The second form of recognition is the evaluative or perceptive model, which involves the
“perception of an already independently existing status.”48 Recognition on this view is
understood as responding to features that we cognize in an agent because we react correctly to
features that he or she already possesses. Although the qualities already exist in the perceived
subject, she or he can only affirm those capabilities if, and when his or her interaction partners

46

“The disadvantage I see with this way of viewing things lies in the same point that Laitinen considers the
central defect of the attributive model: if the recognitional attitude were merely to attribute positive qualities to the
other subject, we would no longer have an internal criterion for judging the rightness or appropriateness of such
ascriptions; instead, the variability of recognition would then have no boundaries, since anything could end up
having to count as a capacity or status, as long as it comes about through an act of attribution. One way out here
could be found in the thesis that the legitimacy of recognition depends on the normative quality of the process by
which it emerges; but then the concept of recognition would lose all the moral implications that distinguish it in the
first place from a sociological ‘labeling approach’. Honneth, 2002, 507. According to Zurn, “If this attributive model
is correct, then when Mia esteems Tom, she is in some way ascribing to Tom those positive characteristics of hard
work and achievement, and thereby constituting those characteristics in the first place as characteristics of positive
value, as being worthy of appropriate acknowledgement. On the other hand, it would seem that Tom would actually
have to display real hard work and achievement in order for the act of recognition to be appropriate. For instance,
Mia’s expression of esteem would simply be misplaced if Tom is lazy and has not contributed to the departmental
report – she would have misperceived Tom’s actual characteristics.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 47.
47
48

Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 507.

“Of course, ‘perception’ is not quite the right word here, since Laitinen prefers to speak, drawing on
Joseph Raz, of a ‘responsive attitude’, in order to emphasize the practical features of ‘recognition’: in recognition we
react correctly or appropriately to evaluative properties that human beings already possess in various ways.” Ibid.,
507.
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affirm those traits, when they are reinforced through recognitional behavior from others. 49 In the
perceptual model, the perceiver ‘reasonably’ identifies positive traits in a subject, and thereby
accord the person due respect. The perceiver is thereby understood as merely strengthening or
publicly affirming a potential property of a person.50 Honneth thinks the model of evaluative
recognition is superior to the attributive model because in this case “we respond appropriately to
potential qualities that humans possess, which becomes “available to them when they are able to
identify with them”… “as a result of experiencing the recognition of these qualities” from
others.51 Unlike the attributive model, the evaluative model is not directly constitutive, because
what is ‘recognized and affirmed’ are potential, and not actual traits.52
But like the attributive model, this (perceptive) conception of recognition also has a
problem. Our perceptual abilities and the ‘positive’ traits that we are able to perceive in others
are always a function of the time and place in which we have been socialized. Thus the
perceptive model’s requirement of ‘reasonable assessment” of the perceived subject seems to
demand subscription to some form of value realism, by presupposing the objective existence of

49

Ibid., 510.

50

“… in the second case, by contrast, it would be a matter of a certain kind of perception of an already
independently existing status.” Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 507.
51
“…in our recognitional attitudes, we respond appropriately to evaluative qualities that, by the standards of
our lifeworld, human subjects already possess but are actually available to them only once they can identify with
them as a result of experiencing the recognition of these qualities.” Honneth, 2002, 510.
52

“In this response model, features of persons are potentialities that recognition from the other merely
actualizes. This makes it indirectly constitutive by actualizing a potential, making it a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition. (Honneth, 2002, 510). On the one hand, if recognition is supposed to have a constitutive role in the
recipient’s development of self, then it would appear that the recognizer takes the lead here in some way or another
constituting or constructing or determining the positive quality given positive regard.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 47.
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values (it enables us to assess what is, or is not a valid trait).53 Thus the problem with the
(perceptive) conception of recognition is that, “… the valuable qualities for which we can
appropriately recognize someone have reality only within the experiential horizon of a particular
lifeworld.”54 But because values “represent lifeworld certitudes whose character can undergo
historical change,”55 valuable traits cannot be presumed to be “immutable and objective, but
(are) historically alterable.” 56 This creates the need to “…specify further the status of these
evaluative reasons.” 57
Honneth tries to address this challenge by arguing that since the goal of recognition is to
“expand the domain of the moral,” moral social recognition requires that we locate recognition in
the “space of reasons.”58 But this does not address the problem - recognition as perception
commits him to an indefensible value realism. He recognizes this problem, but sees his choices

53

“In order to be able to claim that someone is responding ‘correctly’ to the evaluative qualities of a person
or group of persons, the objective existence of values must be presupposed in a way that is incompatible with what
we know about the constitution of values.” Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 507.
54

Ibid., 507.

55

Ibid., 508.

56

“This gives rise, within this conception, to the danger of a form of relativism that is fundamentally
incompatible with the normative aims of the concept of recognition; for the values in terms of which the
appropriateness of acts of recognition would be assessed appear to have normative validity only for a single culture.
Consequently, the relativism that accompanies the ‘response’ or ‘receptivity’ model would be indistinguishable from
the ‘attribution’ model; in both cases the validity of the recognitional attitude, whether it is described as an
attribution or as an appropriate response, would depend exclusively on the normative givens of the form of life in
question.” Ibid., 508.
57
58

Ibid., 508.

Honneth says, of Laitenen’s position, “I think he is right to claim that we should locate recognition in the
‘space of reasons’, so that it is not deprived of its character as a moral action; for only if our recognition of other
persons is motivated by reasons, which we can also try to articulate as necessary, can we understand it as a matter of
acting on the basis of insight and thus, in a broad sense, expand the domain of the moral.” Ibid., 507.
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as limited between “completely ahistorical value realism and cultural value relativism.”59 He
attempts to inhabit a middle ground by arguing for “a moderate value realism,”60 which he is best
understood as a sociological, and not ontological realism.61 But this position exposes the theory
to possible charges of ethnocentrism since the standards for assessing positive values will
inevitably be confined to one, or at most a set of cultures.62
Honneth recognizes that his position could expose the theory of recognition to
accusations of cultural relativism, but he does not see this as a fatal flaw because he buttresses
his position with a “robust conception of progress.”63 He sees societies as being on “a
developmental path that would allow for justified judgments regarding the trans-historical
validity of a specific culture of recognition.”64 Social progress entails the continued expansion of
recognizable agents as well as a desirable endpoint, in this case, a world in which all human
persons are able to enjoy full autonomy.65 Since the goal of recognition is human autonomy, the
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Ibid., 509.

60

Ibid., 508.

61

Zurn, Axel Honneth, 48.
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“This gives rise, within this conception, to the danger of a form of relativism that is fundamentally
incompatible with the normative aims of the concept of recognition; for the values in terms of which the
appropriateness of acts of recognition would be assessed appear to have normative validity only for a single culture.
Consequently, the relativism that accompanies the ‘response’ or ‘receptivity’ model would be indistinguishable from
the ‘attribution’ model; in both cases the validity of the recognitional attitude, whether it is described as an
attribution or as an appropriate response, would depend exclusively on the normative givens of the form of life in
question.” Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 508.
63

Ibid., 508.

64

Ibid., 509.

65

“Thus if the responsive model is correct, successful acts of recognition need to be something like the
perceptions of the objective characteristics in the recipient that are evaluated. Honneth clearly endorses this second
perceptual model, in large part because it is required in order to explain how we can often distinguish successful
(true, right, appropriate, adequate) from unsuccessful (false, wrong, inappropriate, inadequate) recognition in terms
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standard for assessing a valuable human trait is the extent to which such a trait could bring about
increased the autonomy of all persons.66 Thus this idea of progress, to Honneth, saves the model
from accusations of value realism, or ethnocentrism.
Although Honneth leans more towards an understanding of recognition as perception and
not attribution, he ends up endorsing aspects of both forms of recognition. The problem he wants
to address with this straddling of the conceptions of recognition involves two conditions of
accurate recognition67 The first is that correct recognition must be “adequate” - it must accurately
capture features of the subject. Secondly, it must meet the “mutuality” condition - the subject
must acknowledge and internalize the recognitional attitude of the observer.68

of whether it is properly responsive to the actual characteristics possessed by persons. This is easily seen in every
day interactions where one person is unjustly disrespected by another: the injustice lies precisely in the fact that the
former’s actual characteristics has not been given adequate regard by the latter. In the same vein, social struggles
over recognition presuppose that there is truth of the matter about an instance of misrecognition: some persons are
collectively being disrespected because the broader society is not giving due or appropriate regard to some morally
significant characteristics or achievements that the disrespected persons objectively possess or have achieved.” Zurn,
Axel Honneth, 47.
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“The answer already suggested by Hegel (and subsequently proposed in ever-changing versions)
reintroduces human autonomy as the goal of recognition: only the person who knows that she is recognized by
others can relate to herself rationally in a way that can, in the full sense of the word, be called ‘free’.” Honneth,
“Grounding Recognition,” 509.
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“Although we make manifest, in our acts of recognition, only those evaluative qualities that are already
present in the relevant individual, it is only as a result of our reactions that he comes to be in a position to be truly
autonomous, because he is then able to identify with his capabilities.” We would have to say that this identification
presupposes recognition by others: with regard to the capabilities to which, in virtue of my culture’s normative
presuppositions, I am entitled as a subject, I can really affirm only those capabilities that are reinforced as valuable
through the recognitional behaviour of those with whom I interact. To this extent, an explanatory model of this sort
actually represents a middle position between pure constructivism and mere representationalism.” Ibid., 510.
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Analysis
Attribution and Perception
The attributive model of recognition conceives of recognition as a person assigning
positive traits to another. The problem with this conception of recognition is that it implies that
any trait that is not recognized by the observer is in a sense non-existent in the observed agent.
This makes the subject overly dependent on the cognizer. In the perceptive model, the agent is
also dependent on the other for the accuracy of the other’s vision of his or her ‘potential’ traits.
Therefore, both forms of recognition privilege the observer. However, the attribution model
seems more subjective, since the existence of traits seems to be entirely dependent on the
observer – she chooses what traits exist in the subject. In the perceptive model of recognition
seems to more accurately capture intersubjectivity. In acknowledging a potential trait, the
observer, in a weak sense ‘permits’ its expression, in the weak sense of creating a space, for the
subject to express the trait. This description of recognition accords just as much power to the
observer, but because traits are potential, it leaves room for the ambiguity of intersubjective
relations. Honneth concludes that “I can really affirm only those capabilities that are reinforced
as valuable through the recognitional behavior of those with whom I interact.”69 In this way, he
ends up straddling both the attributive and the perceptive explanations of recognition.70
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“To this extent, an explanatory model of this sort actually represents a middle position between pure
constructivism and mere representationalism: although we make manifest, in our acts of recognition, only those
evaluative qualities that are already present in the relevant individual, it is only as a result of our reactions that he
comes to be in a position to be truly autonomous, because he is then able to identify with his capabilities.” Honneth,
“Grounding Recognition,” 510.
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“It seems to me that an exceptionally apt explanation emerges from an understanding that combines the
insight into the constitutive role of recognition with the response model: in our recognitional attitudes, we respond
appropriately to evaluative qualities that, by the standards of our lifeworld, human subjects already possess but are
actually available to them only once they can identify with them as a result of experiencing the recognition of these
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Recognition and Social Justice
Social injustice involves the inequitable distribution of social (tangible and intangible)
goods. In modern societies, groups with more social power, relative to other groups, usually have
more of a say with regards to how social institutions are maintained and sustained. This implies
that relative to less dominant members of the social group, the more dominant members of
society have more power over the determination of social distribution patterns. Social injustice is
thereby an instance of the violation of the basic right not to be dominated by others. Many of the
arguments that Honneth makes in support for his theory of recognition are similar to the
arguments I present for the right to non-domination.
Honneth holds the position that social injustice, particularly when traceable to ‘normally’
functioning institutions, is based on flawed inter-subjective relations, between the more
dominant members of society, against those with relatively lower social power. To him, such
injustice implies that the dominant members of society do not adequately “recognize” the agency
of the harmed group.71 I am therefore in agreement with Honneth that social injustice is preceded
by the denial, or at best limited, or partial recognition from the powerful of weaker groups. This
makes misrecognition a necessary prelude to social injustice, which I define as domination.
Whether or not they are acknowledged by others, human traits always already exist. It
seems that no matter what traits an observer grants an agent, the observed agent remains a part of

qualities.” Honneth, 2002, 510; “Both recognizer and cognized are in the driver’s seat, as it were, for successful
recognition: both have a constitutive role in the dialectic between other-regarding attitudes and practical relation-toself.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 49.
71

This is based on the argument that, how much respect we have for the agency of another person is
revealed in the amount of care we show not to express our agency in a manner that results in the restriction of his or
her agency.
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the process of determining his own traits. Therefore, what is missing in the theory of recognition,
is the role (or the power), of the observed agent. What does he bring into the formation of
himself (into a subject, with a healthy relation to self)? It seems that the observed agent has some
power to either accept or reject the conception the other grants him. The former will lead to a
healthy relation to self, and the latter to the sort of psychological harm that Honneth claims is at
the root of social struggle. By straddling both conceptions, Honneth Illustrates why recognition
is so important to healthy inter-subjective relations, personal autonomy, and by extension, social
justice.
Honneth sees social struggle as the demand for social recognition in the modes of
emotional bonds, the granting of rights, and a shared orientation of social values. The granting of
these forms of recognition yields, self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.72 Lack of social
recognition can only be experienced as an affront if the agent already knows himself to possess
traits that society refuses to acknowledge. One could raise the question against Honneth’s theory
that: if denied social recognition prevents the development of these three traits, on what basis do
the disenfranchised demand that they are recognized in the three modes?
The Role of Love
The foregoing implies that demand for social recognition indicates that denigrated
persons already know themselves to possess the traits that they see society as denying them. This
seems to indicate that recognition from the dominant groups in society might not be the only
source and outlet for feelings of self-respect and self-esteem. When a disenfranchised person or
group demands legal and esteem recognition, this would seem to indicate that such
72
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‘unrecognized’ persons already ascribe those values to themselves. The feelings of humiliation
that leads to struggles for recognition implies a violated sense of self-esteem and self-respect, in
at least some members of the unrecognized group. This implies the existence of sources of
respect and esteem outside of the dominant culture, which could be the basis on which
denigrated members of society demand recognition. Honneth alludes to love (defined as a close
network of emotionally supportive people), as the source of the self-confidence that forms the
basis of all other forms of positive self-relation. The modality of love could thereby be a source
of, and an outlet for, self-respect and self-esteem. This could explain how an unrecognized group
or person could still ‘recognize’ herself as worthy of forms of recognition that the larger society
denies her. It seems that (at least in modern pluralistic societies), most persons are aware that
they already have positive traits, and thereby see the lack of social recognition as an affront.
Recognition and Social Power
In modern societies, the ability to influence the allocation pattern of tangible and
intangible social goods is positively correlated to access to all forms of social power. In what
follows, I want to highlight the relationship between social recognition and social power. Take
the hypothetical example of a middle-aged female Indian who is of the Hindu religion. Assuming
such a woman moves to Germany as an immigrant, she would probably hold strong (negative)
opinions about people who eat meat in general, particularly the subset who eat beef. Such a
woman will not have much respect (in Honneth’s terminology, will withhold, or will not grant
adequate recognition), to meat eaters. It is, therefore, safe to assume that she will grant
inadequate recognition, or ‘mis-recognize’ a non-vegetarian, German politician. Since her social
position gives her little or no social power to affect the well-being of the politician, the fact that
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she accords him little or no respect or esteem recognition does not count for much. Given her
limited social power, the extent to which she could affect the well-being of the politician is
severely limited. On the other hand, her social status (immigrant, and illiterate by German
standards), creates a strong possibility for the politician to also ‘mis-recognize’ her. While the
female immigrant’s misrecognition of the politician is harmless, the politician’s misrecognition
could negatively affect her, since the politician is in a position to affect her well-being.
This example illustrates the fact that it is only when the person who mis-recognizes us
has some social power to affect our well-being, does the accordance or withholding of
recognition become a justice issue. Likewise, it is only when lack of adequate recognition leads
to, or has the potential for harm does it become a moral (and in a more general sense, a social)
problem. In the foregoing example, the female immigrant’s opinion is not available for moral
scrutiny precisely because she is not in a position to carry out actions that could lead to
detrimental effects against the politician. It could be argued that it would be wrong for her to
think less of people who do not share her religious views. But this argument misses the point,
which is that her social position renders her personal views and opinions of little or no relevance
to social justice debates. Honneth, therefore, seems correct that with regards to social injustice, in
modern societies, powerful parties ‘expand’ recognition to ‘include’ weaker and formerly
excluded others. This analysis shows that the theory of recognition requires a theory of power.
As Hegel said, it is only the recognition of those whom we deem worthy that matters to us.73 To
this, we can now add that misrecognition becomes a social justice issue only when such
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Although Hegel makes this argument in a somewhat different context of inter-subjective recognition, the
argument seems to also apply to contexts of power and the allocation of social goods. Honneth, Struggle, xviii.
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misrecognition affects the allocation patterns, and by extension access to social goods.
Globalized Social Recognition or Global Injustice and Domination
Social existence means that our agency will inevitably be restricted as a result of the
expression of the agency of another. Restrictions on agency are not unjust (dominative) if the
restricted party has the option of reasonable dissent and the veto power over the restriction.74 The
persistence of inequitable distribution social goods in a society indicates that the marginalized
live under the will of others, who do not accord them adequate recognition. Systemic, long term
injustice indicates that the marginalized have neither veto power nor room for reasonable dissent.
If indeed domination is the fundamental social injustice, and lack of recognition is always a
prelude to domination, then the theory of recognition seems applicable to global injustice issues.
My position implies irrespective of distance and layers of causation; social injustice
always derives from human agency. To Honneth, allocation patterns of social goods are
determined in large part by the society’s recognition regime. Therefore, misrecognition could
arise not just inter-subjectively, but also through social institutions. This is because social
institutions reflect the (recognitional) attitudes of those who create, maintain and uphold them. A
person could thereby be dominated (or suffer restricted agency as a result of the actions of
another) irrespective of how many layers of causation lies between the two parties. This implies
that in a world of interconnected social, economic and political relationships, due in large part to
the operation of global institutions, global institutions could also misrecognize persons.
Proximity (for instance, by belonging to a political unit) is therefore not a condition for social
injustice.
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The foregoing would seem to support the position that the theory of recognition could
ground a global justice theory. However, it should be borne in mind that Honneth developed this
theory to apply to modern western democracies, and not the global community. Before exploring
the applicability of this theory to global injustice, in what follows, I present a short literature
review of attempts by some scholars to globalize the theory of recognition.
Globalizing the Theory of Recognition
Gottfried Schweiger agrees with Honneth that, “although self-realization is a formal
concept that has to be fulfilled by the individual, it is often shaped by social, economic, political
and technological possibilities.”75 Schweiger notes that extreme poverty inevitably leads to
debilitating lack, which usually leads to denial of social rights and lack of esteem, making it
unlikely that victims could experience undistorted self-realization.76 And because poverty
severely limits a person’s ability to lead life the life of an equal and respected citizen, in many
cases, poverty also leads to debilitating social invisibility.77 From this perspective, what makes a
social injustice like avoidable poverty a moral wrong is its correlation to severe forms of social
disrespect (which we can presume causes victims psychological harm). To Volker Heins (2010),
Honneth’s inclusion of victim’s self-understanding into his analysis makes it superior to many
justice theories, because this provides more theoretical tools to understand additional dimensions
of global injustices like extreme poverty.78 But are the three modalities of recognition as
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presented by Honneth, expandable to questions of global injustice? To explore the possibility of
expanding the theory, in what follows, I undertake an analysis of the three modalities of
recognition.
Other-regarding models of action like global rights advocacy are usually based on an
ethic of brotherliness. An example of this is what Heins refers to as, ‘Samaritan-type of love.”79
Samaritans draw their very identity from assisting others, whereas the same cannot always be
said of the beneficiaries of such brotherly love. The feelings of fraternity that drive many forms
of global justice advocacy indicate that not all instances of love are symmetrical – in Honneth’s
sense of symbiotic, self-confidence generating love.80 Honneth seems to ignore the role that nonsymmetrical love sometimes plays in social and global injustice struggles.
Honneth’s regards feelings of disrespect as a result of not being accorded the requisite
recognition as what leads the victims of social injustice to fight for social change. But the
Samaritan form of advocacy indicates that it is not just one’s own experience that could motivate
social struggles. This could be seen as a fundamental weakness of the theory of recognition - it is
unable to account for people who act vicariously for others without having themselves gone
through an experience or history of disrespect. In many cases, the people who suffer from global
injustice are extremely debilitated by aspects of such injustice which make it almost impossible

Contemporary Political Theory 9, No. 2 (2010): 149-170, 150.
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Heins reads Honneth’s recognitional love as being necessarily symmetrical. According to Heins, “Unlike
other forms of mutual recognition, love is scale-neutral… close emotional relationships…that have little regard for
boundaries.” In this case, “The object of personal love is distinguished by its particular, outstanding qualities,
whereas a universalistic love ethos forsakes all distinctions in favor of recognizing all humans as ‘needy creatures’”
(Honneth, 1995, 95) Ibid., 147. However, Honneth does seem to have room in his theory for asymmetrical love.
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for them to be able to fight for justice. Precisely because they do not suffer from social injustice,
advocates have the means (social power) to work as advocates for the victims of injustice. These
issues seem to place a limit on the extent to which Honneth’s recognition theory is a correct
assessment of global justice advocacy.
Within moral foreign policy debates on issues such as child labor, legitimate uses of
violence, women’s rights or the place of religion in society, there is rarely consensus on what
counts as a valid moral claim. It is, therefore, implausible to assume that activists in these areas
confine themselves to redeeming the normative ‘surplus’ of already valid moral claims.81 This
can be seen in the activities of global activists and International Non-Governmental
Organizations (INGOs) involved in fighting to secure the legal or human rights of
disenfranchised people. Such organizations are beginning to institutionalize forms of legal
recognition beyond the state, thereby placing such issues even further beyond the control of the
state.82 The activities of these trans-national social movements “threaten to disrupt the publicly
communicable features of rights which the recognition model hinges.”83 And on the assumption
that bilateral aid agencies and global financial or investment institutions are a source of improved
access to resources, they also “erode the sense in which needy people as rights bearers claim
those rights from their interaction partners.”84
Recognition theory conceives of poverty as the result of the poor members of society
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denied social recognition (specifically, Honnethian legal recognition), which in turn leads to their
also being deprived of socio-economic rights. There is a sense in which extreme global poverty
and inequality could be conceived as a manifestation of inadequate recognition of the global
poor. It also seems correct to assume that the global poor, wherever they might be located,
probably suffer from low self-regard. Honneth argues that the feelings of disrespect brought
about by social denigration will spur the disenfranchised to the pursuit of legal recognition. The
crucial aspect is that this pursuit will be spearheaded by the misrecognized. But we see that in the
global arena, the experience of poverty and the political advocacy that demands its rectification
do not necessarily derive from the same political unit, or from those who directly suffer the
social injustice. Such demands are on many occasions taken up by persons who have not suffered
from the legal misrecognition (at least not in a way directly related to the one they try to rectify).
This example also shows that the connection between lack of social recognition and the demand
for recognition is not as linear as Honneth’s theory implies.85
In the theory of recognition, esteem is the third source of increased autonomy. Honneth
makes esteem recognition dependent on the assumption that all parties exist in a social space
with a “shared currency of esteem”.86 The two aspects of achievement esteem and contribution
esteem further complicates and thereby limits the extent to which the theory of recognition could
be globalized. According to Jonathan Seglow (2009), they are in tension with each other. This is
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because although these two aspects or kinds of esteem could overlap, “to esteem someone for
their merit is not the same as to esteem them for their contribution.”87
In addition to this, the global community does not share a currency of esteem. Global
cultural differences greatly influence what counts as an esteemable trait. Furthermore, in our
world of circular migration, guest workers and refugee inflows, stable communities of esteem are
becoming even rarer.88 Lastly, the distinction of esteem as merit and esteem as contribution
further muddies the conceptual waters. What will count as esteemable is complicated by the
attitudes that different societies hold towards the value of pure merit (for instance the
achievement of a purely ceremonial title), and the attainment of tangible goods like money,
which could, for instance, be donated to the society (as in the case of a millionaire endowing a
museum). Thus, different societies will have different, and in many cases conflicting, values for
each of these measures of esteem.
For esteem to be a source of increased autonomy, the esteem of others must be regarded
as valuable, and vice versa. Seglow, therefore, argues that while global justice movements could
be grounded on the modalities of love and legal rights, it would be more difficult to ground
demands for global justice on social esteem. This should however not be taken as a fatal flaw but
as the result of the attempt to globalize a theory that was developed to function within a national
frame.89 To Seglow therefore, attempting to globalize the theory of recognition risks severing
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“the special connection between recognition and the modalities of self-regard.”90 However, of
the three modalities of recognition, fundamental human rights (legal recognition in Honneth’s
language) should be globalized, because rights seem to best reflect the universal respect we owe
every person.91
This is precisely what Schweiger (2012) attempts to do, by first arguing that globalization
of the recognition approach is only possible when it is grounded on the dialectic of relative and
absolute elements of recognition. Since “recognition as the intersubjective condition of a good
life,”92 the absolute core of recognition is undistorted self-realization. Claims of recognition
could, therefore, refer to this absolute core (which transcends any given society).93 In this case,
the demand would be that intersubjective conditions and social relations change in order to make
undistorted self-realization possible. Since recognition is also determined by material and social
forms such as income, housing or political participation, redistribution problems should also be
reconstructed as materializations of (mis-) recognition.94 Poverty or any other injustice is thereby
morally wrong if it violates any implicit or explicit values or norms within the global society or
the social relations of those affected. To him, therefore, a convincing critique of global poverty
must be the major focus of a theory of global justice.95
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The foregoing analysis shows that the globalizability of a social justice theory that
develops its concepts, and thereby inevitably conceives of persons as limited by, and in a sense
confined to a specific geopolitical unit is severely limited.
The Global
Against Rawlsian Contractarian global justice theories (Pogge and Miller), I argue that
distributive injustice is just one aspect or dimension of global injustice. There are other
dimensions of global injustice which are prior, and therefore more important than global
distributive injustice. Therefore, identifying and addressing these aspects of global injustice will
be more effective in addressing the problem of inequitable allocation of global resources.
However, in a world of globalizing neoliberal capitalism, global resource allocation is greatly
determined by neo-liberal capitalist principles. In addition, economic power is strongly
correlated to other forms of social power, like political voice and cultural valuation. This means
that the level of comparative access a person has to resources could be taken as a proxy for her
wellbeing.
Although neo-liberal globalization involves the use of both political and economic power,
global resources are still allocated mostly through market exchanges.96 Furthermore, the
institutions that affect the lives of most of the global population are predominantly global
financial and economic institutions. Many cases of global distributive injustice can be traced to
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the central feature of capitalism.
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policies that originate from such organizations.97 An adequate global justice theory must,
therefore, engage with global capitalism and the global institutions that determine how global
markets function. Therefore, to be applicable to global injustice, the theory of recognition must
be able to engage with the issue of global distributive injustice.
In an ideal (capitalist) market, goods are allocated anonymously, through an impartial
(though efficient) price mechanism. Markets are indifferent to whether or not, or who,
specifically, benefits or is harmed as a result of a market exchange. One of the most common
complaint against capitalism is that the prioritization of economic growth leaves little room for
considerations of human needs. To this, supporters of capitalism respond that economic growth
leads to increased human well-being. As long as economic growth occurs, the benefits from such
growth will inevitably trickle down to all persons, making the majority better off. Proponents of
capitalism see the twin features of anonymity and indifference to outcomes, as some of the most
advantageous features of a properly functioning market. They acknowledge the possible harms
of market mechanisms but insist that such harms are the inevitable price to be paid for increased
well-being of the majority. Such harms should be seen as an unfortunate, unavoidable, but
tolerable result of efficiency and economic growth.
The foregoing could lead to the conclusion that demands for recognition in an economic
exchange, or a market-based relationship, must be based on a contradiction. The concept of
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recognition seems to be more appropriate in legal, cultural or political contexts, but not in market
exchanges. It, therefore, seems incorrect to claim that a global economic or financial institutions
‘misrecognized’ persons who suffer from lack of resources. This would seem to call into
question, the applicability of the theory of recognition to global justice issues, particularly, the
harms that come about as a result of the normal functioning of global markets, through the global
institutions that regulate them. However, if Honneth is correct that social institutions could
misrecognize persons, this implies that global institutions could also misrecognize persons. If
such misrecognition is a necessary prelude to social injustice, then the injustice that is caused by
global financial institutions should also be understood to be preceded by the misrecognition of
those who suffer its detrimental effects.
To defend his position against such criticisms, Honneth proposes the idea of “moral
economism.”98 He argues that a deep recognitive ethos underlies markets. But while these social
norms guide and sustain the market, they do not create the market, or cause markets to come into
existence. 99 Markets are normative - economic outcomes have normative determinants, and
functioning markets have normative preconditions.100 To Honneth, markets have two important
functions – meeting individual needs (in consumption) and recognition of individual
achievement (in labor).101 A well-functioning market supplies human needs, while providing us

98

Zurn, Axel Honneth, 146.

99

“If market institutions do not realize, at least to some tolerable extent, the implicit norms that justify them
in the first place, then people will simply withdraw their consent from them and stop participating in them or in the
legal and social practices needed to sustain the. Thus, to the extent that markets do actually continue to operate, there
must be some at least minimal moral consent to them on the part of participants.” Ibid., 147.
100

Ibid., 146.

101

Ibid.

170
with avenues to express (and sell) our abilities and skills. To Honneth, ‘economic injustice’
entails a failure of one or both normative preconditions - inability to meet our needs in the
marketplace, inability to sell our skills and abilities, or both.
He argues that despite the apparent acceptance of the market as an anonymous place in
which goods are allocated by means of indifferent price mechanisms, markets in fact exist and
subsist on implicit normative assumptions. Markets thereby function on the condition that this
underlying ethos is fulfilled.102 The reason why social protests usually result whenever market
outcomes create inequity or severe lack is because the failure of the market’s normative
preconditions is taken as a violation of this ethos.103 Protests occur because ‘market failure’ is
experienced as a very subjective experience of inequity. Victims of economic inequity
experience material lack as the market (as a component of society) having failed to fulfill those
normative expectations.104 Honneth thereby rejects the functionalist conception of markets, and
argues instead for “normative functionalism.” This should be understood as a functionalism that
is conditional to meeting certain non-market criteria.105 At this point, one is justified to ask:
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should economic injustice, particularly when it is the result of market-based exchanges, be
understood as deriving from inadequate social recognition? Honneth answers this question in the
affirmative.106
While I agree in general with the major parts of Honneth’s theory of recognition, the
causal claim that misrecognition is the cause of or a prelude to economic misdistribution seems
to be too strong a generalization. Although there is usually a strong correlation between forms of
social power, like political voice, education, cultural valuation, etc. Honneth’s tries to explain
economic injustice as a form of economic or market misrecognition. He seems to be claiming
that persons, expect to be recognized by society through the market. When a person is unable to
sell her labor, or buy material resources, the person interprets this as her society not adequately
recognizing her need for work and access to material resources, via the market. While this seems
to be inaccurate at the social level, it seems even more so at the global level. Particularly at the
global level of analysis, it might be more accurate to say that misrecognition accompanies most,
and perhaps all instances of economic injustice. Such a formulation acknowledges the correlation
of economic injustice and social recognition, without subordinating economic injustice to these
other aspects of injustice. Honneth has been criticized precisely on this point by Nancy Fraser,
who insists that the theory of recognition is not adequate to address both social and global justice
issues.
The role to be accorded to social recognition and equitable distribution of resources and
the relationship between the two forms the basis of an important debate between Axel Honneth
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and Nancy Fraser. In the next chapter, I introduce the work of Fraser, who argues against
Honneth, that an adequate social justice theory must include both recognition and redistribution.
In the following chapter, I provide an analysis of this debate, in which the two writers address
the question of whether social recognition (as described by Honneth), is sufficient to meet the
demands of social justice, or whether justice requires both recognition and redistribution. If
Fraser’s objection is correct, that is, if misrecognition is not always the cause of economic
injustice but nonetheless accompanies it, then the remedy for economic injustice will not
necessarily take the route of improved social recognition, for example by anti-discrimination
laws, but might require straightforward changes in the economy instead. Another way of putting
this is that if indeed, inequitable allocation of social goods, but not subjective recognition, is
morally relevant to justice theories, then global injustice is best addressed not by increased
‘recognition’, but by a more equitable allocation of material resources.

CHAPTER VII
FRASER
Introduction
Although there are some historical examples to the contrary, in the current global order, a
positive correlation usually exists between social recognition and access to material resources.1
Although “globalization,” understood as interactions, economic or otherwise, among societies is
not a new phenomenon. However, its current form is more accurately, one of globalized
neoliberal capitalism, whose distinguishing feature is even more intensive economic integration.
Since access to resources is central to this form of globalization, an adequate global justice
theory must engage with the question of resource allocation.
Thus, one of the aims of this project is to cut through the many layers of causation to
provide an understanding of global injustice as the result of flawed intersubjective relations. In
the previous chapter, I agreed with Honneth that lack of social recognition is a prelude to social
injustice, and inadequate access to resources and indication of such injustice. If this is true then,

1

There have been cases in history where a denigrated subset of society has held substantial economic, but
not political power. An example of this is the European Jews of the 18th century - although they usually held
economic power, anti-Semitism meant that Jews were usually denied other forms of social (notably political) power.
In more recent times, lack of social recognition is more likely to lead to limited access to resources for the
misrecognized. An example of this is pre-Civil Rights period in southern United States where the non, or inadequate
recognition of Black people severely limited the extent to which they were able to access social and economic
resources.
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a global justice theory will need to engage with the issue of the respective roles and relationships
between social recognition and global patterns of resource allocation.2
In the previous chapter, I analyzed Honneth’s Theory of Recognition and concluded on the
question of the connection between social recognition and access to resources. Nancy Fraser
holds the position that “social causes of recognitional and distributive injustices are different,
neither can be reduced to the other.”3 She disagrees with Honneth’s position that adequate social
recognition will automatically address all forms of social injustice. In this chapter, I provide an
overview of Fraser’s alternative social theory following 1. In section 2, I provide a synopsis of
some major points in an important debate between Fraser and Honneth. In section 3, I conclude
by siding more with Fraser’s position that while social misrecognition accompanies in most,
perhaps all cases of economic injustice, Honneth’s claim that misrecognition is the cause of, or
prelude to economic misdistribution is too strong a generalization.
Overview
To Fraser, although access to resources seems to be the touchstone to human welfare, it
remains just one aspect of social injustice. The aspiration to social recognition is a second,
equally important aspect. Therefore, social subordination should be understood as involving

2
Embarking on such an enquiry does not detract from my position that injustice is better understood as
intersubjective domination or that lack of social recognition is a prelude to domination. Rather, this makes access to
resources an important dimension of the relationship between lack of recognition and domination.
3

Zurn, Axel Honneth, 115. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth are both critical theorists of the Frankfurt school
tradition, who develop their respective arguments to apply to bounded political units, like a modern nation state. I
include this debate because as I will try to show, some important aspects of their theories are applicable to global
injustice. In addition, combining some of their arguments to Rawlsian Contractarian global justice theories will
provide stronger grounds for the conclusions derived by theorists like Richard Miller and Thomas Pogge.
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aspects of both cultural misrecognition and unjust patterns of resource allocation.4 Social
injustice could be caused by patterns of allocation of material resources (unjust class structure),
but could also be based on institutional hierarchies of cultural value (unjust status order) of
society.5 An adequate theory of justice will accord equal importance to the two aspects because
although they tend to move in tandem, inequitable distribution of resources and inadequate social
recognition remain analytically distinct dimensions of social injustice.6 Social justice thereby
requires both redistribution and recognition, making the separation of justice claims between the
demands for recognition and a more egalitarian allocation of resources “a false anti-thesis,”7

4

“Both can be contrasted in the following ways: (1) First, the two paradigms assume different conceptions
of injustice. The redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes to be
rooted in the economic structure of society. The recognition paradigm, in contrast, targets injustices it understands as
cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. (2)
Second, the two folk paradigms propose different sorts of remedies for injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the
remedy for injustice is economic restructuring of some sort. In the recognition paradigm, in contrast, the remedy for
injustice is cultural or symbolic change. (3) Third, the two folk paradigms assume different conceptions of the
collectivities that suffer injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the collective subjects of injustice are classes or
class - like collectivities, which are defined economically by a distinctive relation to the market or the means of
production. (4) It follows, and this is the fourth point, that the two folk paradigms assume different understandings
of group differences. The redistribution paradigm treats such differences as unjust differentials. Far from being
intrinsic properties of groups, they are the socially constructed results of an unjust political economy. The
recognition paradigm, in contrast, treats differences in either of two ways. In one version, they are benign, preexisting cultural variations, which an unjust interpretative schema has maliciously transformed into a value
hierarchy. In another version, group differences do not pre-exist their hierarchical transvaluation, but are constructed
contemporaneously with it. For the first version, justice requires that we revalue devalued traits; thus, we should
celebrate, not eliminate, group differences. For the second version, however, celebration is counterproductive;
rather, we should deconstruct the terms in which differences are currently elaborated.” Nancy Fraser and Axel
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003), 3, 12-15.
5

Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), 16. According to Fraser, “An accurate social theory must account for two
possible causes of injustice – cultural patterns institutionalized in the status hierarchy and economic mechanisms
institutionalized in class structure - where neither form of injustice can be reduced to, nor is a result of, the other
form.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 116; Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 34-35.
6
7

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 3.

Ibid., 7, 9, 29. “The disagreement over whether or not distribution can be made to supervene on
recognition arises from the differing interpretations of recognition. According to Fraser one can understand
recognition as either (a) a matter of justice, connected to with the concept of a universal ‘right’ (Fraser’s position); or
(b) a matter of self-realisation, connected with historically-relative cultural conceptions of the ‘good’ (Honneth’s
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Fraser therefore proposes “a two-dimensional conception of justice that can accommodate both
defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference.”8
Therefore, many forms of contemporary injustice, like class, gender, race, or ethnicity,
cannot be adequately understood or assessed by what she sees as a “reductivist,” onedimensional perspective.9 Rather, they are better viewed from “dual perspectives,” of both
recognition and redistribution.10 Her “two-dimensional conception” of justice, combines
distributive concerns rooted in economic structures (maldistribution), with recognition concerns
rooted in status hierarchies (misrecognition).11 This two-dimensional conception is able to
accommodate defensible claims for both social equality and recognition of difference, without

position).” “Fraser believes that this binary opposition derives from the fact that, whereas recognition seems to
promote differentiation, redistribution supposedly works to eliminate it. The recognition paradigm seems to target
cultural injustice, which is rooted in the way people’s identities are positively or negatively valued. Individuals exist
as members of a community based upon a shared horizon of meanings, norms and values. Conversely, the
distribution paradigm targets economic injustice, which is rooted in one’s relation to the market or the means of
production. Here, individuals exist in a hierarchically-differentiated collective class system which, from the
perspective of the majority class who are constituted by a lack of resources, needs abolishing.” Paddy McQueen,
“Social and Political Recognition,” The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, accessed February
22, 2017, http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp/#SH3c
8This also calls for the political task of “devising a programmatic political orientation that can integrate the
best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.” Ibid., 9.
9

Ibid., 3. “While Honneth “reinterprets the socialist ideal of redistribution as a subvariety of the struggle for
recognition”, Nancy Fraser, denies that distribution can be subsumed under recognition. Thus, she proposes a
“perspectival dualist” analysis that casts the two categories as co-fundamental and mutually, irreducible dimensions
of justice.” Thomas McCarthy, review of Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, by
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke, Ethics 115, No. 2 (2005):
397-402, 398-399, 402.
10

Fraser emphasizes that this is not a “substantive dualism,” which treats questions of economic distribution
and cultural recognition as pertaining to two different domains of society, but a “perspectival dualism” that
recognizes the pervasive “interpenetration” of the two dimensions: “the economy” is “always already permeated”
with patterns of interpretation and evaluation, while “the cultural sphere” is deeply permeated by “the bottom line.”
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 61-63. It is on this basis that she proposes that all social
injustices be viewed from both perspectives. McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 399.
11

Ibid., 398.
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reducing either dimension to the other.12 An advantage of this dual perspective, which she
conceives of as a perspectival, and not an analytic, is that it integrates into one comprehensive
framework, two “analytically distinguishable” dimensions of the social order, requiring
correspondingly different forms of remediation.13 It can thereby be “assumed with respect to any
domain.”14
Fraser regards as a minimal standard of social justice, the principle that all members of
society have “equal opportunity and ability to participate in the political system or the society’s
decision-making process.”15 In modern societies, it is difficult for persons who lack a minimum
level of resources, or who occupy a systematically denigrated social position to participate on
equal standing with other members of society. To say that all persons must be on a par with
others in the social interactions in which they participate does not imply that all members of
society must be substantively equal.16 But it does imply that a just society should not have status

12

She argues in addition, that, “Decoupling cultural injustices from economic injustices, cultural struggles
from social struggles, it reproduces the very dissociation we are seeking to overcome. Substantive dualism is not a
solution to, but a symptom of, our problem. It reflects, but does not critically interrogate, the institutional
differentiations of modem capitalism.” Such a conception is thereby superior to, and should not be mistaken for
“substantive dualism”, which treats, “redistribution and recognition as two different spheres of justice, pertaining to
two different social domains.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 62.
13

Ibid., 63.

14

Ibid.

15

Fraser, Scales of Justice, 16.

16

“This principle prohibits both institutionalized patterns of cultural value that assign subordinate standing
to some groups of social actors in relation to others (i.e., status hierarchies) and economic arrangements that
distribute material resources so as to entrench inequalities and dependencies (i.e., class divisions).” McCarthy,
Redistribution or Recognition, 398. “The application of this principle to concrete problems or policies is not
understood by Fraser as a “monological” process—on the part of either claimants or authorities—but as a
“dialogical” process of democratic debate and deliberation. This has the important consequence that claims to the
recognition of distinct identities must be evaluated publicly and with an eye to participatory parity. McCarthy,
Redistribution or Recognition, 399.

178
hierarchies or class divisions. A society that does not have “social arrangements that permit all to
participate as peers in social life” in place, inevitably deprives at least some of its members, the
privilege of “participatory parity.”17 The principle of justice as ‘participatory parity’ implies that
a just society pursues policies that prevent individuals or groups from suffering ‘participation
impairing’ lack, or socially entrenched, systematic denigration.
To Fraser, the objective and intersubjective conditions of the principle of participatory
parity precludes economic injustice and institutional deprecation of some persons. The principle
is thereby conditional on just social recognition and fair distribution of resources.18 Thus
injustice, whether in the form of misrecognition or maldistribution, is detrimental, because, and
to the extent that it inhibits “participatory parity.”19

17
“Dependence and inequality impede parity of participation. “Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements
that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby
denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers. In contrast, the-second condition
requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal
opportunity for achieving social esteem. This I shall call the intersubjective condition of participatory parity. It
precludes institutionalized norms that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities
associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are institutionalized value patterns that deny some people the status of
full partners in interaction - whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed “difference” or by failing to
acknowledge their distinctiveness.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 60; Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition,
36; McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 398.
18

“For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, at least two conditions must be satisfied. First, the
distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and "voice." This I shall call
the objective condition of participatory parity. It precludes forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality
that impede parity of participation. “Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation,
exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and
opportunities to interact with others as peers.” “In contrast, the-second condition requires that institutionalized
patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social
esteem. This I shall call the intersubjective condition of participatory parity. It precludes institutionalized norms that
systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are
institutionalized value patterns that deny some people the status of full partners in interaction - whether by
burdening them with excessive ascribed “difference” or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.” “Both
objective condition and intersubjective condition are necessary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient.”
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 36.
19

Fraser, Scales of Justice, 16; Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 36.
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Fraser Honneth Debate20
Generally, the capitalist system is assumed to rely on anonymous, indifferent market
mechanisms to allocate resources based almost entirely on the principle of efficiency. This would
seem to support the position that maldistribution of material resources results from system errors,
and could thereby be rectified by adjustments to the economic system. Both Fraser and Honneth
would disagree with this conclusion. They would also agree that it is often the case that members
of society who are not adequately recognized socially also tend to be economically marginalized.
But they part ways with regards to how distributive injustice should be understood.
In the previous chapter, I provided an analysis of Honneth’s theory of social interaction
and socialization, in which he provided both a theoretical framework for social analysis and a
normative framework for social critique.21 As we saw, Honneth’s central argument is that, since
all social interactions are normatively structured, distributional injustice is the institutional
expression of social disrespect, grounded in “unjustified relations of recognition.”22 On this view,
mal-distribution results from social misrecognition, therefore, recognition should be the
foundational category of social analysis. This implies that addressing problems of inequitable
distribution requires the first step of establishing measures to establish a more just regime of
social recognition. Fraser agrees with Honneth that the trend towards “growing impoverishment

20
It must be noted at this point that both theorists (at least at the time of the publication of Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 1993), developed their respective arguments with the Westphalian national
frame in mind. Therefore, their arguments seem to be of little relevance to global justice cases. However, I include
this debate because there are aspects of the debate that I will argue are of relevance to global justice theorizing.
21

McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 401; Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 213-

22

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 114.

216.
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of large parts of the population,” which is the result of “unbridled capitalism” as problematic. 23
She also agrees with him that “an adequate understanding of justice must encompass”
recognition and redistribution.24 Thus, they both reject “the economistic view that would reduce
recognition to a mere epiphenomenon of redistribution.”25 However, Fraser takes issue with
Honneth’s assumption that “capitalist societies differentiate a systemically integrated market
order from value-regulated social orders.”26 Therefore, their point of divergence is that while
Honneth feels that mal-distribution is the result of misrecognition, Fraser disagrees.27

23

In other words, it is not the case that social patterns of distribution of resources determine (whether
understood in a strong or a weak sense), social recognitional patterns. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 2.
24

Ibid., 114.

25

In other words, it is not the case that social patterns of distribution of resources determine (whether
understood in a strong or a weak sense), social recognitional patterns. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 2.
26

Ibid., 222, 235, Note 14.

27

Ibid., 3.
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Moral Philosophy28
To Honneth, social injustice is always predicated and preceded by the withdrawal (or
denial) of social recognition. Therefore, “a moral experience that can be meaningfully described
as one of “disrespect” must be regarded as the motivational basis of all social conflicts,” which is
experienced by the subject as humiliation and disrespect. 29 He sees social injustice as the
experience of violations of such “deep-seated claims on the social order.”30 The resultant
psychological suffering is, therefore, best understood as possessing a “normative core.”31
Because all social conflicts arise from such feelings of disrespect, an adequate social-theoretical

28

Fraser divides the task that social injustice creates for the critical theorist into three categories: Moral
philosophy, social theory, and political theory. I analyze the Fraser/Honneth debate from these three perspectives.
Fraser explains the respective tasks as follows: Moral philosophy, - the task is to devise an over- arching conception
of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition
of difference. Social theory, the task is to devise an account of contemporary society that can accommodate both the
differentiation of class from status and also their mutual imbrication. In political theory, the task is to envision a set
of institutional arrangements and policy reforms that can remedy both maldistribution and misrecognition, while
minimizing the mutual interferences likely to arise when the two sorts of redress are sought simultaneously. Practical
politics, the task is to foster democratic engagement across current divides in order to build a broad-based
programmatic orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of
recognition. Fraser opens up the debate with the following questions, “Is recognition really a matter of justice, or is
it a matter of self-realization? Do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, sui generis (of its own
kind), normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other? How can we distinguish justified
from unjustified claims for recognition? Does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals
or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient?” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 26-27.
29

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 157.

30
To the moral agent, “social injustice is experienced the moment it can no longer be rationally understood
why an institutional rule should count on agreement in accordance with generally accepted reasons.” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 130.
31

“If the adjective "social" is to mean anything more than “typically found in society,” social suffering and
discontent possess a normative core. It is a matter of the disappointment or violation of normative expectations of
society considered justified by those concerned. Thus, such feelings of discontent and suffering, insofar as they are
designated as “social,” coincide with the experience that society is doing something unjust, something unjustifiable.”
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 129.
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approach to social conflicts must be attentive to such “moral disappointments.”32 To him, this
makes recognition “the appropriate tool for categorically unlocking social experiences of
injustice,”33 thereby making it the most important concept on which to construct a social justice
theory.
Fraser disputes the adequacy of the social psychology of suffering as a basis for a justice
theory.34 She argues instead that the denial of social recognition is not wrong because it leads to
“psychical deformation” or because it impedes “ethical self-realization.” 35 Neither is the wrong
located in social relations, or in “individual or interpersonal psychology.”36 Rather,
misrecognition is “a violation of justice” and is wrong because it leads to persons having
different social statuses.37 The demand to be treated fairly, and not the demand for social

32
“What motivates individuals or social groups to call the prevailing social order into question and to
engage in practical resistance is the moral conviction that, with respect their own situations or particularities, the
recognition principles considered legitimate are incorrectly or inadequately applied. It follows from this, first of all
contra Fraser, that a moral experience that can be meaningfully described as one of “disrespect” must be regarded as
the motivational basis of all social conflicts: subjects and groups see themselves as disrespected in certain aspects of
their capacities or characteristics because they have become convinced that the institutional practice of a legitimate
principle of recognition unjustifiably fails to reflect these dispositions. In contrast, the opposition between
“economic” and “cultural” conflicts could at most have a secondary significance, since it more precisely designates
the respects in which disrespect is experienced.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 15-18.
33

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 233.

34

Ibid., 202-204.

35

To Fraser, Honneth’s self-realization model construes, “misrecognition in terms of impaired subjectivity
and damaged self-identity.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 28, 30.
36

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 29. In addition, “The model accepts that
misrecognition can have the sort of ethical - psychological effects described by Taylor and Honneth. But it maintains
that the wrongness of misrecognition does not depend on the presence of such effects.” “One can show that a society
whose institutionalized norms impede parity of participation is morally indefensible whether or not they distort the
subjectivity of the oppressed.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 32.
37

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 30.
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recognition, is a more plausible explanation for the “rubric of daily discontent.”38 Social
misrecognition is unjust because it impairs the ability of denigrated members of society to
participate on a par with other members of society.39 Rather, redistributive justice should be
pursued alongside recognition demands because the demand for social recognition alone is not
adequate to achieve the goal of participatory parity for those who suffer social injustice.
Honneth counters this by first noting that the difference between his position and Fraser’s
is that while Fraser finds an “empirical reference point” in present-day society, 40 he finds it “in
the structure of social reality.” 41 To Honneth, without locating the sources of social discontent in
subjective feeling, one will be limited to seeing ‘injustice’ only in issues that are already
articulated by publicly recognized social movements.42 He sees such a position as ‘dominative’
because a focus on visible social movements ignores embryonic, but morally relevant, forms of
social discontent.43 To Honneth, the theory of recognition is located “one level beneath” Fraser’s,

38

“But they are not best interpreted as violations of personal identity. To insist on construing them as such is
to shift the focus away from society and onto the self, implanting an excessively personalized sense of injury. Far
from clarifying matters, the net effect is to stretch the concept of recognition to breaking point.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 203.
39

Ibid., 29.

40

Ibid., 244-245.

41

Ibid.

42

“Bringing together these three abstractions, it becomes clear that Fraser's initial diagnosis is a sociological
artifact: first, from the multitude of current social contracts, only those are picked out that have attracted the
attention of the political public sphere as social movements (in the USA) under the official title of "identity politics";
then, tacitly applying a normative criterion, from these identity-political movements precisely those are excluded
that pursue aims by the illegitimate means of social exclusion and oppression; and finally, by leaving out historical
forerunners, the small group of social movements that remain are stylized into the new key phenomenon of the postsocialist era, to which the normative conceptualization of critical social theory must feel partially bound.” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 124.
43
“Today, such a - surely unintended - complicity with political domination can only be undone by
introducing a normative terminology for identifying social discontent independently of public recognition.” Fraser
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and is thereby, “more comprehensive” because it is able to thematise social injustice as such.
From this position which he thinks is more comprehensive, “even the "material" inequalities that
most concern Fraser must be interpretable as expressing the violation of well- founded claims to
recognition.”44
Social Theory
Fraser concedes that distribution and recognition are sometimes correlated, but insists
that it is not necessarily the case that addressing one form of injustice will automatically address
the other.45 Therefore, Honneth’s attempt to subsume distribution into recognition leads to an
overly narrow monistic, and therefore, inaccurate social theory.46 Since both forms of injustice
have different causes, theories of social recognition cannot (adequately) subsume distribution
issues or vice versa.47 Therefore, Honneth’s conclusion, that “changing the cultural order is
sufficient to preclude maldistribution,” is based on a faulty “reductive culturalist view of
distribution.” 48 Fraser sees Honneth’s recognition theory as one that truncates the full range of

and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 125.
44

Ibid., 134.

“From one side, the issue is whether standard theories of distributive justice can adequately subsume
problems of recognition. In my view, the answer is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the
importance of status over and above material well-being and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But the
results are not wholly satisfactory.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 34.
45

“He goes from the true premise that markets are always culturally embedded to the false conclusion that
their behavior is wholly governed by the dynamics of recognition. Likewise, he goes from the valid insight that the
capitalist economy is not a purely technical, culture-free system to the untenable proposition that it has no economic
dynamics worth analyzing in their own right. Finally, he goes from the valid insight that all social struggles have a
cultural dimension to the insupportable conclusion that all are cultural simpliciter, and in exactly the same way.”
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 216.
46

“Economic outcomes”…“occur independently of any changes in society’s morally imbued patterns of
intersubjective evaluation.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 117.
47

48

“From one side, the issue is whether standard theories of distributive justice can adequately subsume
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social processes, leading to an illegitimate totalization of society.”49 For instance, Honneth
obscures the key question of how, precisely, the recognition order interact with other modes of
the social order to produce relations of social subordination?50 She thinks that her twodimensional approach to social justice that includes both aspects, but does not reduce one
dimension to the other is able to answer this question.51
To illustrate, she cites two examples in which one form of injustice has little to do with
the other. The first is that of an African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to
pick him up (a case of misrecognition without maldistribution). The second is the case of a
skilled, white, male industrial worker who becomes unemployed due to a factory closing
resulting from a speculative corporate merger (a case of maldistribution without
misrecognition).52 Social justice, therefore, seems to require both subjective (access to a
problems of recognition. In my view, the answer is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the
importance of status over and above material well-being and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But such
results tend not to be wholly satisfactory.” “Axel Honneth, for example, assumes a reductive culturalist view of
distribution, supposing that all economic inequalities are rooted in a cultural order that privileges some kinds of
labor over others, he believes that changing that cultural order is sufficient to preclude maldistribution. In fact,
however, as we saw, not all maldistribution is a by-product of misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of
imperatives intrinsic to an order of specialized economic relations whose raison d'etre is the accumulation of profits.
To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural value patterns to examine the structure of
capitalism. It must ask whether economic mechanisms that are relatively decoupled from structures of prestige and
that operate in a relatively autonomous way impede parity of participation in social life.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 34-35.
49

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 214.

Fraser insists that, “An adequate approach must theorize both the distinctive dynamics of the capitalist
economy and its interaction with the status order.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 214.
50

51

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 35.

“Most such theorists assume a reductive economistic-cum-legal-listic view of status, supposing that a just
distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition. In fact, however, as we saw, not all
misrecognition is a by-product of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal discrimination. To handle such
cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine institutionalized patterns
of cultural value; it must ask whether such patterns impede parity of participation in social life. What, then, of the
other side of the question? Can existing theories of recognition adequately subsume problems of distribution? Here
52
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minimum level of material resources) and intersubjective (preclusion of “institutionalized value
patterns that deny some people the status of full partners in interaction”53) social conditions and
institutions.
Since not every social recognition or redistribution claim is warranted, Fraser also raises
the question of how we should decide on which social claims should be met. To Fraser, a good
yardstick is that recognition (or redistribution) claimants must show that “…current
arrangements prevent them from participating on a par with others in social life.”54 They also
must show that the demands they are making will not hamper others from participatory parity.
While this question is salient for every social justice claim, she thinks it is a question that poses
grave dangers for theories like Honneth’s, since he treats recognition “as a matter of selfrealization.”55 Subjective feelings of discontent, and other feelings of violated expectations are
lacking in independent evaluative standards, and therefore precludes external standards for
assessing justified from unjustified demands for recognition.56

too, I contend the answer is no. To be sure, some theorists of recognition appreciate the importance of economic
equality and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But once again the results are not wholly satisfactory.” Fraser
and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 34.
53

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 36.

“Claimants must show, first, that the institutionalization of majority cultural norms denies them
participatory parity and, second, that the practices whose recognition they seek do not themselves deny participatory
parity – to some group members as well as to nonmembers. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 3841. In general, then, the status model sets a stringent standard for warranting claims. Yet remains wholly
deontological. Unlike the self-realization model, it can justify claims for recognition under modern conditions of
value pluralism.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 42.
54

To Fraser this makes social justice claims overly reliant on subjective feelings. Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 37.
55

56

Zurn, Axel Honneth, 127.
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Honneth counters this by noting that one of the important achievements of modern
societies is that increases in human autonomy are one of the most desirable aims of social justice.
He sees this as the culmination of a long learning process, with the result that justified claims for
social recognition are those that increase net social inclusion and individuation for at least the
claimant and some other.57 In this regard, his position resembles Fraser’s, which is that justice
claims are justified if and only if it increases the net number of people in society (including the
claimant), who enjoy greater participatory parity.
What then are the similarities and differences between inclusion and individuation
(Honneth’s position) on the one hand and participatory parity (Fraser’s position) on the other?
Honneth is in general agreement with Fraser on the desirability of participatory parity. 58
However, he notes that their positions differ with respect to the fact that he sees the goal of
equality in “the good of personal identity-formation,” while she sees it in the ability of persons to
participate in society on a par with others.59 Honneth thinks that Fraser’s argumentation skips

57
“Autonomy means individuation (more opportunities to express unique aspects of human personalities)
and inclusion (expanding the number of subjects considered as full members of society).But in order to now pick out
morally justified particularities from the multitude of those typically asserted in social struggles for recognition, it is
first necessary to apply a criterion of progress, however implicit. For only demands that potentially contribute to the
expansion of social relations of recognition can be considered normatively grounded, since they point in the
direction of a rise in the moral level of social integration. The two measures of individualization and inclusion,
which I outlined above, represent the criteria by means of which this weighing can be accomplished.” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 184-186, 187.
58
“Here the point of recognition is the same as that of participatory parity: the development and realization
of individual autonomy is in a certain sense only possible when all subjects have the social preconditions for
realizing their life goals without unjustifiable disadvantages and with the greatest possible freedom.” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 259.

“Even if the idea of uncoerced participation in public life plays a prominent role in both intuitions, for
Fraser it serves above all to explain what it now means to speak of social justice, while for me it serves to explain
the fact that successful identity formation has a social, “public” side.”” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 176.
59
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one step. Although they both provide an egalitarian account, Fraser moves directly from
individual autonomy to the idea of social participation. Honneth on the other hand, moves from
individual autonomy to “the most intact identity formation,” before moving to healthy
intersubjective recognition, which is the condition to Fraser’s “parity of participation,” as a
necessary presupposition.60
Political Theory
Fraser thinks “Only a theory of justice that is simultaneously general and determinate can
meet the challenges of globalization.”61 Therefore, an adequate social theory for a globalizing
age must be able to accommodate a diversity of reasonable visions of the good life.62 She
criticizes Honneth’s version of the primacy of the good over the right, that is, his reworking of
the normative standards of critical theory through general conceptions of “human nature” and the
“good life.”63 To her, an adequate theory of justice must fulfill the conditions of determinacy (to
enable it to adjudicate conflicts and resolve dilemmas). But at the same time, it must also be nonsectarian (to enable it to mediate conflicts across different value horizons).64 Fraser thinks that

60
“It is the case that both Fraser and I proceed from the idea that under the conditions of modern societies,
every conception of justice must have an egalitarian character from the start, in the sense that all members of society
regard one another as having equal rights and each is therefore accorded equal autonomy. But the difference between
our approaches consists essentially in the fact that Fraser moves immediately from this starting point in individual
autonomy first to the goal of the most intact possible identity formation, in order to then bring in principles of
mutual recognition as the goal’s necessary presupposition.” “Put in terms of an ethics of particular goods, Nancy
Fraser defines the “why” or “what for” of equality with reference to the good of participation, whereas I understand
this “what for” as the good of personal identity-formation, whose realization I see as dependent on relations of
mutual recognition.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 176.
61

Ibid., 224.

62

Ibid., 223.

63

McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 402.

64

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 225.
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Honneth’s reworking of normative standards causes him to end up with an approach that “can
succeed in satisfying one of those requirements only by failing to meet the other.”65 She presents
an alternative in her deontological and non-sectarian principle of participatory parity, which she
sees as “a theory of justice that is compatible with a plurality of reasonable views of the good
life.”66 In her view, Honneth purchases the close correspondences among his perfectionist ethical
theory, his account of social integration, and his reading of political struggles at the cost of a
certain homogenizing of normative expectations and political motivations.
To Fraser, Honneth’s “teleological starting point” leads him to a monistic theory of
justice. But more problematic is that his sectarian teleological perfectionist standards (as can be
seen by the fact that he subscribes to a form of the good life), cannot be universalized.67 Equal
autonomy means participatory parity which is now understood to include not just formal rights,
but the social conditions of their enjoyment.68 The principle of participatory parity is also the
outcome of “a rich, historical process that has enriched the meaning of liberal equality over

65

Ibid.

“Participatory parity constitutes a radical democratic interpretation of equal autonomy.” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 228-229.
66

The root problem, I contend, is his teleological starting point. By grounding his account of justice in a
theory of the good life, he is forced to take extraordinary steps to avoid capitulating to ethical sectarianism.
Constrained to construe his normative principles formally, he must drain them of substantive content – hence, of
normative force. In seeking to resist teleology’s built-in temptation to sectarianism, he ends up succumbing to
indeterminacy. Ironically, then, an ethical starting point designed to overcome empty formalism itself descends into
moral vacuity. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 228.
67

No longer restricted to formal rights but also encompassing the social conditions for their exercise,
equality is coming to mean participatory parity. Participatory parity, then, is the emergent historic "truth" of the
liberal norm of the equal autonomy and moral worth of human beings. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 232.
68
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time.”69 And since equal participation is the meaning of equal autonomy, the principle of
participatory parity is superior to Honneth’s because it is ethically pluralistic, and grounded on a
“thick deontological liberalism.”70
To this, Honneth responds that no matter how much a theorist attempts to provide a
context independent theory, to the extent that theory must be informed by a vision of the ideal,
anticipation of some form of social arrangement (or the good life) becomes unavoidable.71
Therefore, the social theorist has no choice but to subscribe, however tacitly, to an idea of the
good life. He, therefore, sees nothing wrong with his goal of “teleological liberalism,” which
defines only “the preconditions that must be available for individual subjects to realize their
autonomy.”72 He adds that Fraser’s reluctance to specify a form of the good life makes her
unable to clarify the precise role the good of participation is supposed to play in society.73 He
69
As a result, it bursts the bounds of Honneth's account of the possible options in moral philosophy. In his
account, there are oy two possibilities: the thick “teleological liberalism” favored by and the thin “procedural
liberalism” associated with Habermas and Rawls. Justice as parity of participation, however, fits neither of those two
ideal types. It diverges from teleological liberalism in eschewing ethical foundations, while also parting company
with liberal proceduralism in articulating substantive requirements of justice. Thus, this approach attests to a
possibility overlooked by Honneth. Rejecting both teleological sectarianism and proceduralist formalism, justice as
participatory parity exemplifies a third genre of moral philosophy, which could be called thick deontological
liberalism. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 230.

Her three criticisms are that Honneth cannot make universally justifiable claims, 2) is unacceptably
sectarian concerning the wide diversity of conceptions of the good acceptable in modern societies, and, 3) is
insufficiently determinative when assessing actual social and political controversies. Zurn, Axel Honneth, 124.
70

71

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 178.

72
“Now in my view, Nancy Fraser takes an unclear in-between position within the spectrum of these two
alternatives. On the one hand, she seems to want to tie the idea of social equality to a goal she refers to with the
concept of “participation”; here realizing equality corresponds to the goal of putting all members of society in a
position to take part in social life without disadvantage. But on the other hand, Fraser does not want this goal to be
understood as the result of a conception of the good life, but simply as an explanation of the social implications of
the idea of individual autonomy. Thus, she can attack the ethical overload of recognition theory without being forced
herself to call upon ethical elements.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 178.
73
“We do not learn precisely why the right to equal participation in public life presupposes only the
elimination of economic inequality and cultural humiliation, but not also self-respect with reference to individual
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also notes that like Rawls and Herbamas, Fraser also espouses values of individual autonomy
and self-realization – a particular modern conception of the good life. Thus, she “smuggles”
rights, political procedures, and specific kinds of social arrangements into her theory, and is
thereby just as guilty of prescribing a form of the good life.74
To Fraser, class structures and status hierarchies “represent analytically distinct orders of
subordination, (that) typically cut across all social movements” of contemporary capitalist
societies.75 Since these are the two most important impediments to participatory parity, an
adequate social theory must clarify, “the relations between maldistribution and recognition,” or
the dimensions of status subordination and economic class subordination.76 In contemporary
societies, “… one cannot deduce maldistribution directly from misrecognition, nor
misrecognition directly from maldistribution.”77 This is because unlike past forms of status
hierarchies, modern status is not fixed, but rather exists in hybrid forms. Furthermore, in a

achievements or ego strength acquired through socialization. And, on the same level, it is also uncertain why the
economy and culture, but not the spheres of socialization or law, appear as possible obstacles to participation in
social interaction. All these questions impose themselves because Fraser introduces her concept of “participation”
without considering the functions it has to fulfill in view of the social preconditions of individual autonomy. Only a
careful analysis of the connection between the realization of autonomy and forms of social interaction could have
prevented this under –specification of her central normative concept.” “… normative theory depends on precisely
the kinds of identity – and personality-theoretical set-pieces Fraser calls into question.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 178.
74

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 176-179.

75

Ibid., 49.

“An adequate approach must allow for the full complexity of these relations. It must account both for the
differentiation of class from status and for the causal interactions between them. It must accommodate, as well, both
the mutual irreducibility of maldistribution and misrecognition and their practical entwinement with each other.
Such an account must, moreover, be historical. “…while providing an explanation of why they, “have become
decoupled and antagonistically counterposed” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 48.
76

77

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 54.
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globalizing world, the interconnection between different societies further complicates the
category of “social status.”78 It follows that a social theory based on either culturalism or
economism will not provide an adequate understanding of contemporary society.79 Rather, “a
critical theory of contemporary society must include an account of the relation of status
subordination to class subordination, misrecognition to maldistribution.”80 What is required is a
theory that treats “every practice as simultaneously economic and cultural.”81 To Fraser, the
perspectival dualism approach, which takes economy and culture as constituting “two analytical
perspectives that can be assumed with respect to any domain,” is an approach that could meet the
conditions for an adequate critical social theory.82
To Honneth on the other hand, social “injustice is regularly associated with withheld
(social) recognition.”83 He sees Fraser’s position as one that wrongly “suggest(s) that experiences

“On the contrary, it is a presupposition of my approach that injustices of status are intrinsic to the social
structure of modern capitalism, including in its contemporary globalizing phase.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 54.
78

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 54. But neither will what Fraser refers to as, “poststructuralist anti dualism” do. As she says, “Instead of theorizing the relations between status and class, therefore,
post-structuralist anti-dualists advocate deconstructing the distinction altogether.” The result is that, “…far from
advancing efforts to join struggles for redistribution, this approach makes it impossible to entertain pressing political
questions about how the two types of struggles might be synergized and harmonized, when at present they diverge
and conflict.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 60. Therefore, neither will approaches like poststructuralist anti dualism, which seeks to deconstruct the distinctions between class and status; nor will “substantive
dualism”, which would treat distribution and recognition as “two different spheres of justice.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 61.
79

But, “above all, it must clarify the prospects for emancipatory change for a time in which struggles for
recognition are increasingly decoupled from struggles for egalitarian redistribution - even as justice requires that the
two be joined.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 59.
80

81

Ibid., 63.

82

Ibid.

83
“To this extent, it seems to me inadvisable simply on the descriptive level to divide experiences of
injustice into two diametrically opposed classes, the first comprising questions of distribution, the second questions
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of "material" disadvantage can be described independently of individuals' and groups' problems
with social recognition.”84 He thinks it is wrong to suggest that “demands for economic
redistribution can be understood independently of any experience of social disrespect.”85 To him,
Fraser’s separation does not take adequate account of the correlation between misrecognition and
maldistribution. Furthermore, her separation of social injustice into two, “diametrically opposed
classes” creates an inaccurate “simple opposition” that does not exhaust the spectrum of social
moral discontent.
In addition, separating social processes or privileging only economy and culture – seems
arbitrary.86 Not least because it excludes, or at least inadequately theorizes, important aspects of
society like law and politics, which are aspects of society that should be of central concern to a
critical theory of justice.87 To him, the “legitimation of the social distribution order owes (much)
to cultural views of the contribution of different status groups or strata to social reproduction.”88

of “cultural recognition.”” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 83, 135.
”Accordingly, in contemporary societies we can expect various types of morally substantive struggles or
conflicts whose differences correspond to whether what is contested is the “just” application of the recognition
principle of love, legal equality or the merit principle. Of course, a direct consequence of this consideration is that
the opposition of “distribution conflicts” and “struggles for recognition” is not very helpful, since it creates the
impression that demands for economic redistribution can be understood independently of any experience of social
disrespect. It seems much more plausible to me, to the contrary, to interpret distribution conflicts as a specific kind
of struggle for recognition in which the appropriate evaluation of the social contributions of individuals or groups is
contested.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 170-171.
85

“In short, any kind of methodological perspectivism remains empty as long as it is not anchored in socialtheoretical views about how social reproduction in capitalist societies is to be understood.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 156.
86

“As many of the signature struggles of the age are against legal discrimination and political domination,
and for legal equality and political democracy, they would seem to merit special attention within a critical theory of
justice.” McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 400.
87

“All this shows how much the legitimation of the social distribution order owes to cultural views of the
contribution of different status groups or strata to social reproduction.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 153.
88
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Hence, it is better for “experiences of injustice be conceived along a continuum of forms of
withheld recognition – of disrespect – whose differences are determined by which qualities or
capacities those affected take to be unjustifiably unrecognized or not respected.”89 He points out
that institutions (even those of capitalist societies) rely on moral consensus, through rational
legitimation. Social recognition is, therefore, “the basis for the normative expectations of
members of society as well as their readiness to conflict.”90 Therefore instead of Fraser’s “dual
perspective,” Honneth proposes a “moral-theoretical monism.”
Political Practice
With regards to politics, Fraser first notes that many injustices include both recognitional
and distributional components – it is usually the case that when one perspective is privileged,
attempts to address distribution injustice leads to increases in recognitional injustice or vice
versa.91 Perspectival dualism has the advantage that “…it can help us anticipate, and hopefully
avoid, the perverse effects of faulty political strategies.”92 But more important is that a critical
theory that is adequate to a rapidly globalizing world must be able to provide a social justice
account that can accommodate the many different peoples and societies that globalization is

Ibid., 135-136. Honneth notes at this point that, “Such an approach also allows us to consider that
differences in the experience of injustice can be determined not only with regard to the object, but also by the form
of the missing recognition. Thus, when it comes to the sorts of "identity conflicts" Fraser stresses, it makes a
fundamental difference whether the culturally defined groups are demanding a kind of social appreciation or the
legal recognition of their collective identity.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 136.
89

90

Ibid., 157.

91

Fraser cites the examples of welfare reform that has the unintended effect of adding “the insult of
misrecognition to the injury of deprivation,” as well as recognition claims that produces adverse effects on the
economic well-being of supposed beneficiaries. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 67.
92

An example of a dualist institutional effort is the “comparable worth” campaign, which was an attempt to
“redress the cultural devaluation of the “feminine” precisely within the economy.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 66-67.
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bringing closer together. Fraser concedes that recognition is a valuable concept for such a
project, but insists that it must be complimented with distribution.93
To Honneth, “the opposition of “distribution conflicts” and “struggles for recognition” is
not very helpful,”94 because a society’s recognition structure is what leads to both injustice and
demands for its rectification. Also, “the normative expectations subjects bring to society are
oriented toward the social recognition of their capabilities by various generalized others.”95 In
addition, although other social considerations like efficiency or stability could be relevant, the
most important measure for political conflicts are normative.96 The legitimacy of all social
struggles should be measured by whether they will result in increases or decreases in the

93

“Nevertheless, recognition alone cannot bear the entire burden of critical theorizing. By itself, it is not
sufficient to capture the normative deficits of contemporary society, the societal processes that generate them, and
the political challenges facing those seeking emancipatory change. To ask that of recognition is to overextend the
concept, distorting it beyond recognition and depriving it of critical force. Such an approach, I have argued here, can
provide neither a suitable empirical reference point, nor a viable account of culture, nor a defensible theory of
justice. What is needed, in contrast, is clear: Critical Theory should situate recognition as one dimension of a
perspectival-dualist framework that also encompasses distribution.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 233.
94

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 170. “Only on this basis can it be shown with more
than a merely relativistic claim to justification to what extent certain social demands can be regarded as normatively
justified.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 184.
95

“To this extent, every human subject depends essentially on a context of forms of social interaction
governed by normative principles of mutual recognition; and the disappearance of such relations of recognition
results in experiences of disrespect and humiliation that cannot fail to have damaging consequences for the
individual’s identity - formation.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 176.
96

“We only judge the objectives of such struggles positively when they point in the direction of social
development that we can understand as approximating our ideas of a good or just society.” “To this extent, every
evaluation of social conflict situation depends upon showing the normative principles in which social morality or
political ethics are anchored and by which they are guided beneath the surface.”
a) What principles make up the normative kernel of a just and good society?
b) How do we think our different conceptions of a good and just social order can be justified? {Must such a
justification have recourse to the ethical idea of a good life?}
c) How will each of the differently formulated guiding principles to be applied to social reality such that it can be
called upon in moral judgements of social conflict situations. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition, 172.
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expression of aspects of unique human traits, or whether it leads to the increase of the number of
people that are socially recognized.97 This implies that the best criterion to assess the normative
value of a political ethic is whether it increases human autonomy, defined as “individualization
or inclusion.”98 This is also the normative yardstick to measure the desirable “development
direction” of contemporary social conflicts.99 Ideally, such a yardstick should lead us to
anticipate “a lasting rise in the moral level of social integration.”100 Political practice should,
therefore, be oriented towards the goal of the best identity formation and individual selfrealization, guided by the goal of increasing individual recognition in the three spheres of love,
rights, and esteem.101

97

“But in order to now pick out morally justified particularities from the multitude of those typically
asserted in social struggles for recognition, it is first necessary to apply a criterion of progress, however implicit. For
only demands that potentially contribute to the expansion of social relations of recognition can be considered
normatively grounded, since they point in the direction of a rise in the moral level of social integration. The two
measures of individualization and inclusion, which I outlined above, represent the criteria by means of which this
weighing can be accomplished.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 187.
98

“Two criteria that together can justify talk of progress in the relations of recognition. On the one hand, we
see here a process of individualization, i.e., the increase of opportunities to legitimately articulate parts of one's
personality; on the other hand, we see a process of social inclusion, i.e., the expanding inclusion of subjects into the
circle of full members of society. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 184-185 either new parts of
the personality are opened up to mutual recognition, so that the extent of socially confirmed individuality rises; or
more persons are included into existing recognition relations, so that the circle of subjects who recognize one
another grows.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 186.
99

“But the decisive question concerns the problem of how, beyond mere affirmation, such a recognitiontheoretical conception of justice can take on a role that is critical and indeed progressive. For what above is at issue
between Fraser and myself is the extent to which, with the help of an appropriate theory, something normative can
be said about the development direction present-day social conflicts should take.” Fraser and Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition, 182-183.
100
101

Ibid., 183.

“The justice or well-being of a society is proportionate to its ability to secure conditions of mutual
recognition under which personal identity-formation, hence individual self-realization, can proceed adequately.”
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 172. “But for the purposes of my response to Nancy Fraser, it is
only necessary to assert here that the fundamental interest in social recognition is always substantively shaped by the
normative principles determined by the elementary structures of mutual recognition within a given social formation.
From this follows the conclusion that at present we should orient a political ethics or social morality by three
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From the foregoing, one of the most important areas of disagreement between Honneth
and Fraser is how the relationship between social norms and market mechanisms should be
understood. To Fraser, capitalist societies have “a quasi-objective, anonymous, impersonal
market order that follows a logic of its own.”102 Although culturally embedded, markets are “not
directly governed by cultural schemas of evaluation. Rather, the economic logic of the market
interacts in complex ways with the cultural logic of recognition.”103
In contrast, Honneth maintains that the economic dimension of social subjugation does
not negate the fact that economic structures and mechanisms are always normatively embedded.
From this perspective, maldistribution reveals patterns of social esteem prevalent of the
society.104 To him, markets are not an “amoral and norm free domain,”105 there is, therefore, no

principles of recognition that, within our society govern what legitimate expectations of recognition there can be
among members of society. Hence, it is the three principles of love, equality, and merit that together determined
what should now be understood by the idea of social justice.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition,
175.
102

Ibid., 214.

103

“This market order is culturally embedded, to be sure. But it is not directly governed by cultural schemas
of evaluation. Rather, the economic logic of the market interacts in complex ways with the cultural logic of
recognition, sometimes instrumentalizing existing status distinctions, sometimes dissolving or circumventing them,
and sometimes creating new ones. As a result, market mechanisms give rise to economic class relations that are not
mere reflections of status hierarchies. Neither those relations nor the mechanisms that generate them can be
understood by recognition monism.” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 214.
104

McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 401.

105
“The central ambition of Honneth’s RoR account of a capitalist economy is to show the plausibility of a
theory that is thoroughly grounded in recognition, rather than in other non-recognitional normative principles or in
functionalist accounts of the economy. Thus, the account aims to show how issues focused on distribution-focused
theories of justice – e.g., systematic impoverishment, increasing material inequality, structural unemployment, the
concentration of oligarchic power, global economic inequality – can be comprehended and normatively evaluated
with the same recognitional concepts applied to other forms of injustice, misrecognition and social pathology.
Accordingly, he must develop a social theory of modern capitalist economies that rejects the methods of
functionalism and systems theory, while economies are theorized as amoral, norm-free domains of interaction with
more or less automatic processes happening behind the backs of participants, largely out of their control and
understanding.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 110.
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need to develop a different set of theoretical tools to explain the economic domain.106 Rather, the
“normative preconditions of functioning markets” and “Normative determinants of economic
outcomes,” makes capitalist markets normative.107
Fraser concedes to Honneth that some social demands for redistribution “contest reigning
interpretations of achievement.”108 However, this does not mean that economic processes follow
normative paths. She agrees that recognition can influence some economic outcomes, but
recognitional factors alone do not fully – or even mostly – determine those outcomes.109 To
buttress her position that capitalist markets are best understood in system theoretic terms, she
cites examples of places around the world “where profit maximizing imperatives interact with
status distinctions and with legacies of past depredations,” to create “economic-system
mechanisms that exclude many from labor markets altogether.”110

106

“Rather, on Honneth’s account, economic phenomena are seen as thoroughly shot-through with
normative content, subject to human control and guided by moral concerns, in particular, moral concerns that can be
traced back to the structures of intersubjective recognition.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 110-111.
107

“On this view, justice in the political economy is a demand arising from individuals’ legitimate
recognition expectations to the appropriate social bases of self-respect and self-esteem.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 110.
“With regards to the former precondition, Honneth argues that economic dislocations are experienced subjectively
by victims as a violation of their self-respect and self-esteem, and thereby as a form of social misrecognition. With
regards to the latter precondition, a functional market requires individuals that have been socialized into having
goals and values that sustains markets.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 113-114.
108

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 215.

109

“Against Fraser’s attributions, Honneth claims that he is not giving a full explanation of economic
developments, nor dismissing the role of economic imperatives such as profit and utility in accounting for economic
outcomes.” Zurn thinks that the reason for this argument is that, “there is an ambiguity centering on words such as
‘determines’ and ‘determinants’: do they mean ‘dictates’ – as the sole or overwhelmingly significant causal factor –
or do they mean ‘influences’ – as one among several significant factors?” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 117.
110

“Contra Honneth, this sort of maldistribution is no less paradigmatic of contemporary capitalism than the
sort fuelled by nonrecognition of women's carework - witness the fate of much of sub-Saharan Africa, eastern
Germany, and the south Bronx. The vast deprivation in question here stems not from undervaluation of labor
contributions, but from economic-system mechanisms that exclude many from labor markets altogether.” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 215-216.
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While global injustice involves more than global distributive injustice, the correlation
between the levels of access to all forms of social goods makes a lack of resources indicative of
the existence of social injustice. Both Fraser and Honneth are aware of the harms of
distributional injustice. Both theorists accept that there is a recognition ethos that underlies (all
social relations including) market exchanges. However, Fraser regards Honneth’s occasional
causal claim that misrecognition underlies all forms of economic misdistribution as too strong as
a generalization. It might be more accurate to say that misrecognition accompanies in most,
perhaps all cases of economic injustice. This, in turn, implies that, if misrecognition is not
always the cause of economic injustice but nonetheless accompanies it, then the remedy for
economic injustice will not necessarily take the route of improved recognition, for instance by
implementing anti-discrimination laws, but might require straightforward changes in the
economy instead.
Late Fraser
The intensification of economic relations brought about by globalization has created a
situation in which many cases of distributional injustices are likely to be caused by transnational
factors.111 If the causes and results of economic harms in a globalized economy can no longer be
assumed to be contained in one political unit, a critical social theory for this age should be
attentive to the global economic environment. Both Fraser and Honneth originally developed
their theories to apply to bounded political units, like modern, Western democracies. In later
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“In particular, many of the material harms heaped upon various groups by economic globalization result
from the workings of markets, mergers, out-sourcing, currency fluctuations, technological innovations—and, I
would add, of powerful national and international agencies—which cannot adequately be grasped by a theory of
social integration constructed around norms of recognition.” McCarthy, Redistribution or Recognition, 401.
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work, Fraser has developed her arguments to account more for social justice in a rapidly
globalizing world.
The idea that a person should not be obligated to live under rules he or she was not
involved in making, is a basic tenet of modern justice. This principle rests on the notion that
living under rules that one was not involved in making implies that a person is living under the
will of those who are able to make such rules. In her earlier work, Fraser considered the
possibility of including a third category of “the political” (in addition to redistribution and
recognition), which she refers to as “representation.”112 To justify this, she first notes that “there
can be distinctively political obstacles to parity, not reducible to mal-distribution or
misrecognition although (again) interwoven with them.”113 She adds that representation or

112
“But I did not rule out the possibility of additional modes. On the contrary, I left open the question of
whether there might exist other modes of social ordering corresponding to other types of subordination and other
dimensions of justice. The most plausible candidate for a third dimension is “the political.” “Political” obstacles to
participatory parity would include decision-making procedures that systematically marginalize some people even in
the absence of maldistribution and misrecognition - for example, single-member district winner-take-all electoral
rules that deny voice to quasi-permanent minorities. The corresponding injustice would be “political
marginalization” or “exclusion,” the corresponding remedy, “democratization.”” Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution
or Recognition, 68. “I should note that the incorporation of political representation as a third dimension of justice
constitutes a major revision of my framework, which was originally two-dimensional.” Frames of Justice Pg. 145.
“The third dimension of justice is the political. Of course, distribution and recognition are themselves political in the
sense of being contested and power-laden; and they have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state.
But I mean political in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the state’s jurisdiction and the decision
rules by which it structures contestation. The political in this sense furnishes the stage on which struggles over
distribution and recognition are played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus determining who
counts as a member, the political dimension of justice specifies the reach of those other dimensions: it tells us who is
included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition.
Establishing decision rules, the political dimension likewise sets the procedures for staging and resolving contests, in
both the economic and cultural dimensions: it tells us not only who can make for distribution and recognition, but
also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 17.
113

Fraser, Scales of Justice, 18. “From the beginning it was clear to me that there could exist (and did!)
economic and cultural obstacles to parity, which is why I originally conceived justice in just two dimensions. Later,
however, I began to ask myself whether political obstacles to parity could exist, even in the absence of
maldistribution and misrecognition. For example, could an electoral system, operating in the context of relatively
fair distribution and reciprocal recognition, leave ideological minorities permanently voiceless?” Fraser and
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 146.
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political justice, is essential to the pursuit of distributive or recognitional justice because it
creates a space in which questions not just about the “who” of justice, or, who justice should
pertain to, but also about the “how,” or the procedure of justice.114 And since dialogue is “the
proper standard for warranting claims,” the condition of representation can only be met “through
a “dialogical” process of debate and deliberation.”115
Frames of Justice
The arena of representation or the political dimension is “the intersection of symbolic
framing and democratic voice.”116 Political “frame setting” is the arena that determines right and
wrong political inclusion and exclusion. This is the arena in which we raise questions of whose
voice should be heard, but it is also where the selection process or the “frame” of justice could
also be contested.117 This makes society’s choice of a frame of justice “among the most
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But there can be no redistribution or recognition without representation. “Struggles for justice in a
globalizing world cannot succeed unless they go hand in hand with struggles for meta-political democracy.” Fraser,
Scales of Justice, 27. “At this meta-level, the term calls attention to the patterning of the broader space within which
bounded polities are embedded and, so, to the question of who is included, and who excluded, from the circle of
those entitled to participate within them.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 147. First order claims (of recognition and
redistribution), and second-order or meta-level claims about the conditions in which first-order claims are
adjudicated are made within the political frame. Therefore, although it could be seen as independent of distribution
and recognition, representation, which presumes parity of participation, is an indispensable dimension of social
justice.”
115

Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 42.

116

Fraser, Scales of Justice, 147.

Representation thereby provides the space to question not just what social goods I am allowed, but also
creates room for me to contest the process by which how much (recognition and resources) I should get, was
decided.
117
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consequential of political decisions,”118 and misframing the “defining injustice of a globalizing
age.”119
Fraser admits that she originally took the “Keynesian-Westphalian” frame for granted,
but she later identifies three levels or kinds of political misframing.120 She refers to the first
category as, “intra-frame.” This involves ordinary political injustice, like unjust electoral rules
and structures, or unfair policies, such as when gender-blind rules exacerbate gender-based
maldistribution and misrecognition.121 The second kind of political injustice is the “boundarysetting aspect of the political.”122 This form of misframing is even more important because,
“Constituting both members and non-members in a single stroke, this decision effectively
excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community in
matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary political representation.”123
So long as it leaves “some relevant aspects of justice beyond their reach,” the injustice of
this second kind of misframing is not mitigated even when people who become excluded as a
result are re-absorbed into some other political community.124 The last sort of misframing is
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Fraser, Scales of Justice, 19.
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Ibid., 21.
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“That, at least, is the view of justice I defended in the past. And this two-dimensional understanding of
justice still seems right to me as far as it goes. But I now believe that it does not go far enough. Distribution and
recognition could appear to constitute the sole dimensions of justice only so long as the Keynesian-Westphalian
frame was taken for granted.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 17.
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Ibid., 19.
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even more extreme. An example is a case in which people are denied membership from any and
all political communities,125 making them “non-persons, with respect to justice.”126 In addition to
such cases, the global division of countries into discrete political units has the consequence of
preventing “the poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress them.”127 The
injustice in this kind of misframing, has become even more evident in a globalizing age.128 The
Keynesian-Westphalian frame partitions the global political space “in ways that block many who
are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress them.”129 By effectively

Still more serious, of course, is the case in which one is excluded from membership in any political
community. Akin to the loss of what Hannah Arendt called “the right to have rights.” that sort of mis-framing is a
kind of “political death.” Those who suffer it may become objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived of the
possibility of authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to justice. Fraser, Scales of Justice,
19-20.
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Fraser, Scales of Justice, 20.

“Today in contrast, globalization has put the question of the frame squarely on the political agenda.
Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now considered by many to be a major
vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from
challenging the forces that oppress them. Channeling their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively
powerless, if not failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from critique and control. Among those shielded
from the reach of justice are more powerful predator states and transnational private powers, including foreign
investors and creditors, international currency speculators, and transnational corporations. Also protected are the
governance structures of the global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and then exempt them from
democratic control. Finally, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is self-insulating: the architecture of the interstate
system protects the very partitioning of political space that it institutionalizes, effectively excluding transnational
decision-making on issues of justice.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 20.
127
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“First, given present levels of economic integration and ecological interdependence, we face political
problems that cannot be handled by the Westphalian frame – such as the problem of global warming. In such cases,
we have no choice but to look for other frames, which will often (though not always) mean bigger frames, including,
for some issues global frames. Second, there is the problem of power. The fact is some interests derive substantial
benefit from a world in which others have no venues where they can lodge claims against offshore powers and be
taken seriously. In these situations, it makes perfect sense to ask: Is there a better frame?”
129

Fraser, Scales of Justice, 20.
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insulating oppressive forces from the democratic reach of those whom they oppress, global
political frames have become “a major vehicle of injustice.”130
One of the consequences of globalized capitalism is that we are all subject to
simultaneous local, national, regional and global rules.131 This raises the need to ask: “How can
we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation within a
post-Westphalian frame” of global justice?132 To respond to this question, Fraser first
distinguishes between “affirmative” and “transformative” approaches of contesting global frames
of justice. While both approaches do not challenge “the underlying grammar of the Westphalian
order,”133 the former “contests the boundaries of existing frames while accepting the Westphalian
grammar of frame setting.”134 The latter on the other hand holds that the grammar of the modern
state “is out of sync with the structural causes of many injustices in a globalizing world, which
are not territorial in character.”135 Given the undemocratic manner that the global political frames
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“Setting aside the question of whether or not, or to what extent we consented to be a part of such
structures, it is worth noting that some of the most powerful elements of these structures are individuals, acting in
their private capacities.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 21. This alludes to the inter-subjective nature of whatever ill that
comes about as a result of the ‘normal operation’ of such organizations.
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Fraser, Scales of Justice, 21.
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Ibid., 23.
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“But they still assume the territorial state is the appropriate unit within which to pose and resolve
disputes about justice. For them accordingly, injustices of mis-framing are not a function of the general principle
according to which the Westphalian order partitions political space. They arise, rather, as a result of the faulty way in
which that principle has been applied. Thus, those who practice the affirmative politics of framing accept that the
principle of state-territoriality is the proper basis for constituting the “who” of justice.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 22.
135

“Precisely that principle is contested, however, in a second version of the politics of framing, which I
shall call the transformative approach. For proponents of this approach, the state territorial principle no longer
affords an adequate basis for determining the “who” of justice in every case. They concede, of course, that that
principle remains relevant for many purposes; thus, supporters of transformation do not propose to eliminate state
territoriality entirely. They contend that its grammar is out of sync with the structural causes of many injustices in a
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of justice have been set, there is a need to democratize the process by which the frames are
chosen.
Fraser argues for the need to “establish a post-territorial mode of political
differentiation,”136 because the conflation of state-territoriality with social effectivity is no longer
plausible. In the first place, it is now evident that a state’s constitutional order cannot address all
the justice concerns of its subjects. Secondly, the detrimental effects of the Westphalian order are
not limited to the citizens of any state.
In the search for a principle that could guide the development of a “Post-Westphalian
frame,” Fraser first considers the membership principle, which appeals to the criteria of political
membership to settle the question of how to determine the “who” that global injustice remedies
should apply to. She rejects this criterion, because such a principle would be based on
nationality, and could all too easily “ratify the exclusionary nationalisms of the privileged and
powerful.”137 She next considers the principle of humanism, which “resolves questions of the
“who” by appealing to the criteria of personhood.”138 She discards this principle because its lofty
abstraction makes it “oblivious to actual or historical social relations.”139

globalizing world, which are not territorial in character. Examples include the financial markets, “offshore
factories,” investment regimes, governance structures of the global economy, which determine who works for wages
and who does not; the information networks of global media and cybertechnology, which determine who is included
in the circuits of communicative power and who is not; and the bio-politics of climate, disease, drugs, weapons, and
biotechnology, which determine who will live long and who will die young.” In these matters, so fundamental to
human well-being, the forces that perpetrate injustice belong not to “the spaces of places,” but to “the spaces of
flows.”” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 22.
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Next, she suggests that “all those affected by a given social structure or institution have
moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it.”140 This seems like a better alternative
because a post-Westphalian political frame of justice guided by an “all-affected principle” could
“provide a critical check on self-serving notions of membership, while also taking cognizance of
social relations.”141 But this principle has two disadvantages. The first is that “it effectively
relegates the choice of the “who” to mainstream social science,”142 making it undemocratic. This
is wrong because human beings are not passive objects. Therefore, the operationalization of an
adequate principle must not be left to science but must be as political as it is epistemic.143 And to
leave it to be ‘discovered’ by social scientists is not to discover independent sociological facts,
but is in fact, to “ratify previous framing decisions.”144 Secondly, since it could be argued that all
persons are “affected” by all things, the principle is “unable to identify morally relevant social

140

“Until recently, the all-affected principle seemed to coincide with many with the state-territorial
principle. It was assumed, in keeping with the Westphalian world picture, that the common framework that
determined patterns of advantage and disadvantage was precisely the constitutional and order of the modern
territorial state. As a result, it seemed that in applying the state territorial principle, one simultaneously captured the
normative force of the all-affected principle.” “On this view, what turns a collection of people into fellow subjects of
justice is not geographical proximity, but their co-imbrication in a common structural or institutional framework,
which sets the ground rules that govern their social interaction, thereby shaping their respective life possibilities in
patterns of advantage or disadvantage.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 24-25.
141

Ibid., 64.
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Ibid. “Analogous complexities surround the all-affected principle. It is intuitively possible, to be sure to
hold that all those affected by a given structure should have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it. But
it does not follow that we can operationalize the principle by appealing to uncontroversial, social scientific fact. The
problem is that, given the so called butterfly-effect, one can adduce empirical evidence that just about everyone is
affected by just about everything. What is needed, therefore, is a way of distinguishing those levels and kinds of
effectivity that are deemed sufficient to confer moral standing from those that are not. Normal social science cannot
supply such criteria.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 40.
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relations.”145 To Fraser, the relevant “who” of social justice must be discovered in political
discourse, which implies that the best principle would be one that entails a dialogue.
So far, Fraser has rejected the principles of membership as too narrow, humanism as too
abstract, and the “all affected” principle as unable to account for salient social relations. But we
are all “subject to a plurality of different governance structures, some local, some national, some
regional, and some global.”146 This is because we live in a globalized world in which we are
subject to numerous, simultaneous, and in many cases, intersecting frames. This raises the need
to delimit a variety of different frames for different issues. And because justice requires that “all
– subjected” are “accorded equal consideration,”147 she proposes the “all-subjected” principle, as
adequate to “submit allegations of misframing.”148
According to this principle, all those who are subject to a given governance structure
have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it. On this view, what turns a collection of
people into fellow subjects of justice is neither shared citizenship or nationality, nor common
possession of abstract personhood, nor the sheer fact of causal interdependence, but rather their
joint subjection to a structure of governance, which sets the ground rules that govern their
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“… the all-affected principle falls prey to the reduction ad absurdum of the butterfly effect, which holds
that everyone is affected by everything.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 64.
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Ibid., 65.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. “In addition, the all-subjected principle remedies the major defects of the previous principles.
Unlike membership, it pierces the self-serving shield of exclusionary nationalism so as to contemplate injustices of
mis-framing. Unlike humanism, it overcomes abstract, all- embracing globalism by taking notice of social
relationships. Unlike affectedness, it avoids the indiscriminateness of the butterfly effect by identifying the morally
relevant type of social relation, namely, joint subjection to a governance structure.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 66.
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interaction. For any governance structure, the all-subjected principle matches the scope of moral
concern to that of subjection.149
“Subjection” should be understood as including not just the state, but also “the coercive
power of non-state and trans-state forms of governmentality.”150 For instance, non-state actors
like INGOs and MNCs, so long as they regulate the interaction of large transnational
populations, could be said to subject the latter, even though the rule-makers are not accountable
to those whom they govern. The all-subjected principle is able to provide guidance for assessing
the different constituents of relevant political actors, and also capable of delimiting a variety of
different frames for different issues. Thus, it could serve as an accurate guide in locating
precisely who a specific global institution has harmed, and by whom, thereby making justice
demands more precise.
Conclusion
I concluded part 1 of this project by arguing that partly because of their economic point
of departure, Rawlsian Contractarians lay too much emphasis on the distributive dimension of
global injustice. Although Pogge holds a human rights perspective and conceives of the primary
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She adds that, “I understand this expression broadly, as encompassing relations to powers of various
types. Not restricted to states, governance structures also comprise nonstate agencies that generate enforceable rules
that structure important swaths of social interaction. The most obvious examples are the agencies that set the ground
rules of the global economy, such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. But many
other examples could also be cited, including transnational agencies governing environmental regulation, atomic and
nuclear power, policing, security, health, intellectual property, and the administration of civil and criminal law.
Insofar as such agencies regulate the interaction of large transnational populations, they can be said to subject the
latter, even though the rule makers are not accountable to those whom they govern. Given this broad understanding
of governance structures, the term “subjection” should be understood broadly as well. Not restricted to formal
citizenship, or even to the broader condition of falling within the jurisdiction of such a state, this notion also
encompasses the further condition of being subject to the coercive power of nonstate and trans-state forms of
governmentality.” Fraser, Scales of Justice, 65.
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injustice of the global arena is distributive, he is aware of the political dimensions of global
poverty. Although Miller engages more with the political dimensions of global poverty than
Pogge does, he also sees extreme poverty as the primary global injustice. Both focus on
institutions, leading them to prescribe policies that do not get to the intersubjective relations that
lie at the root of global injustice. The result is a set of policy prescriptions which are not based on
deontological grounds, such as inter-subjective recognition and non-domination, which would
have given their prescriptions the force of a moral law.
I moved from Rawlsian Contractarian theory to Critical Theory because the former do not
adequately emphasize the flawed inter-subjective relations which I argue are the grounds of
social and global injustice. I began section 2 with Honneth’s theory of recognition, which is
framed around social recognition within a bounded political unit, specifically a modern, Western
nation state. His central argument is that a society’s distribution pattern (for all social goods) is
determined by its recognition structure. Therefore, addressing social injustice requires improving
its underlying recognitional structure.
One of Fraser’s arguments against Honneth is that Honneth subsumes economic injustice
into the category of (social) recognition, which leads to a theory that does not adequately account
for distributive injustices that could result from the normal functioning of markets. To her, social
injustice involves dimensions of both misrecognition and maldistribution, and an adequate social
justice theory must include the dimensions of social recognition as well as fair redistribution of
resources, without subsuming one dimension into the other. To this she later adds the dimension
of representation, the three dimensions being what will guarantee that all persons are able to
participate on a par with others, and thereby guaranteeing justice for all.
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She adds that justice debates usually presume ‘normal’ discourse.151 Political members
(i.e., citizens) were presumed to be the agents of justice, and the Westphalian frame was taken for
granted. It was presumed that citizens debated among themselves, in reference to a constitutional
state, which was the primary agent for addressing their needs. But intensified globalization has
increased the incidence of legal and illegal, temporary and permanent migration. In addition to
this, the activities multi-national corporations and international organizations make it inaccurate
to continue to assume that the only candidates of justice within a political unit are its citizens. It
is therefore no longer tenable to presume that citizenship automatically guarantees that person’s
rights are protected.
Furthermore, in today’s globalizing world, many social problems are trans-national in
nature.152 Trans-national social justice problems are those that originate from and affect people
in separate political units. The global structure of political divisions creates a situation in which
trans-national actors like the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, and Multi-national
corporations as well as International NGOs subject persons to global rules which the current state
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“In some contexts, public debates about justice assume the guise of normal discourse. However fiercely
they disagree about what exactly justice requires in a given case, the contestants share some underlying
presuppositions about what an intelligible justice claim looks like. These include ontological assumptions about the
kind(s) of actors who are entitled to make such claims (usually, individuals) and about the kind of agency from
which they should seek redress (typically, a territorial state). Also included are assumptions about scope, which fix
the circle of interlocutors to whom claims for justice should be addressed (usually, the citizenry of a bounded
political community) and which delimit the universe of those whose interests and concerns deserve consideration
(ditto). Finally, the disputants share social-theoretical assumptions about the space in which questions of justice can
intelligibly arise (often, the economic space of distribution) and about the social cleavages that can harbor injustices
(typically, class and ethnicity). In such contexts, where those who argue about justice share a set of underlying
assumptions, their contests assume a relatively regular, recognizable shape. Constituted through a set of organizing
principles, and manifesting a discernible grammar, such conflicts take the form of “normal justice.” Fraser, Scales of
Justice, 49.
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The manifestations, causes, and possible solutions of a ‘trans-national’ social problems are usually
located in more than one political unit. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, 91-93.
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structure does not provide arenas in which they could question or contest such rules. Since
consistency demands that a theory of justice account for all persons, an adequate justice theory
must, in an important sense, be trans-national. Fraser, therefore, argues that increased and
intensified globalization makes these “abnormal times” requiring abnormal justice.
Fraser’s theory could be summarized as follows: Justice demands that all persons have
adequate resources (distributive justice), be adequately recognized (social recognition) and be
co-authors of social institutions that affect them (political participation). Adhering to these three
principles best guarantees that the standard of parity of participation is met. Fraser’s theory is
superior to Honneth’s for three reasons. First, she does not presume a national frame but
develops a theory that accounts for the impact of globalization within and among societies.
Secondly, more than Honneth, she theorizes distributional injustice as a separate category of
social injustice. Thirdly, by proposing that justice demands that the process of making (or
contesting) rules be available to all who are subjected to any system of social rules, she includes
representation or the political as a third important dimension of social injustice.
Thus, of all the theories examined so far, Fraser’s arguments for participatory parity,
based on the three conditions of distribution, recognition, and representation, and the allsubjected principle seem to be the best theory to guarantee global non-domination. However,
Fraser is unclear about the role that the principle of participatory parity is supposed to play as a
normative social justice rule. That is, if a theory of justice implies a situation of injustice, how
can the principle of participatory parity be simultaneously demanded and applied? In other
words, does it serve as a means or an end to social justice?
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In the following concluding section, I present some features that should be part of a
theory of global justice that precludes non-domination. To do this, I will briefly summarize each
of the theorists I have discussed, highlighting whether and to the extent that it accommodates or
precludes domination. After which I will suggest some possible directions for future work.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Introduction
Sweat-shops, human trafficking, the marginalization of indigenous groups, environmental
damage, and global poverty are some examples of trans-national social problems. These
problems indicate that although the intensification of globalization could be advantageous to the
global community, it also creates unique social problems while exacerbating others.1 Global
justice theories seek to articulate and address such trans-national social justice problems. It must,
however, be borne in mind that justice and injustice are relational concepts that only occur in the
course of human interactions.2 Therefore, whether considered at the social or global level,
injustice is always the result of flawed inter-subjective relations, which leads to the violation of
the negative duty of non-domination.

The manifestations, causes, and possible solutions of a ‘trans-national’ social problems are usually located
in more than one political unit. ‘Trans-national’ problems usually originate in one country, and lead to results in at
least one other country, sometimes more. Although these problems manifest in specific societies, but they are also
instances of trans-national problems. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A PoliticalPhilosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003), 3, 12-15, 91-93.
1

“Justice is a relational, as well as an institutional, virtue; it does not refer to all asymmetrical relations
between human beings without discrimination, but it does refer to those exhibiting forms of domination and social
arbitrariness – whether in contexts involving only sparse legal regulation or in thicker institutional contexts, within
and beyond the state.” Transnational Justice and Domination Rainer Forst, 101. There is a difference between an
inevitable occurrence and an injustice. An unfortunate occurrence can however lead to relational injustice, only
when the person that suffered the unfortunate incident is entitled to actions to mitigate the event. Forst and Flynn,
The Right to Justification, 7.
2
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Domination occurs when one party expresses agency in a manner that results in
restrictions in another party’s ability to express his or her agency. A rule, institution or social
system is non-dominative if and only if the people who live under it have the option of
reasonable dissent and veto power.3 The absence of this condition implies a violation of the right
of the persons who must live under such laws, by those who make and uphold such laws,
institutions or social systems.4 Social domination is usually not a contingent or accidental event,
but a structural and intentional relationship between persons or groups.5
An adequate global or social justice argument must be based on a moral demand for some
party to stop acting in a way that leads to harmful results to others. This means that the required
changes to global institutions and practices that will address global injustice must be grounded
on a strong negative duty, and not on optional positive duties like charity or sympathy.
Generating such a duty will require looking beyond duties that attach to particular institutions or
practices, to the inter-subjective relations between moral agents. By way of conclusion, in what

“Thus, what matters in a republican account of non-domination is freedom as autonomy; that is, freedom
from unjustifiable subjection or coercion and freedom as a self-determining agent of moral (as well as political)
justification. Only where practices of justification exist that prevent some from dominating others is freedom as nondomination guaranteed. Rather than focusing on the “robust” legal state of enjoying freedom of choice, we should
focus on the relational freedom of being a codetermining agent of justification within the normative order that binds
us.” Rainer Forst, “Transnational Justice and Domination.” In Domination and Global Political Justice Conceptual,
Historical, and Institutional Perspectives, ed. Barbara C. J. Buckinx, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, and Timothy Waligore,
(New York: Routledge, 2015), 98.
3

“If interference or rule by others is justifiable between equals, it is not seen as an infringement of freedom.
The notion of justice referring to the quality of the relations between free and equal participants in the basic structure
of justification is thus central and normatively prior to that of freedom of choice. Justice as justification determines
which freedoms are justified and what an arbitrary interference is in the first place.” Forst, “Transnational Justice
and Domination,” 97.
4

5

Philip Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower,” Ethics 106, No. 3 (1996): 580, 586.
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follows, I will examine each social or global justice theory for whether, and to what extent its
principles allows or precludes intersubjective domination.
The Rawlsian Contractarians – Pogge and Miller
The ability to live what Pogge refers to as an ethical life is dependent on the ability to
gain access to some minimal level of material resources. Without this minimum level of
resources (development parlance refers to this as ‘basic needs’), enjoyment of other rights
become if not impossible, at least precarious. Therefore, it is understandable that the Rawlsian
Contractarian theorists (Pogge and Miller) frame their analysis of global injustice around the
question of how best to mitigate global poverty.
Pogge’s central argument is that, to the extent that global economic and financial order
creates extreme global poverty, the order violates the social and economic human rights of the
global poor. He develops an institutional and not interactional justice theory, based on assessing
institutions, and not individual actors. He proposes that citizens of societies that create and
uphold poverty-creating global institutions are shirking their negative duty not to harm those
who are poor. I agree with Pogge’s argument that debilitating, extreme global poverty is an
injustice which should concern all moral persons. He is also correct that the persistence of such
poverty implies inadequate respect for the social and economic human rights of the global poor,
particularly on the part of those who maintain global institutions.
Pogge argues that the global poor should be compensated, and some aspects of global
institutions should be reformed. He ends his analysis by suggesting policy options that leave the
structure of the global economic and financial order in place. However, Pogge does not argue
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against the global economic and financial order per se.6 Global poverty is not the result of
deliberate measures designed to keep people poor, but the result of the normal functioning of the
global financial and economic order. Therefore, to the extent that the structure of neo-liberal
capitalism generates poverty and inequality, his suggested reforms can only provide a temporary
palliative to global poverty. Such reforms will always be needed to address the poverty that the
global order inevitably generates.
Extreme poverty severely limits the ability to live what Pogge refers to as, an ethical life a life worth living. Poor people face severe limits in their relative and absolute ability to act in
the world. That the poor exist in national or global environments, in which they are unable to
freely express agency is what makes poverty a grave moral problem. The harm of extreme
poverty is to the human autonomous agency. Although Pogge’s primary concern seems to be for
the global poor, his institutional analysis provides little account for the subjectivity of this
category of people.
Justice and injustice are relational concepts that derive from inter-subjective relations.
Pogge is right that the fact that moral agents suffer crushing poverty as a result of the normal
functioning of the global order indicates that those who create, maintain, and benefit most from

“I believe that today’s vast human-rights deficit, especially among the global poor, is best addressed
through efforts at global (and national) institutional reform. Relatively small reforms of little consequence to the
world’s affluent would suffice to eliminate most of its human-rights deficit, whose magnitude makes such reforms
our most important moral task.” PAU, 56. This moral demand could be met in one of three ways - individual
donations, national donations (bilateral aid), or institutional reform. PAU, 52. Pogge proposes three initiatives,
which he argues will improve the livelihood of the global poor, while reducing global inequality. The first is the
Global Resources Dividend (GRD). This is a tax to be imposed on all natural resources at the point of extraction,
and the revenues utilized for development projects, in poor societies and communities. The second initiative is to
stop Western firms and governments from buying raw materials from corrupt leaders of poor countries. Lastly,
Pogge proposes that rich countries desist from using their political and economic might to strike harsh bargains to
the detriment of poor countries, as is currently the case in The World Trade (WTO) negotiations.” Thomas Pogge,
World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 17-19.
6
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the order do not give adequate consideration to those who suffer from it. Global injustice, even
when limited to global poverty, is the result of some moral agents expressing agency in a manner
that leads to restrictions on the ability of other people to express their own agency. Furthermore,
the measure of tangible or intangible social power is relative – how much of it a person has is
related to how much others lack. This shows that access to social goods is determined by intersubjective relations.
An adequate global justice theory should include a relational account that adequately
theorizes the role of human agency and the flawed intersubjective relations that lead to the
domination of some parties by others. Partly as a result of choosing to locate his analysis at the
level of institutions, and not interactions, Pogge does not provide an intersubjective, relational
account of global injustice (or global poverty). Although there is some account of the agency of
those who create and maintain global institutions (generally, citizens of rich, western
democracies), there is little theorization of the agency of the “global poor.” This is problematic
for two reasons.
The first is that although Pogge is right to propose that the global economic and financial
order should be altered to provide better outcomes for the poor, his analysis problematically
constructs the global poor as recipients, and not authors of justice. They are constructed as
people who have been deprived of material resources and should, as a matter of morality, be
granted more resources. Like the material deprivation which was ‘done’ to them, Pogge’s
suggested reforms will also be “done for” the poor. They do not demand their own justice, but
rather have to rely on others to act in a just manner towards them. In Pogge’s analysis and
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policies, the poor have no input in the process of addressing the injustice that they face. They
have no say in the construction of justice.7
Secondly, this leads to a theory in which global poverty is depoliticized. Pogge does
acknowledge the role that global political power differentials play in creating and perpetuating
the injustice of global poverty. However, the political dimension of his theory remains at the
level of states and global institutions. There is little acknowledgment of the fact that the
persistence of poverty implies that the global poor lack the political power to alter their social
circumstances. Given the correlation political power and access to material resources, a theory
that de-politicizes global poverty will be inaccurate, or at best, incomplete.
No matter how much resources a person has access to, without the political voice to
influence social arrangements, he or she remains in an important respect subject to decisions
made by those with more political power. Therefore, the most effective way to guarantee secure
access to adequate material resources is for people to be agents of justice. This calls for the
creation of social relations in which all moral agents who are subject to social institutions also
have the political voice or power to influence such arrangements.
Therefore, Pogge suggests reforms does not adequately address social injustice, which I
define as inter-subjective domination. Although his suggested policies could alleviate global
poverty, they will not alter the intersubjective, dominative relations that ground such injustice.
Therefore, even if his policy recommendations are successfully implemented, the ends of justice
would still not have been met. Therefore, a theory of global justice that creates room for the
disenfranchised to make demands of those who oppress them seems superior to Pogge’s theory.

7

Forst and Flynn, The Right to Justification, 243-244.
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In what follows, I analyze Richard Miller’s alternative global justice theory which, as I will try to
show, contains more inter-subjective elements than Pogge’s.
Like Pogge, Miller also approaches global injustice from the perspective of global
extreme poverty. Miller attributes a large proportion of global poverty to oppression and abuses
of power by powerful (particularly imperialist) countries, like the United States, against weaker
countries.8 He argues that such interactions yield negative duties not to harm, as well as positive
duties to alleviate at least some of such harms. Miller recognizes that power asymmetries create
the temptation for abuse, but he does not recommend that abuses of global power, of which
imperialism is an example, should be done away with.9 Rather, he advocates for more
responsible wielding of such power, and that the basic needs of those under imperial dominion
be met.
Miller notes that in many countries, extreme poverty is the result of economic, military,
and political domination. He complains that the well-being of people under imperial dominion is
not taken as an important consideration in the political dealings of imperialist countries. And
although rich countries could, and should be charitable to the global poor, countries whose direct
actions create poverty have a stronger moral duty (beyond benevolence) to alleviate the poverty
they create.10 Miller proposes that both powerful and weaker countries should aim for relations
based on cooperation and respect GCF (Global Civic Friendship). Such relations will lead to

Richard W. Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 1-3.
8

According to him, the loss of US imperialism will simply hasten the rise of China. This reveals his
philosophical anthropology – persons are dominative by nature, so the question is whether you will dominate, or be
dominated by others. Miller, Globalizing Justice, 208.
9

10

Miller, Globalizing Justice, 3.
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global relations in which all parties would be able to give non-coercive consent to any institution,
rule or policy that affects them.11 This will pave the way for Global Social Democracy (GSD),
which will make global institutions function in a more equitable and just way.
Miller’s analysis holds some advantages over Pogge’s because he extends his analysis to
cover issues like global warming and geopolitical relations. More importantly, by calling for
discourse ethic, his account engages more with the intersubjective dimensions of global
injustice.12 However, by taking the neo-liberal order and asymmetric global power relations as a
given, not only could his justice theory accommodate relations of domination, it also harbors
contradictions.
The first contradiction is that Miller thinks that in spite of its flaws, neo-liberal capitalism
is the best way to generate and allocate global resources, and is thereby also the most effective
way to address global poverty. This position is contradictory because growth (which increases
inequality), and unemployment (which increases poverty) are essential features of capitalism.
These two features mean that global capitalism will inevitably generate poverty.

11
He envisions such global cooperation as a force that will move all parties towards the goal of equitable
cooperation, which he says will ensure that even those subject to imperial power will have their needs met Miller,
Globalizing Justice, 153-154.

Miller recommends a Discourse-Ethical principle for regulating global interactions in trade negotiations
global manufacturing, and even geopolitical relations: mutual respect for interests leading to reasonable deliberation
oriented to principled compromises that all could accept without constraint (71). The conditions to “reasonable
deliberations” entail three duties:
1. Reciprocity towards other representatives, both regarding good faith consideration of each party’s interests and
the giving and weighing of reasons acceptable to all.
2. Towards one’s own compatriots by justifying agreements by reasons they could accept.
3. Duty to live up to responsibilities to both locals and foreigners, which entails taking the interests of vulnerable
locals and foreigners into account. Miller, Globalizing Justice, 71-72.
12
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Dominating and imperialist countries are mostly rich, while dominated countries are
mostly poor. In the current global order, economic power is easily converted to or utilized for
political ends and vice versa. It is, therefore, contradictory to call for fairer economic relations
from within relations of political domination since economic domination usually relies on
political domination. Miller ignores the strong possibility that economic domination is usually
part of the geopolitical strategy of the dominating country. Therefore, the demand that
dominating countries act in a minimally fair manner, by at the very least providing the basic
needs of those they dominate, ignores the relationship between political and economic
domination.
Miller also calls for reasonable, ethical discourse between imperialist countries that
dominate and the countries that are dominated. Ethical discourse presumes equality between
interlocutors and a veto right, particularly on the part of the weaker party. It also presumes that
decisions will be respected, and if need be, enforced. More importantly, such discourse is not
limited to any area or dimension of social life. However, Miller does not explain how to achieve
such reasonable discourse from within grave asymmetrical trans-national power.
Furthermore, if ethical discourse is ever available to politically dominated people, one
would expect that the dominated party would immediately end the relationship of political
domination. Miller says that justice demands that dominated people should be subjected only to
policies they have, or could have consented to. However, he does not mean his discourse ethics
to apply to external political policies, but only economic ones. Miller’s idea of discourse is
thereby not free, ethical discourse, but discourse limited to economic relations.
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And although he acknowledges that bullying and domination easily arise within
asymmetric power relations, he does not argue for doing away with imperial power. Rather, he
takes such asymmetric power relations as a given, arguing instead that the demise of U.S.
hegemony will simply lead to the rise of another world power – like China, which might turn out
to be worse for everyone. Miller’s theory allows for the continued domination of powerful and
imperialist countries, so long as they meet the basic needs of those under their dominion. Thus,
his global justice theory also accommodates inter-subjective domination.
Pogge’s human rights argument while not wrong, devolves into suggestions of how to
make the lot of the global poor better, while retaining the global capitalist system, which will
inevitably continue to produce poverty and inequality. To the extent that Miller also does not
criticize, but rather endorses neoliberal global capitalism, his theory carries within it the same
drawback as Pogge’s. However, despite my criticisms of Rawlsian Contractarians, respecting the
socio-economic rights of those who suffer extreme poverty, and/or providing room for ethical
discourse between poor and dominant countries would be an improvement over current global
relations. Pogge would agree with Miller’s discourse ethic proposal, but would also agree with
Miller, that grave economic lack militates against equality, which is necessary for ethical
discourse.
Transition to Critical Theory
In a world of interconnection and mutuality, economic inequality, particularly when it can
be connected to extreme poverty is seen by morally sensitive people as a moral violation. Our
moral intuitions of the wrong of extreme global poverty and inequality derive from the prior
notion of justice and injustice as relational concepts. However, social relations are intersubjective
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relations, therefore the objective wrong of inequitable social conditions is exacerbated by the fact
that it is the result of someone’s action or inaction. The intersubjective component of social
injustice makes not just a bad situation, but also a moral problem. Therefore, while it is correct to
consider social injustice as objectively bad, it is also important to bear in mind that such
situations are the result of the expression of autonomous agency by some parties that leads to
such adverse results for others.
Both Pogge and Miller regard growing global distributive injustice and global poverty as
a violation of human dignity, and thereby a moral problem. But neither seeks deeper
deontological grounds for human rights, such as inter-subjective recognition and nondomination. To fill some of the gaps I have identified, I introduce the works of Axel Honneth,
Nancy Fraser.
To Axel Honneth, a society’s recognition regimes express prevalent social attitudes.13 To
him, justice and recognition mutually illuminate each other because what counts as an injustice
depends on our reasonable expectations of (social) recognition.14 The denial of social recognition
is a prelude to injustice since the prevailing recognition order determines patterns in which social
goods are allocated. Therefore, a just recognition order will go a long way to addressing social
justice problems. I criticized Honneth’s theory for not providing an explanation for how the
disenfranchised get the initial recognition which prompts struggles for increased social

Mattias Iser, “Recognition,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, No. 3
(2013), accessed April 29, 2015, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/recognition/>.
13

14

Ibid.
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recognition. I also agreed with Fraser’s criticism of Honneth’s inclusion of distribution problems
under the category of recognition.
Despite these criticisms, the idea of a justice theory grounded on recognition seems to
capture the intuition that an adequate global justice theory be universal, that is, applicable to all
persons qua persons. However, Honneth’s theory of recognition is reliant on principles that are
developed to apply to the social or national environment, which severely limits the extent to
which his theory could be extrapolated to the global environment.15 However, some of his central
ideas, notably the relationship between social recognition and social justice, could be modified
for a global justice theory. To what extent can global injustice be understood as the result of a
flawed global recognition regime?
I defined social injustice as based on inter-subjective domination. Domination implies
that the dominating agent does not accord adequate regard to the subjectivity of the dominated
party. Domination, therefore, presumes flawed intersubjective relations. Justice as nondomination presumes ‘healthy’ intersubjective relations, which in turn presumes healthy relations
of recognition between moral agents. While I agree with Honneth that social injustice is usually
preceded by the denial of social recognition, my conception of recognition is not social, but intersubjective. It is thereby different from Honneth’s conception because recognition does not derive

Zurn says of Honneth’s view, “The general structure of both his recognition theory and his theory of
social freedom is more or less nationally or culturally-bounded. Recall that his analysis centrally supposes that social
integration occurs through a general background consensus on some abstract norms and ideals. An implication of
this view, though never explicitly thematized as such, is that the boundaries of any given society are drawn around
this consensus; groups of people with fundamentally distinct norms and values constitute distinct societies.
Honneth’s social theory is centrally focused on the structure and dynamics internal to ‘our’ society, but gives little
attention to understanding the relationships between societies.” Zurn, Axel Honneth, 176. To this I will add that there
is also little account for the interactions between persons that belong different societies.
15
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from societal arrangements. In addition, reliance on the national frame leaves little room to
account for the international relations between states.
As Fraser argues, in many cases, existing socio-political frames hide unjust social
relations. An adequate global justice theory must not only be independent of existing frames, it
must also be able to interrogate those frames. Partly because it relies so heavily on the national
frame, Honneth’s theory of recognition has little to say about global phenomena like transnational and international organizations, global finance and immigration.
Since justice is a relational concept, the standards of justice can be used to interrogate any
interaction between moral agents. Demands for justice could be made in any context of social
cooperation (including those of negative cooperation, as in cases of social domination). Given
the many, sometimes overlapping contexts of justice in the modern, globalizing world, Honneth’s
reliance on a national frame limits the applicability of his theory to global injustice. Therefore, an
unmodified theory of recognition is not applicable to the global arena, it could thereby also
harbor domination.
Fraser argues that the most important principle of social justice is that all members of a
society be able to participate on a par with all other persons. She argued that Honneth’s
recognition theory is overly monistic because he stretches the concept of social recognition to
cover all dimensions of social reality. Partly in response to Honneth’s theory of recognition, in
earlier work, Fraser argued for social recognition and adequate distribution of resources, as the
two dimensions needed to meet the demands of justice in modern nation-states. In later work, she
includes a third category of representation or political participation. She now argues that these
three dimensions (recognition, distribution, and representation) should be pursued because this
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will best guarantee the principle of participatory parity for all members of the polity. In addition,
she argues for the ‘all subjected’ principle, which is that all those subjected to a social system or
structure should have the political power or voice over the structure.
In addition, Fraser argues that the assumption that the ends of justice are best served by
the ability of the state to protect the interests of her citizens is wrong. Among other factors, the
intensification of globalization – through the actions of multi-national companies and
international organizations, as well as the increase in both legal and illegal migration – has
drastically altered this traditional frame of justice. It is, therefore, wrong to continue to take the
modern state as the primary frame of justice, and citizens as the primary candidates for justice.
Insisting on the old picture, by relying on the old frame of justice, will unjustly exclude both
persons and issues. For instance, such a frame will exclude those who live within the state but
are not citizens (e.g., guest workers, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants). It is also incapable
of accounting for forms of social injustice that originate from one country but affects people in
other societies (for instance, environmental damage). Therefore, presuming the old frame in
developing a justice theory will lead to a theory that harbors injustice.
Like the Rawlsian Contractarians, Fraser gives some priority to access to material
resources. However, her explicit reference to recognition and political participation adds more to
the Rawlsian contractarian theories. Her theory is also superior to Honneth’s because of her
emphasis on not just social recognition and redistribution of resources, but more importantly,
political participation.16 Lastly, unlike Honneth, Fraser starts out with the assumption that all

As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of the political into her original two-dimensional theory could be in
response to earlier criticisms (specifically from Honneth and Forst) of her original theory. See Rainer Forst, “First
Things First,” European Journal of Political Theory 6, No. 3 (2007): 291-304.
16
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persons are already entitled to something which unjust social arrangements deprive them, rather
than Honneth’s account of social justice as something which people are granted by others, as he
says, through the expansion of the ‘ray of recognition’ to include others. Her deontological
theory is thereby superior to Honneth’s teleological theory because it grounds a more urgent
moral demand: social change is not implied to be a gradually increasing process. Rather, she
strongly argues that social institutions should be altered so as to provide all persons with an equal
political voice as an essential component of the principle of parity of participation. Therefore, of
all the theories I have discussed, Fraser’s theory is the one that best precludes inter-subjective
domination.
Project Conclusion – Suggestions of Possible Ways Forward
To develop a global justice theory grounded on the protection of this right and its
correlative duty not to dominate other persons, I have redefined social injustice as the result of
moral agents expressing their autonomous agency in a manner that results in restrictions in other
agent’s ability to also express autonomous agency. Although social existence leads to such
restrictions, I take restrictions to agency as ‘just’ when the restricted party has room for
reasonable dissent and a veto right to stop any restriction that he or she cannot reasonably
consent to.17 Therefore a rule, institution or social system is non-dominative if and only if those
who live under it have the option of reasonable dissent and veto power.18 Failure to meet this

As I note in the introduction, the republican conception of non-domination conflates notions of
predictability and justifiability, and posits this conflation as freedom from arbitrariness. I however argued that the
fact that a law is predictable does not mean that it is thereby justified or justifiable. Arbitrary laws are not just laws
that cannot be predicted or anticipated, but those that are not, or could not be justified to those who must obey them.
Lovett, “Republicanism.”
17

18
“Thus what matters in a republican account of non-domination is freedom as autonomy; that is, freedom
from unjustifiable subjection or coercion and freedom as a self-determining agent of moral (as well as political)
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condition means that such a rule, institution or social system is a violation of the rights of the
persons who must live under it, by those who make and uphold such laws, institutions or social
systems, and is thereby unjust.19 Of all the theorists considered, Fraser’s social justice theory
provides principles that are least likely to accommodate relations of social and inter-subjective
domination. Therefore, she best captures the requirements and demands of justice.
Although I am in basic agreement with Fraser’s theory, however, in future work I would
like to examine questions like the precise role that the principle of participatory parity is to play
in the pursuit of social justice. It is yet unclear whether Fraser sees this principle as the means of
justice or the ends of justice.20 Another area of future work is in the category of gender injustice.
Although Pogge, Honneth, and Fraser mention aspects of gender injustice, it is with regards to
how women tend to suffer more from distributive injustice than men. In future work, I would like
to examine gender injustice at the global level. Such an exploration will be aimed at examining
the underlying relations that make it the case that disruptions in social life as in the case
collective poverty or war, ends up affecting women more than men. Lastly, future research

justification. Only where practices of justification exist that prevent some from dominating others is freedom as nondomination guaranteed. Rather than focusing on the “robust” legal state of enjoying freedom of choice, we should
focus on the relational freedom of being a codetermining agent of justification within the normative order that binds
us.” Forst, “Transnational Justice and Domination,” 98.
“If interference or rule by others is justifiable between equals, it is not seen as an infringement of
freedom. The notion of justice referring to the quality of the relations between free and equal participants in the
basic structure of justification is thus central and normatively prior to that of freedom of choice. Justice as
justification determines which freedoms are justified and what an arbitrary interference is in the first place.” Forst,
“Transnational Justice and Domination,” 97.
19

This is similar to a criticism leveled against her work by both Rainer Forst and Axel Honneth. Forst,
“First Things First,” 296.
20
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should also include the development of a global political theory as a result of the foregoing
analysis.
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